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PREFACE 
Numerous NASA reports and studies have identified Planetary Protection (PP) as an important part of 
a Mars Sample Return mission, both for preventing forward- and back-contamination and for ensuring 
maximal return of scientific information. A key element of PP for sample return missions is the 
development of guidelines for returned sample containment, 'biomarker' analysis, and biohazard 
testing. Reports from two previous major studies [DeVincenzi et a/., 1999, and Carr et a/., 19991 have 
provided preliminary recommendations on specific aspects of handling returned Mars samples 
including biocontainment, life detection, biohazard testing, sample collection and transportation, 
certification, and sample receiving, curation, and distribution. 
To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and the criteria for subsequent release of 
sample materials from containment, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened an additional 
Workshop Series beginning in March 2000. The overall goal of the Series was to develop a 
comprehensive protocol to assess the returned materials for any biological hazard(s) and to 
safeguard the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. It is anticipated that the 
findings of this workshop series will: 1 )  assist NASA's Planetary Protection Officer and senior 
administrators in preparing for Mars sample return facilities, technology, and operations; 
2) serve as a briefing document for advisory groups, regulatory agencies, and other entities that will 
ultimately establish and review sample return handling policies, requirements, and implementation, 
and 3) provide recommendations in a form suitable as input for possible future announcements of 
opportunity soliciting proposals for Mars sample handling. 
This document is the report of Workshop 4, the last Workshop in this Series; it builds on the 
deliberations and findings of the earlier Workshops in the Series1 (Workshop 1 : Race and Rurnmel, 
2000; Workshop 2: Race et a/., 2001a; Workshop 2a: Bruch ef a/., 2001; Workshop 3: Race ef al., 
2001b). The reports of these Workshops are available from the National Technical Information 
Service as indicated on the previous page. 
Because development of the Working Draft Protocol was accomplished through an iterative process 
of discussion and review during the Workshop series and afterwards, it is useful for the reader be 
aware of key workshops, reviews, publications, and terminology used to refer to various versions of 
the developing protocol. The table on the next page shows a chronological listing of the stages and 
terminology used in the process leading to the Working Draft Protocol found in this document in 
Appendix A (beginning on page 71). Full citations for the various published reports are listed in 
Appendix F. 
1. The reader is referred to the final reports from the prior Workshops in the Series for full documentation of the detailed 
discussions held by the Sub-groups in those Workshops. As a framework and proof-of-concept, the Working Draft Protocol 
is a distillation of those discussions and therefore does not include the level of detail brought out in those discussions. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In preparation for missions to Mars that will involve the return of samples to Earth, it will be necessary 
to prepare for the receiving, handling, testing, distributing, and archiving of martian materials here on 
Earth. Previous groups and committees have studied selected aspects of sample return activities, but 
specific detailed protocols for the handling and testing of returned samples must still be developed. 
To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and to develop the criteria for 
subsequent release of sample materials from containment, NASA's Planetary Protection Officer 
convened the Mars Sample Handling Protocol (MSHP) Workshop Series in 2000-2001. The overall 
objective of the Workshop Series was to produce a draft protocol by which returned martian sample 
materials could be assessed for biological hazards and examined for evidence of life (extant or 
extinct) while safeguarding the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. 
This report provides the first complete presentation of a Draft Protocol for Mars Sample Handling to 
meet planetary protection needs (see Appendix A, page 71) and a record of the proceedings of 
Workshop 4, the final Workshop of the Series, which was held in Arlington, Virginia, June 5-7, 2001 
During Workshop 4, the Sub-groups were provided with a draft of the protocol dated May 2001 which 
had been compiled from work done at all prior Workshops in the Series. Then eight sub-groups 
were formed to discuss the following assigned topics: 
Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for PhysicalIChemical Testing 
Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Life Detection Testing 
Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Biohazard Testing 
Environmental and Health Monitoring and Safety Issues 
Requirements of the Draft Protocol for Facilities and Equipment 
Contingency Planning for Different Outcomes of the Draft Protocol 
Personnel Management Considerations in Implementation of the Draft Protocol 
Draft Protocol lmplementation Process and Update Concepts 
Summaries of the Sub-group discussions and findings begin on the next page; the complete 
individual Sub-group reports can be found beginning on page 1 9.3 
The "Working Draft Protocol" included in this document in Appendix A is based on the deliberations 
and recommendations of the Workshop 4 Sub-groups combined with those of the Sub-groups from all 
the earlier Workshops in the Series. As such, it represents a consensus that emerged from the 
discussions of all the sub-groups assembled over the course of the five Workshops of the Series. 
These discussions converged on a conceptual approach to sample handling, as well as on specific 
2. Development of the Draft Protocol occurred over the course of the Workshop Series; a table of all the versions is shown in 
the Preface. Prior to Workshop 4, materials developed in all the earlier Workshops in the Series were compiled into a 
version of the Draft Protocol subsequently designated the "Penultimate Working Draft Protocol" (dated May 2001). The 
"Working Draft Protocol" (dated June 2001), found in this report in Appendix A beginning on page 71, is the result of 
incorporating the comments and changes from the Workshop 4 Sub-groups into the Penultimate Working Draft Protocol. 
3. Materials such as the Workshop agenda and partiapant lists as well as complete citations of all references and a glossary of 
terms and acronyms appear in the Appendices. 
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analytical requirements. Discussions also identified important issues requiring further consideration, 
as well as research and development needed for implementation of the final protocol. 
The Working Draft Protocol is divided into 3 major analytical areas: physicallchemical 
characterization of the sample(s), life detection, and detection of any biohazards, if present. It also 
addresses environmental, and health monitoring and safety issues, facilities and equipment 
requirements, personnel management considerations, contingency planning for different outcomes of 
the analyses, and the process by which the final protocol will be updated and implemented. The 
Working Draft Protocol deliberately lacks detail about specific analytical techniques to be used for 
testing returned sample materials. Throughout the Workshop Series the sub-groups agreed that the 
rate of development of new techniques and refinement of current standard techniques is so rapid that 
these details are best left unspecified until closer to the time of the implementation of the actual final 
protocol. 
This Working Draft Protocol will now undergo a thorough review and refinement process? the first 
step of which is a review by the Oversight and Review Committee (see Appendix D3, page 145) 
scheduled to occur in November 2001 .5 The development of the final, detailed sample handling 
protocol is still a long way off, nevertheless this Working Draff Protocol represents a comprehensive 
and coherent approach to the handling of returned Mars samples. If any porfion of this Working Drafl 
Protocol is fo be cited or referenced, it must be with the understanding that this documenf is not 
indicative of any final decisions or plans for future Mars missions and that this is not the final version 
of the Draft Protocol. 
Finally, during a one-hour plenary session on the final day of Workshop 4, the participants explored 
the areas of research and development needed in order to implement or enhance the implementation 
of the protocol; these are outlined beginning on page 68. These areas currently exist in various 
degrees of development and no attempt was made to define specifications or requirements at this 
time. 
Sub-Group 1: Review and Assess the Draf t  Protocol for Physical/Chemical Testing 
Sub-group 1 reviewed, assessed, and adjusted the Penultimate Working Draft Protocol for Physical 
Chemical (PIC) processing, which was compiled from deliberations and recommendations in earlier 
Workshops in the Series. The proposed processing plan is based on a solid heritage of PIC handling, 
processing, and experiences with Apollo lunar samples, Antarctic meteorites, and cosmic dust. The 
processing plan is consistent with requirements and conditions recommended by the Space Studies 
Board (SSB) of the National Academy of Sciences [SSB 19971, the Mars Sample Handling and 
Requirements Panel (MSHARP) [Carr et al., 79991, and the Curation and Analysis Planning Team for 
Extraterrestrial Materials (CAPTEM) [Neal, 2000]. As a starting position, the Sub-group determined it 
was essential to examine all the returned material in at least a minimal fashion in order to provide 
enough data to make informed choices about samples for subsequent Life Detection (LD) and 
4. The reader should understand that this Working Draft Protocol represents an early stage in the development of the final 
protocol, and is reported here to document this stage in the process. 
5. At the time this report went to press, the ORC had met; the F i l  Version of the Draft Protocol [Rummel et al., 2002, in press], 
with their comments incorporated is expected to be published in October 2002. 
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Biohazard (BH) testing. In recognition of the rate of technological and scientific change anticipated in 
both LD and BH areas, the proposed PIC plan provides a conceptual approach to processing and 
handling rather than a detailed list of prescribed methodologies based on current approaches. The Sub- 
group recommended the use of a Scientific Oversight Committee at the time of sample return in order 
to adjust the PIC processes to changing technology and mission specifics, to monitor the final protocol 
in progress, and to make real-time adjustments to fit the actual returned materials. 
Overall, the PIC processing can be divided into three phases: 1) initial pre-processing prior to 
preliminary examination of samples; 2) preliminary examination and screening to permit informed 
choices for selecting samples for subsequent detailed testing; and 3) subdivision of selected samples 
for LD and BH tests. The actual PIC processing is made up of three main tracks - one each for 
gases, fines, and solids. In addition, there are provisions for creating carefully controlled storage and 
reserve banks for both pristine and handled sample materials. 
The PIC process begins with pre-processing steps to clean, decontaminate, and open the sample 
return canister (SRC), followed by prompt extraction of head gas and back-filling with a chemically 
un-reactive gas to ambient 'room' pressure. Head gas and other gas samples will be distributed in 
sealed containers after suitable filtration to remove any particles (filter size TBD). 
Processing of solids (regolith samples, rocks, rock cores, soil cores, etc.) includes the requirement for 
careful consideration of appropriate ambient conditions and materials to which the samples will be 
exposed. After preliminary examination, rock fragments and cores will be separated from fines and 
sorted into groups for preliminary characterization and screening, and eventual selection of materials 
for LD and BH tests. Samples and sub-samples not selected for further screening at this point will be 
stored in a pristine sample bank designed to maintain the physical, chemical, and biological integrity 
of samples under controlled conditions while they await allocation for other analyses and research at 
a later date. 
The fines track is designed to process samples of varied types (collected dusts, regolith with coarse 
materials removed, dusts filtered from head gas, or particulates removed from surfaces of rocks or 
cores.) After characterization by imagery, fines will be split and selected for LD and BH assays. 
Real-time modifications to the PIC process are likely, and will be done in close collaboration and 
consultation with those involved in LD and BH processing. The Sub-group report also includes a 
detailed list of future research and development needs and specific areas of concern. 
Sub-Group 2: Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Life Detection Testing 
Sub-group 2 examined those sections of the Penultimate Working Draft Protocol related to Life 
Detection, and suggested modifications to wording and content in several sections that had been 
developed ear~ier.~ In particular, refinements and revisions were made in sections related to the 
Principles guiding Life Detection tests, Analytical Methods to be used, and Integration and 
Organization of Methods. In addition, the Sub-group included commentary and revisions on other 
6. The full report of Sub-group 2 (beginning on page 33) was prepared in the form of comments and suggested changes to the 
Penultimate Working Draft Protocol. No attempt was made to re-write their report as prose. 
3 
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areas of concern including prioritization of analytical methods, controls, equivocal findings, sensitivity, 
detection of biological activity, culture testing, non-carbon based life, and possible independent 
origins of martian life. 
In the text related to Principles Guiding Life Detection tests, the Sub-group suggested refinements to 
emphasize broadly-defined signatures (e.g., structural, chemical-structural and biosynthetic, isotopic, 
and geochemical) that cover all known terrestrial life as well as, possibly, non-terrestrial life. In 
addition, revisions were made to earlier versions of tables to clarify wording about pre-biotic 
chemistry, universal properties of life, and non-Earth-based life. 
The Sub-group made modifications to the Analytical Methods to be used and recommended a 
general approach that initially surveys a portion of different sample types for suggestive features - 
structure, basic chemistry (organic or complex carbon), and local inhomogeneites - followed by 
focussed examination for polymers and more complex structures. Clarifications and refinements were 
also made about sample survey methods, culturing efforts, and the search for and interpretation of 
geochemical signatures of life and discrete subsets of compounds. 
Sub-group 2 also suggested modifications concerning Integration and Organization of Methods within 
the Life Detection section. Specific changes were made on the use of minimally destructive methods, 
a recommendation to start testing with surface fines, and the need for more details about controls, 
transport procedures, forward contamination, and false positives. 
The Sub-group added comments concerning the Use of Replicate Analyses to seek bioactivity 
through time, and addressed problems about sterilization and false positives. The Sub-group also 
suggested that it is inadvisable at this time to specify a time period for completion of LD testing. 
The Sub-group made extensive comments on several other areas as well. Specifically, they provided 
detailed comments regarding prioritization of analytical methods for Life Detection. The 
recommended sequence of tests for "signs of life" should be designed to proceed sequentially 
through analyses for structural, chemical, biochemical and molecular evidence followed by methods 
searching for replication or signs of bioactivity. Minimally destructive methods to detect structural 
signs of life should guide the use of methods to seek chemical, biochemical, and molecular signs of 
life. Sub-group 2 also included comments related to controls, integration of the protocol, sensitivity of 
methods, microbial culture strategies, and the relative value of specific methods for detecting activity 
versus inactivity. Finally, Sub-group 2 added comments concerning concepts on the origins of life on 
Mars and/or Earth and suggested alternative ways of thinking about Life Detection based on 
biochemical patterns and unusual macromolecular assemblages and compounds. 
Sub-Group 3: Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Biohazard Testing 
Sub-group 3 examined those sections of the Penultimate Working Draft Protocol related to Biohazard 
(BH) testing. The format, wording, content, and current limitations were addressed. Since many key 
issues had already been addressed during previous Workshops, the Sub-group focused on perfecting 
parts that had already been substantially worked through, and on identifying and addressing pending 
issues. The specific modifications identified in the Sub-group report have been incorporated in the BH 
portion of the Working Draft Protocol beginning on page 103. 
Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series Workshop 4 Final Report 
Sub-group 3 began by addressing the issue of definitions and terminology used in sections on 
Biohazard testing. For example, changes were made to broaden the definition of biohazard to include 
both a 'replicating agent' andlor 'one able to be amplified by a biological system.' In addition, wording 
was changed to include any type of 'significant alteration,' rather than just adverse effects. 
Terminology for "biohazard" was refined in a way that clarified the meanings and intentions. 
The Sub-group suggested a format change in the PWDP for references to the report7 of the National 
Academy of Sciences' Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration (COMPLEX) [SSB 20021 and 
made suggestions about criteria to be used for selecting tests ten years hence. 
For the sake of clarification, and in order to keep a coherent set of definitions throughout the 
documents (and all further documents), Sub-group 3 also made recommendations related to levels of 
containment and numbers of facilities. They specifically emphasized the need to use the newly 
defined planetary protection level (PPL) terminology8 rather than biosafety level (BSL) and to 
explicitly define required levels of cleanliness for each level of PPL. In addition, for clarity, the Sub- 
group recommended the use of " B S L - ~ - A ~ " ~  instead of "BSL-3," with BSL-3-Ag designated as 
"PPL-6," to be considered as the first possible downgrading of containment in the event that the 
results of all LD and BH tests are negative. The Sub-group indicated that only the Sample Receiving 
Facility (SRF) is likely to require PPL-a, the strictest level of cleanliness and containment coupled 
with Mars-like ambient conditions. If facilities beyond the SRF are used as part of the final protocol 
testing, these other facilities will likely be certified for conducting studies and tests at PPL-P, PPL-y, 
and PPL-6 conditions. The Sub-group suggested that BSL-3-Ag facilities should be built around large 
instruments, rather than miniaturizing instruments to fit into a pre-existing lab. Finally, the Sub-group 
identified the need to certify mobile containers at the appropriate PPL (as opposed to BSL 
requirements exclusively) to allow transport of samples. 
Two divergent points of view emerged during the discussion about possible irradiation of samples, 
although it was not part of Biohazard testing per se. Some Sub-group members argued that even in 
the absence of evidence of biohazard, samples should be gamma-irradiated at substantial doses 
(equivalent or higher to those used for present-day BSL-4 sample release) prior to gradual de- 
containment and release. Those with a different perspective argued that, if Life Detection and 
Biohazard results allow the conclusion that samples are safe enough for release, there is nothing in 
them that can be made safer by irradiation. Despite lengthy discussions, Sub-group 3 did not reach 
any consensus and could not make any recommendations regarding irradiation or sterilization of 
samples. 
Finally, the Sub-group also made several recommendations related to sub-sampling, and noted the 
importance having explicit decision making procedures for data interpretation and decision making as 
well as a communication plan to keep both the public and the scientific community informed of results 
during Life Detection and Biohazard testing. 
7. An Advance Copy of the COMPLEX Report was made available to the Workshop 4 participants. 
8. For complete definitions of the four PPL levels, see page 74. 
9. For the most current definition of BSL-3-Ag, consult the web site of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
<http:/ /www.afm.ars.usda.gov/ppweb/242-01nhtm> 
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Sub-Group 41: Environmental and Health Monitoring and Safety Issues 
The charter for Sub-group 4 was to determine methods relevant to the protocol for monitoring the 
health and safety of the personnel working in the Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) and of the 
environment in and around the SRF, (as well as at secondary sites, if any are used). The Sub-group 
considered monitoring of both personnel and environment over time, beginning prior to the arrival of 
Mars samples, during and after work on the Mars samples at the SRF, and at secondary sites. Also 
discussed was the question of how long to continue monitoring. 
The leading principle for personnel monitoring and safety should be the optimal protection from the 
anticipated hazards for the individuals working with the Mars samples. Because of the unique nature 
of the potential hazards, additional controls beyond those routinely used for hazard monitoring may 
be required. Nevertheless, the monitoring plan should use existing regulations and standards 
whenever possible, and maintain a balance between the estimated risks to individuals, the 
environment or the general population, and the personal impositions of the monitoring program. The 
plan should allow for cross-correlation of data from the LD and BH testing with data from monitoring 
of the SRF personnel and environment. Procedures to monitor personnel and the environment should 
be developed considering international regulatory, cultural and ethical issues. These procedures for 
the monitoring of personnel should include education and certification. 
Five categories of potential hazards were considered in discussions: physical hazards (radiation from 
samples and hazards associated with equipment); potential chemical hazards from non-biological 
toxins; biological hazards; psychological hazards (working under PPL conditions); and monitoring of 
containment itself. Recommendations for monitoring are as follows: 
Phvsical Hazard Monitorinq: Physical hazard monitoring should be among the first PIC tests done. If 
the radioactivity level does not represent a biohazard, then radiation monitoring can be discontinued, 
unless required for equipment used in the SRF. Other risks from equipment or facilities can be 
addressed by standard procedures of training and maintenance. 
Chemical Hazard Monitorinq: Chemical hazard monitoring will be assessed early in the PIC testing 
process. If an unusual substance or chemical is identified, specific monitoring methods can be 
designed, and the substance might also be used as a marker for breach of containment monitoring. 
Moniforina of Containment and fhe Environment: Standard methods for monitoring containment can 
be adapted for use in PPL. Procedures can be developed to assess breaches both inside and outside 
the SRF and to correct personnel exposures as well as possible environmental andlor human 
consequences. 
Before arrival of a Mars sample, a assessment of the environment around the SRF should be made, 
identifying sentinel species (i.e., microbes, insects, plants, animals) for use in monitoring for 
environmental changes. During sample handling at the SRF, environmental monitoring could focus on 
the identified sentinel species and any novel components of the Mars samples, if identified. It may 
also be useful to track and record the daily weather conditions in the area of the SRF as baseline 
data in case of a breach to the outside or the reporting of any unusual events. After completion of LD 
and BH testing, the level of continued environmental monitoring should be reassessed. 
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Monitorina of Personnel: Personnel monitoring should focus on time periods before, during, and after 
Mars sample testing at the SRF, as well as parallel monitoring at any secondary sites that may be 
used. 
A process of certification for people hired to work in the SRF should be developed that is completed 
before sample arrival and includes education about procedures and risks for employment, security 
clearance, and medical examinations and tests. Clear inclusion and exclusion criteria should be 
developed prior to the hiring of personnel. Baseline medical evaluations should use existing 
standards appropriate at the time the evaluations are performed, with recommended baseline 
evaluations to include a medical history, physical examination, tests on the person (e.g., chest X-ray), 
tests on samples from the person (e.g., blood and urine), and neuro-psychological evaluations. All 
testing should be as non-invasive as possible and maintain a balance between estimated risks from 
the Mars samples and the risks associated with the tests. 
A schedule for regular evaluations of personnel during sample handling should be established, using 
the same evaluation methods as in baseline data collection. Procedures for medical management of 
personnel illnesses should be available either on site or with adequate transportation to a medical 
facility (with BSL-4 containment if needed). Guidelines should be developed for the various scenarios 
(exposed/symptomatic, exposed/asymptomatic, symptomatic/questionable exposure, etc.) with 
intervention, treatment plans, containment, and monitoring as appropriate. 
The question of how long to continue monitoring after completion of the final protocol was not totally 
resolved, but will certainly be influenced by the outcomes of LD and BH testing. The issue was raised 
as to when monitoring moves from risk management to a research study. The suggested level of long 
term monitoring ranged from minimal (e.g., tracking events like the date and cause of death), to more 
extensive monitoring (e.g., regular examinations and testing similar to baseline testing). Another 
question Sub-group 4 raised with little consensus was determining the appropriate control group for 
comparisons with personnel evaluations. 
Monitorins at Secondarv Sites: Secondary sites beyond the SRF should be identified prior to the 
arrival of the Mars samples to allow for pre-certification of personnel and collection of baseline data. 
All distributions of Mars sample materials must be tracked and procedures for monitoring of 
containment at the secondary sites should be developed. Personnel at secondary sites should be 
monitored using the same processes as used at the SRF. The level of monitoring at secondary sites 
should be based on the results of the Life Detection and Biohazard testing. 
Database Issues: A central database facility with data analysis capabilities and procedures should be 
used to gather and maintain all environmental data (e.g., baseline, monitoring), personnel data (e.g., 
baseline, in-process, follow-up), secondary site data, and sample tracking data. Processes for regular 
data analysis, reporting, back-ups, access, and confidentiality should be developed. 
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Sub-Group 5: Requirements of the Draft Protocol for Facilities and Equipment 
Sub-group 5 discussed a series of questions related to the requirements of the protocol for facilities, 
equipment, and secondary facilities, including the advantagesldisadvantages of multiple facilities. 
Size and Scope of fhe Facility: The size and scope of the facility will depend on the decision whether 
to conduct all protocol tests at the primary SRF site or to distribute protocol functions and activities to 
secondary labs outside the SRF. The Sub-group reviewed the Penultimate Working Draft Protocol 
(PWDP) to develop a schematic showing the sequence in which the samples will be processed prior 
to distribution to the broader scientific community (Figure SG5-1, page 51). Using the PWDP, the 
Sub-group compiled a rough inventory of the proposed tests and bench top footprint of the requisite 
instruments. Based on this inventory, the Sub-group suggested that any individual PPL laboratory will 
not need to be larger than a medium-sized room.1° Regardless, the SRF must be flexible and able to 
be expanded. 
Where Should fhe SRF be Located?: The decision of where to locate the SRF was not considered to 
be a scientific issue; obvious cautions to avoid placement at sites subject to severe natural hazards 
(e.g., active faults, flood plains, etc.) will be exercised. The Sub-group reviewed the recent National 
Research Council report on a Mars Facility [SSB 20021 and did not concur with their decision that this 
facility should necessarily be co-located with a BSL-4 facility. The Sub-group favored a location with 
ready access to an existing labor pool of scientists. 
When Should Desiun of the SRF Be Started?: Regarding the question of when to begin design of the 
SRF, the Sub-group recommended that the process should be started as soon as the mission is 
certain and the funds have been allocated. Ideally, given the amount of time required for the process, 
the design of the SRF should begin at least 10 years prior to the expected sample return. 
Distribution of Profocol Activities: In discussing the question of whether or not to distribute activities 
and functions of the final protocol to more than one laboratory or facility, the Sub-group compiled a list 
of advantages and disadvantages but made no recommendations. The majority opinion was to limit 
activities and functions of the final protocol to one major facility, perhaps with the exception of having 
a duplicate back-up holding facility for the banked Mars samples. However, the Sub-group agreed 
that there is nothing inherent in planetary protection requirements that would preclude the use of 
multiple facilities to receive and process these samples. There was also a broad-based consensus on 
two additional issues: 1) given the anticipated cost and unique design of the SRF, it would be 
advisable to build the facility for continuous operation to support other astrobiology research activities 
or those in biological or micro-circuitry sciences; and 2) the SRF must be flexible and able to be 
expanded. 
I f  a Life-ForrnBiohazard is Defected: In the event a life-formlbiohazard is detected, the SRF must 
have the flexibility to quickly expand to accommodate scientific research by principal investigators 
and researchers. In addition, if a life-formlbiohazard is detected, samples should not be released for 
distribution to the broader scientific community. 
10. Details on the sizes and/or number of various PPL labs are yet TBD. 
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Reauiremenfs to be Mef bv Secondary Facilities: Any secondary facilities must meet the same 
standard operating procedures as the SRF, (e.g., staff monitoring, security, chain of custody, etc.), 
and have appropriate PPL containment based on testing needs. 
Addifional Issues: Sub-group 5 identified a few additional issues and the following recommendations: 
* Completely define the PPL containment guidelines. 
Develop schematics for a self-contained containment structure that could be placed in a BSL-4 
laboratory and as a composite could meet PPL-a containment requirements and use remote 
robotics to handle the specimens. 
* Develop a comprehensive list of equipment required for all proposed tests in the protocol 
* Anticipate the need to do some Life Detection tests under simulated martian environmental 
conditions while maintaining PPL-aIP containment. 
- Put agreements in place with any anticipated PPL-6 laboratories prior to receipt of Mars 
samples. 
Sub-Group 6: Contingency Planning for Different Outcomes of the Draft Protocol 
Sub-group 6 was charged with anticipating how the scientific community would react under a variety 
of possible scenarios following the return and testing of martian samples. In addition to considering 
the suggested scenarios in the original charter, the Sub-group also included the question of how to 
respond in the face of possible breaches in containment. 
Lessons From Workshoa 3: The Sub-group agreed with the recommendations made in the plenary 
discussion of Workshop 3 on 'What [to do] if Life is Detected'll and identified a number of points 
relevant to their charge (i.e., need for an Oversight Committee, a Communication Plan, a plan for 
real-time review of the final protocol, and reviews of facilities and equipment, security concerns, 
intellectual property rights, international considerations, etc.). 
After considering the specific scenarios and questions in its charter, the Sub-group made the 
following findings and recommendations: 
Breach of Containment: The consensus of the Sub-group was that we know how to handle breaches 
based on long term experience and emergency plans for handling pathogenic biological material 
under BSL-3 and BSL-4 containment. Additional information for responding to breaches and 
containment problems has been gained through experience in handling lunar and extraterrestrial 
materials. Clearly, an emergency plan will be needed well in advance to develop recommended 
responses to various breach scenarios. The plan should focus on all aspects of mitigation, cleanup, 
and recovery from the perspectives of both biosafety and sample integrity. 
Oraanic Carbon: It is extremely likely that carbon will be found in sample materials. The sensitivity of 
current and future methods will be very high, so that at least some degree of contaminants will likely 
be detected. The existing knowledge on meteorites and other material collected from space will be 
useful in providing baseline information to help guide the investigations. Since the Viking results 
11. See Rnce ef al. 2001b, page 41 for a discussion held during Workshop 3 on "What if Life is Detected." 
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focused on volatile organics, in situ measurements of non-volatile organics would be useful for 
predictions of anticipated sample organic content. 
Extant Life or Biomarker Positive: If extant life or evidence of biomarkers is detected in the samples, 
all work on the samples will continue to be done in containment. Maximum effort should be made to 
determine if the positive results are originating from terrestrial life (i.e., false positives from 
contamination) or martian life. Finally, if extant life or evidence of past life is detected, information 
management becomes an issue for both scientific communication and public dissemination of 
information. 
Non-Terrestrial Life Confirmed: If a portion of a sample is confirmed as positive for non-terrestrial life, 
subsequent testing and analyses on all sample materials will continue in maximum containment. 
Experimentation on methods to sterilize samples containing the newly discovered life-form should 
begin in conjunction with investigations of appropriate culture conditions. Once appropriate 
sterilization procedures can be validated, detailed plans for distribution of samples can be developed 
or revised in order to meet the established or revised scientific objectives. 
Contradicforv/lnconsistenf Results: Given the number of techniques, spanning several scientific 
disciplines, it is very likely that contradictory or inconsistent results will be found. Variations in the 
sensitivity of methods will exist and confidence in the level of controls will differ. It will be important to 
stress replication of experiments and duplication of results among multiple sites to add confidence to 
the results obtained. 
A~plication of Release Criferia: The stated goal of this Workshop Series was to devise a Draft 
Protocol that could rigorously analyze returned martian sample material(s) to determine that those 
material(s) are free from biohazards andlor and extraterrestrial life-forms and are therefore safe to be 
released from containment in their native state for further scientific research. Nonetheless, there was 
disagreement among the Sub-group members on how to handle a sample found to be devoid of 
organic material and yielding no evidence of life or biohazards. 
Despite the recommendations of COMPLEX [SSB 20021, some members of Sub-group 6 felt that an 
increased assurance should be given prior to any sample distribution and that some sterilization 
procedure would be advised. A method of 'prophylactic sterilization' was proposed that would involve 
gamma radiation and minimal heating. Other members of the Sub-group reaffirmed the position that 
the purpose and design of the protocol is to test for significant biohazards and thus following the final 
protocol should be sufficient. It was felt that blind additions to the final protocol would destroy some 
significant scientific value of the sample while unnecessarily eroding public trust, without adding 
significantly to the assurance of public safety. Because the Sub-group was unable to reach 
consensus on the question of 'prophylactic sterilization,' the arguments and counter-arguments are 
presented in their report (see "Text Box 1" and "Text Box 2" pages 55 and 56). Clearly, the issue of 
sterilization will require serious additional attention and research well in advance of sample return. 
Other Considerations - Containment Facilities and Manauement: Based again on experience with 
handling of pathogenic biological materials, multiple locations for facility functions may be beneficial 
for a number of reasons (e.g., redundancy, increase the security of the samples, etc.). The biohazard, 
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curation, and security equipment are well known, and selection of methods and equipment should be 
based on current biomedical and counter-bioterrorism techniques. 
A Facility Administrator should be present on site to make day-to-day decisions about facility 
management, acting under the general guidelines of the final protocol established by a scientific 
oversight committee. This committee should be available as needed by the Facility Administrator, 
especially for non-anticipated scenarios. Every effort should be made to coordinate the administration 
of the facility with relevant government agencies. 
Sub-Group 7: Personnel Management Considerations in Implementation of the Draft 
Protocol 
Sub-group 7 addressed personnel management and staffing considerations associated with the 
design and construction of the facility(-ies) and the final implementation of the protocol. After a 
thorough discussion about the alternative methods for staffing the facility(-ies), the conclusion was 
reached that various categories of personnel will be required, depending on the different tasks that 
need to be implemented. The Sub-group agreed to the following several considerations: 
The personnel should be hired progressively during the development of the project and the 
facility(-ies). The functions and responsibilities of the Director of the SRF may be carried out 
by appropriate committees until about five years before the return of samples from Mars. 
* The required methods and procedures in the final protocol should be applied to any facility or 
site handling martian samples during the implementation of the final protocol; 
The international character of the program should be respected throughout the whole process. 
In their deliberations, the Sub-group developed an overview of the functions, staffing requirements, 
and organization that will be needed to design, build, and operate an SRF. A series of organizational 
charts and timelines from now until receipt of samples describe their recommendations (see figures 
SG7-1 through SG7-4, beginning on page 59). In developing their recommendations for management 
and staffing of the SRF, the Sub-group used the following assumptions as their working hypotheses: 
The final protocol must be fully and successfully tested before the handling of the actual 
martian samples. 
- It's estimated that a complete series of Experiment Verification Tests (EVTs) will last 
approximately 6 months and one complete EVT series must be successfully demonstrated 
before handling of the actual returned Mars samples. The first EVT must begin no later than 
18 months before the Mars samples arrive on Earth in order to allow enough time to adjust 
and repeat the EVT if necessary 
These EVTs are part of the normal operational testing and are consistent with SSB 
recommendations [SSB 79971 and earlier workshops that the SRF be operational two years 
before the arrival of Mars samples. 
Based on experiences at other BSL-4 laboratories in the United States and France, no less 
than one-year is required to properly staff and train the technical and scientific personnel. 
* Commissioning of the SRF, which must be performed in parallel with the staffing and training, 
will last at least 18 months. 
In order to accommodate the staffing, training, and commissioning requirements of the SRF, 
construction of the facility must be finished three and a half years before the actual operations. 
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* From past experiences in both France and the United States, construction of the facility itself 
will also require three and a half years. 
It is estimated that about three years will be needed to develop design specifications and 
plans for the SRF and obtain necessary authorizations for the facility. To accommodate all the 
activities necessary to design, build and operate an SRF, the entire process must begin fully 
ten years in advance of sample return. 
The Sub-group identified organizational and staffing needs at three key times: 10 years, 5 years, and 
3 years prior to sample return, and provided a series of charts outlining the process. Details about key 
positions, scientific oversight committees, advisory committees, design committees, staffing needs, 
and working groups are described in the full Sub-group 7 report (beginning on page 57). 
Finally, Sub-group 7 also identified three major issues for further consideration: 
1. Since no one has experience in simultaneous operations or activities in BSL-4 and clean room 
conditions (i.e., PPL environment), seeking advice from experts in the pharmaceutical or the 
microprocessor industries would be helpful. 
2. Details on the optimal staffing mix at the SRF must be considered further to ascertain the 
optimal mix of civil servants, semi-permanent employees, contractors, and guest scientists 
needed to staff the facility and implement the final protocol. International access and 
participation should be considered throughout the process. 
3. In order to comply with planetary protection constraints and final protocol requirements, a 
sustained and adequate budget will be needed throughout the design, building, and 
implementation phases of this project. 
Sub-Group 8: Draft Protocol Implementation Process and Update Concepts 
Sub-group 8 addressed questions related to the review, approval, updating, and implementation of 
the final protocol. Before recommending specific processes and committees, the Sub-group 
highlighted several key issues because of their importance to the overall protocol: the need for clarity 
of meaning and consistency of terminology; the use of 'PPL' rather than 'BSL' designations; and the 
creation of an additional containment category, PPL-6, which is equivalent to BSL-3-Ag. 
The Sub-group developed an overview schematic of the implementation process (see Figure SG8-1, 
page 63) and made the following specific recommendations: 
Final Scientific and Policv Reviews: The ultimate review of the final protocol document must be 
subjected to the highest degree of scientific scrutiny and evaluation conducted jointly by scientific 
organizations from both the United States and France. This review should probably occur at the level 
of the National Research Council in the United States, and its equivalent scientific organization in 
France. Final decisions about which institutions should be involved in scientific reviews are TBD. 
Ethical and Public ~eviews: Evaluations of the final protocol should be conducted both internal and 
external to NASA and CNES and the space research communities in the nations participating in the 
mission. An ethical review should be conducted and made public early in the process (appropriate 
French and U.S. agencies to conduct the review are TBD). The final protocol should be announced 
broadly with requests for comments and input from the scientific community and the public. 
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Future Modifications to the Protocol: When a final protocol has been adopted and approved by a 
consensus of appropriate scientific organizations, few changes should be made to its content. 
Changes should be made as scientific information, methodology and/or technology improve between 
the time of the approval and the actual physical implementation of the final protocol within the SRF. 
The Sub-group recommended that changes in the final protocol methodology may be considered if a 
proposed change would meet the following criteria: 
* increases the sensitivity or selectivity of the test, 
reduces the length of time necessary for a test without a reduction in sensitivity or selectivity, 
* reduces the complexity of the sample handling process, 
* increases the overall safety of the process, 
reduces the chances of contamination to the sample or the environment, 
reduces the cost of the process, or 
* represents a new technology or method that has the broad general acceptance of the scientific 
community. 
Advisorv Commiftees and Expert Panels: Changes to scientific methodology and instrumentation are 
inevitable due to the long development time envisioned for this mission. This necessitates long term, 
consistent input and advice from the external scientific communities. To facilitate this process, it is 
recommended that a standing Planetary Protection Advisory Committee (PPAC) be appointed in the 
U.S. to provide input to NASA's Planetary Protection Officer and that a similar standing committee 
(Planetary Protection Committee, PPC) be appointed in France as currently tentatively planned. 
Sub-group 8 also recommends that standing joint French and U.S. working committees or specialized 
expert panels should be appointed with appropriate expertise to provide support and advice to the 
U.S. PPAC and French PPC in technical processes, scientific procedures, and safety/biosafely 
issues. These panels and committees may function jointly or independently depending on the specific 
need. The U.S. PPAC and French PPC will receive the annual reports of the three panels, who will 
also provide annual written reviews to NASA's Planetary Protection Officer and, in France, to the 
appropriate Minister to whom the French PPC reports. 
Communicafions: Since unusual or unprecedented scientific activities are often subject to extreme 
scrutiny at both the scientific and political levels, a communication plan must be developed as early 
as possible to minimize the dissemination of misinformation and to provide the highest level of public 
assurance about the issues addressed by the mission. Communications should clearly inform about 
the extensive efforts to protect the environment and health and safety through facility designs, 
procedures, and personnel training. This information on risk management and planetary protection 
should be balanced with education/outreach about the anticipated benefits of Mars exploration and 
sample return from the scientific perspective. Details about who will be in charge of this plan and the 
release of information and results are TBD. 
Flow Chatfs and Timelines: In order to assure the rational utilization of both the facilities and sample 
materials, development of appropriate flow charts and time lines will be needed to coordinate the 
complex series of interrelated processes and identify key decision points (e.g., release from 
containment, downgrading to lower level of containment). 
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Workshops/Reviews: The need to change schedules and procedures may be anticipated during the 
time between now and sample return. To provide assurance that rules exist between the involved 
international partners and the scientific communities, two workshop/reviews should be scheduled 
prior to sample return to Earth in order to reaffirm details about process, methodology, safety and 
release criteria. The first review should be conducted at the conclusion of the facilities design phase 
to determine if the physical structure meets the scientific and safety standards as defined within the 
specifications. A second similar workshop/review should occur after the samples have been collected 
on Mars but in advance of their actual return to Earth. 
Preparations and Processes for Decision Makina about Release of Samoles: It will be important to 
make advanced preparations for decision making in the event that a distinctly martian life-form is 
found within 'the returned samples. While it is impossible to develop details of the final protocol at this 
time, it will be important to have considered how decisions will be made, by whom, and based on 
what principles, if an extraterrestrial life-form is discovered. A specific committee should be 
established at least one year in advance of sample return to develop contingency protocols and 
processes that would be in place if and when a martian life is found and verified. It will also be 
important to have a review and approval infrastructure for decisions about whether or not to release 
sample materials from containment after the final protocol is completed. The decision to release 
samples should involve an Interagency Committee on Back Contamination (ICBC) similar to the one 
used during the Apollo program, as well as the U.S. PPAC and French PPC reporting to relevant 
bodies in their respective countries. 
The organizational structures, management plans, charters and reporting lines for many of the 
proposed committees and groups will need to be developed in the coming years. Many questions 
cannot be resolved until additional details on facility design, operational logistics, mission architecture 
or anticipated schedules are made available. 
Research and Development Needs 
Throughout the Workshop Series, research and development needs have been identified in the 
various sub-group discussions and reports. On the final day of Workshop 4, a plenary discussion was 
held which focused on areas of research and development that need to be pursued to adequately 
design the SRF and facilitate the implementation of the final protocol. A list of additional research and 
development concerns was compiled; categories and topics identified during the plenary discussion 
included: 
lmprove controls on samples, tests, personnel, and monitoring 
Refine and improve equipment for using synchrotron tomography 
Develop ecological microcosms 
Study post-radiation detection of biosignatures 
Discussion/descriptions of endolithic community 
* Research and characterization of microbiological community cultures 
Robotics and remote manipulation in PPL conditions 
Develop transport and remote containment methodology/requirements 
Improve methods for detection of organic compounds on surfaces 
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Miniaturization of testing and assaying techniques as part of the protocol 
Social science research (i.e., personal and community risk psychology) 
Sample register and tracking methodologies 
Communications 
Sterilization of surface adhering bugs 
Remote sharing of data; telepresence 
Research on rock materials using BH testing procedures 
Cognitive 'protheses' - nanobots in diagnostics 
Combined BSL and cleanroom (i.e., PPL) capability 
Appropriate protective gear for staff working in PPL environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In preparation for missions to Mars that will involve the return of samples to Earth, it is necessary to 
prepare for receiving, handling, testing, distributing, and archiving of martian materials here on Earth. 
Previous groups and committees have studied selected aspects of sample return activities, but 
specific detailed protocols for handling and testing of returned samples from Mars must still be 
developed. 
To refine the requirements for Mars sample hazard testing and to develop criteria for the subsequent 
release of sample materials from containment, NASA's Planetary Protection Officer convened the 
Mars Sample Handling Protocol (MSHP) Workshop Series in 2000-2001. The overall objective of the 
Workshop Series was to produce a Draft Protocol by which returned martian sample materials could 
be assessed for biological hazards and examined for evidence of life (extant or extinct), while 
safeguarding the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. 
This document provides the first complete presentation of the Draft Protocol for Mars Sample 
Handling to meet planetary protection needs (beginning on page 71). Because this version of the 
Draft Protocol is subject to review and modification by an Oversight and Review Committee 
(established as part of the protocol-development process), it has been designated the "Working Draft 
Protocol."12 The Working Draft Protocol represents a consensus that emerged from the discussions of 
all the sub-groups assembled over the course of the MSHP Workshop Series which converged on a 
conceptual approach to sample handling, as well as on specific analytical requirements. Discussions 
during Workshop 4 also identified important issues remaining to be addressed, including areas where 
future research and development are necessary for optimal protocol implementation. 
This document also provides a complete record of the proceedings and findings of Workshop 4, the 
final Workshop in the series,13 convened June 5-7, 2001 in Arlington, Virginia.14 The main work of 
Workshop 4 occurred in sub-group discussions. Workshop participants were provided with a draft of 
the protocol that had been compiled in May 2001 from work done in all the earlier Workshops in the 
Series.15 Workshop 4 participants were divided into sub-groups to address eight separate topics and 
develop recommendations as appropriate.16 On Day 1, the Sub-groups' assigned topics were: 
Review and assess the Draft ~rotocol for Physical/Chemical testing 
Review and assess the Draft Protocol for Life Detection testing 
Review and assess the Draft Protocol for Biohazard testing 
* Environmental and Health Monitoring and Safety Issues 
12. See the table in the Preface for a complete list of the various versions of the Draft Protocol. 
13. Because there was both a Workshop 2 and a Workshop 2a, Workshop 4 is the fifth Workshop in the MSHP Series 
14. The Appendices at the end of this report comprise the agenda, lists of participants, background tutorials presented (in the 
form of the viewgraphs used by the speakers), complete citations of a l l  references and a glossary of terms and acronyms. 
15. Prior to Workshop 4, materials developed in all the earlier Workshops in the Series were compiled into a version of the 
Draft Protocol subsequently designated the "Penultimate Working Draft Protocol" (dated May 2001). The "Vtorking Draft 
Protocol" (dated June 2001), found in Appendix A, is the result of incorporating the comments and changes from the 
Workshop 4 Sub-groups into the Penultimate Working Draft Protocol. 
16. The specific charters of each sub-group and their complete summary reports are present in detail beginning on page 19 of 
this report. The summary reports presented in this document (including tables and figures) reflect the complete 
deliberations of each sub-group. The views expressed and any conclusions and recommendations reached by the sub- 
groups do not represent a consensus of all Workshop participants. 
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After summary reports for each sub-group were presented in a plenary session on the second day of 
the Workshop, participants were assigned to new sub-groups to discuss four additional topics: 
Requirements of the Draft Protocol for Facilities and Equipment 
* Contingency Planning for Different Outcomes of the Draft Protocol 
Personnel Management Considerations in lmplementation of the Draft Protocol 
Draft Protocol lmplementation Process and Update Concepts 
These Sub-groups reported to the plenary session on the morning of the last day of the Workshop. 
On the afternoon of the final day of the Workshop, there was a focused plenary discussion on what 
areas of research and development are necessary to adequately design the SRF and facilitate the 
implementation of the final protocol; an outline of the topics discussed in the plenary discussion 
appears in this document beginning on page 68. 
This Working Draft Protocol will now undergo a thorough review and refinement process, the first step 
of which is a review by the Oversight and Review Committee (see Appendix D3, page 145) currently 
scheduled to occur in November 2001.17 Subsequent to the scheduled review and any required 
amendments/modifications, the Final Version of the Draft Protocol will be issued as a stand-alone 
document. That document will be circulated for further study, approvals by outside entities, and for 
use by the Mars Sample Handling Project and others in the design of a sample receiving facility and 
in the development of an eventual final protocol to be applied to returned martian samples. 
17. The Working Draft Protocol induded in this report represents an early stage in the development of the final protocol, and 
is reported here to document this stage in the process. The ORC review of the Working Draft Protocol was completed in 
November 2001; the Final Version of the Draft Protocol IRummeI et al. 2002, in press], which incorporates the comments 
from the ORC, is expected to be published in October 2002. 
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SUB-GROUP SUMMARY REPORTS 
Background Information on Workshop 4 and the Sub-Group Summaries 
Prior to Workshop 4, materials developed in all the earlier Workshops in the MSHP Series were 
compiled into a first complete draft of the protocol; which was subsequently designated the 
"Penultimate Working Draft P ro t~co l . "~~  
The stated objective of Workshop 4 was to finalize the Penultimate Working Draft Protocol (PWDP). 
Each Workshop 4 Sub-group was provided with a copy of the PWDP and given specific assignments. 
Sub-groups 1, 2, and 3 were each asked to examine specific sections of the PWDP, to refine wording 
and content, and to identify present limitations and address pending issues;19 Sub-groups 4 - 8 were 
asked to address issues not previously covered in the PWDP. 
The "Working Draft Protocol," found in this report beginning on page 71, is the result of incorporating 
the accepted comments and changes from the Workshop 4 Sub-groups into the PWDP. However, not 
all of the recommendations or comments of the Workshop 4 Sub-groups were accepted for 
incorporation into the Working Draft Protocol. Therefore, the individual reports from each Sub-group 
are included here, in their entirety, to provide a complete record of the Workshop 4 deliberations (as a 
result, there is a fair amount of redundancy in this document). 
Sub-Group 1: Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Physical/Chemical Testing 
Charter 
The charter of Sub-group 1 was to "Review, assess, and adjust the Penultimate Working Draft 
Protocol for sample container processing, sample preparation, and physical/chemical analyses: Does 
the Draft Protocol adequately provide for planetary protection 'containment,' handling, and analysis 
requirements to protect the Earth, as well as for the requirements to ensure the scientific value of the 
sample? Can data about the sample be provided in a timely fashion to support the life-detection and 
Biohazard testing steps of the Draft Protocol, as well as to support sample preservation and curation 
considerations? Which analyses need to be done in containment either within the primary 
containment facility or outside of containment using sealed containers? Which analyses can be done 
outside of containment on samples subjected to a sterilizing process involving heat, radiation, etc., or 
a combination of these agents, to ensure they are safe for analyses outside of containment?" 
Sub-Group 1 Members 
Treiman, Alan H. (U.S. Co-Chairperson) 
Counil, Jean-Louis (French Co-Chairperson) 
Allen, Carlton C. 
Allton, Judith H. 
Bibring, Jean-Pierre 
Collins, Mary E. 
18. See the table in the Preface for a listing of the various versions of the Draft Protocol. 
19. AU changes described in the Sub-group reports refer to changes to be made to the Penultimate Working Draft Protocol 
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DeVincenzi, Donald L. 
Edelson, Martin C. 
Garvin, James 
Holland, Heinrich D. 
Johnson, Dale W. 
Manhes, Gerard 
Mills, Aaron L. 
Sub-group II focused its deliberations on refining those portions of the Penultimate Working Draft 
Protocol that involved steps related to Physical and Chemical (PIC) processing of returned martian 
sample materials. PIC processing includes actions affecting the returned samples between the time 
the Sample Return Canister (SRC) arrives in the Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) and the time that 
sample aliquots are apportioned for Life Detection and Biohazard tests. PIC processing should 
include only those actions required in support of planetary protection and future sample utilization. 
The details of the proposed PIC processing, which draws heavily from protocols proposed or used by 
others,20 is outlined in Figure SGI-1 F1 to which the following explanatory sections below are keyed. 
Principles: The selected steps and investigations in the PIC processing tracks are motivated by the 
following principles as functions of the SRF: know what the returned samples are, preserve sample 
integrity, document everything, anticipate that different types of samples (e.g., gases, fines, rocks and 
cores) require different treatment, recognize that all data obtained in the PIC processing must serve 
later scientific investigations, use the minimum sample possible, and provide real-time guidance and 
adjustment to the process. These principles, initially outlined by the report of the Mars Sample 
Handling and Requirements Panel (MSHARP) [Carr et a/., 19991, have been endorsed by all the Mars 
Sample Handling Protocol Workshops [Race and Rummel, 2000; Race et a/., 2001a; Bruch et a/., 
2001; Race et a/., 200161. 
The first two principles (know the sample; preserve sample integrity) are, to some extent, inconsistent 
because every characterization method or action on the returned samples will affect them in some 
way. This inconsistency has been addressed in two ways. First, all initial characterization procedures 
in PIC processing are nominally non-contact and non-destructive - all the sample mass remains in 
the same physical and chemical state after each analysis. Second, most of the returned sample is 
subjected to only minimal investigations, while only a representative portion of the sample is 
subjected to more specific (and potentially sample-altering) analyses. The PIC processing and 
screening methods, except for weighing, involve sample interactions with electromagnetic radiation, 
principally near-visible wavelengths (near ultraviolet, visible, and near infrared). Several methods use 
X-rays to probe the samples, but it was recognized that X-rays can (at some dosages) affect 
biologicaVorganic systems. 
20. The protocol shown in Figure SG1-1 is based on the framework previously developed by sub-groups at the first Workshop 
in this Series [Race and Rummel, 20001, and on an earlier report by MSHARP [Carr et aL, 19991, which are in turn based on 
the protocols developed at Johnson Space Center for handling and processing of Apollo lunar samples, Antarctic 
meteorites, and cosmic dust. Over the course of the MSHP Workshop Series, material suggested by various Sub-groups 
was incorporated into what became the Penultimate Working Draft Protocol; the PWDP is, in general, consistent with the 
requirements and conditions set forth by the Space Studies Board [SSB, 19971, MSHARP Committee [Can; 19991, an earlier 
workshop on sample quarantine protocols [DeVincenzi et al., 29991, and CAPTEM [Neal, 20001. 
21. Figure "SG1-1" indicates the first figure of Sub-group 1. 
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Figure SG1-1. The Physical/Chernical Analyses will occur in four sequential stages 
leading into the Life Detection and Biohazard Testing. 
(The numbers in circles correspond to numbered paragraphs in the text). 
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The first two principles (know the sample; preserve sample integrity) are, to some extent, inconsistent 
because every characterization method or action on the returned ss~ples will affect them in some 
way. This inconsistency has been addressed in two ways. First, 21, initial characterization procedures 
in PIC processing are nominally non-contact and non-destructive - all the sample mass remains in 
the same physical and chemical state after each analysis. Second, most of the returned sample is 
subjected to only minimal investigations, while only a representative portion of the sample is 
subjected to more specific (and potentially sample-altering) analyses. The PIC processing and 
screening methods, except for weighing, involve sample interactions with electromagnetic radiation, 
principally near-visible wavelengths (near ultraviolet, visible, and near infrared). Several methods use 
X-rays to probe the samples, but it was recognized that X-rays can (at some dosages) affect 
biologicallorganic systems. 
This Working Draft Protocol attempts a compromise between the desire to affect only a small 
proportion of the returned sample by planetary protection testing, and the need to assure safety by 
testing all portions of all samples. A range of strategies have been advocated to deal with the sample 
testing issue, from "characterize everything with all available non-destructive methods," to "store most 
of the sample uncharacterized, and do only the minimum with the rest" (see discussions in Carr et a!., 
1999, p. 37; Race and Rummel, 2000, p. 18; Race eta/., 200la, p. 35; Race et al., 2001b, p. 34). 
Here it is stipulated that it will be essential to examine all the returned material in at least a minimal 
fashion to: confirm spacecraft operations in sample transfer from Mars to the Sample Return Canister 
(SRC); correlate returned samples with documentation made on Mars; and provide enough data to 
make informed choices about samples for LDIBH analyses. Examining all returned materials in at 
least a minimal fashion will help avoid a worst case scenario where an obviously biogenic sample 
could be stored unexamined and only discovered after nominal LDIBH tests were completed. 
Documenfation: All treatment and actions with the returned samples need to be documented fully. 
Without a high level of documentation, it would be impossible to establish which samples are 
representative or particularly interesting, and to indicate what had been done to which sample during 
processing. 
Different Samples: It was clear that the different types of samples will require different processing 
techniques. Gases and bulk fines samples are expected to be inherently homogeneous to some level, 
and will require only minimal processing to derive characteristic and representative samples. 
However, solid materials are anticipated to be potentially heterogeneous and will require more 
extensive study and real-time decisions about processing. 
Minimum Sample Mass: The amount and size of returned Mars samples will be small, and it will be 
desirable to subject sample materials to a great range of biological, physical, and chemical tests. 
Thus, by necessity, each test on a returned sample must use the minimum mass consistent with 
achieving the scientific goal of the test. 
Real-Time Adiustments - Oversiclht Commiffee: Provisions must be made to adjust the PIC 
processes in response to changing technology and mission specifics, to monitor the processes in 
progress, and to adjust them in real time to fit the actual returned samples [Carr et al., 1999, pp. 7, 91. 
This current Draft Protocol is being written thirteen years before nominal return of Mars samples to 
Earth. We do not know the spacecraft configuration, the types of martian samples that will be 
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collected, their return configuration, and the exact nature of planetary protection measures. Similarly, 
we cannot anticipate the advances in instrumentation and analytical methods that are likely between 
now and the time of sample return. 
It is likely that the returned samples will not be exactly as we imagine them now, and may include 
materials that are complex (e.g., breccias) or unusual (e.g., a possible stromatolite fossil). Treatment 
of these types of samples would be sample-specific, and cannot be defined in advance. Thus, there 
must be a mechanism like a Scientific Oversight Committee to adjust the Protocol to fit the samples. 
Assum~tions: In preparing the PIC portion of the Draft Protocol, we have assumed the mission profile 
and constraints outlined in the initial Workshop of this Series [Race and Rummel, 20001. It is worth 
reiterating a few of the key assumptions with particular relevance to physical chemical processing: 
the SRCs will be received at the SRF intact and with no breaches of containment; the returned 
samples will include gas, fines material (bulk regolith), and solids; and total sample mass is expected 
to be approximately 500 to 1000 grams. 
Overview of Phvsical/Chemical Processinq: Physical and chemical processing are the priority actions 
taken with the returned Mars samples between arrival of the SRC at the SRF and initial examination 
for Life Detection of fines and solids. These anticipated steps in PIC processing are shown 
schematically in Figure SGI-1 which is based on portions of Figures 6-2 and 6-3 of Carr ef a/., 
(1999), Figure I on page 18 of Race and Rummel(2000), and the narrative of Race et a/., (2001a). 
The numeric annotations in Figure SGI-1 refer to similarly numbered sections of text below, which 
elaborates on the proposed PIC processing in narrative form. 
PIC processing can be divided into three phases in roughly sequential order: 
Initial pre-processing, before preliminary examination of the samples; 
Preliminary examination and screening of gas, fines, and solids, to permit informed choices 
about samples for later detailed testing, banking or curation; and 
Sub-division of those samples selected for biohazard and Life Detection tests. 
Following PIC processing, Life Detection and Biohazard testing will begin. Those processes may 
require information developed during preliminary examination and screening, and may also require 
subsequent more detailed information of a physical or chemical nature. Analyses to obtain these 
latter data are supplemental to the PIC processing and are not included here. 
The steps of preliminary examination and screening were judged different for three types of samples: 
gases; homogeneous particulate samples; and inherently inhomogeneous samples like rocks, rock 
cores, and regolith cores. Each of these sample types will follow a different track through preliminary 
examination and screening as described in the text below and shown on Figure SGI-1 as the 'Gases 
Track, ' 'Solids Track, ' and 'Fines Track. ' 
Pre-processing Samples 
* 1.0 Pre-Processing Steps: Pre-processing steps outlined here are those between arrival of the 
SRC at the SRF, and initial examination of gas, fines and solids. Preprocessing steps refer to 
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cleaning and decontaminating the exterior of any containers holding samples, as well as the initial 
steps in each of the gases-, fines-, and solids-tracks involving opening of containers and removal 
of samples. 
I. I Clean and Decontaminate Exterior of SRC: It is imperative that the exterior of the sample 
return containers or vessel(s) carry no terrestrial microorganisms and are organically clean. (It is . 
assumed that the exterior of the SRC is not contaminated with martian materials.) If these states 
are not achieved, all subsequent analyses for life or biohazard are severely compromised. The 
actual methods of cleaning and decontamination are to be determined. An interesting new method 
for consideration is laser ablation of the SRC exterior. 
Procedures for opening sample containers are mission specific, as to number, types, and contents 
of containers. At a minimum, we assume that some solid materials with surrounding gas will be in 
the container(s). It is recommended that the gas be extracted for separate treatment, and that the 
solid samples be contained thereafter in an inert gas like dry nitrogen. 
1.2 Extract Head Gas and Back-fill: The returned solid samples will arrive on Earth with some gas 
surrounding them. Presumably, this "head gas" would consist originally of martian atmosphere. By 
the time of arrival on Earth, the gas might have been affected by chemical and physical reactions 
with the solids (rock and soil), by out-gassing from the solids (especially if the temperature rises 
above 25°C during return), and possibly by biological activity in the sample. Thus, this gas may 
contain information important to understanding the thermal, chemical, and biological histories of 
the solid returned samples. Therefore, extraction and analysis of the head gas is a high priority. 
In this step of pre-processing, the head gas would be extracted from the SRC, and the SRC back- 
filled with a chemically un-reactive gas to ambient "room" pressure. Exact procedures for 
extraction and back-filling will depend on the SRC design and construction, but might (for instance) 
include puncturing the SRC at an intentional thin point, extracting the head gas to a pre- 
determined vacuum pressure, and refilling the SRC with dry clean N2 gas. The extracted head gas 
would be processed as below (see 2.0 - 2.2). 
Three issues related to gases were identified for further consideration and possible research: 
1) the effects of vacuum and non-martian gas on the chemical properties of the sample; 2) the 
effects of vacuum and non-martian gas on any live martian biota; and 3) the effects of extraction 
on gas isotope ratios. 
For the first issue, experience with curation of the Apollo lunar samples has shown that few 
geochemical and other inorganic investigations are materially affected by holding and processing 
the samples in dry N2 gas at 1 bar. Of course, the lunar samples originated at hard vacuum on the 
Moon. It is not clear, however, what changes might be wrought on returned Mars samples 
(possibly containing clays or other hydrous materials) by vacuum pumping and then by immersion 
in dry N2 gas; this is an area for research. 
For the second issue, there is reason to want the returned solid samples to be treated under 
atmosphere as near to martian as possible - both to preserve key geochemical signatures [Neal, 
2000, p. 22,492ffJ and to maintain potential micro-organisms in their native environment. No one 
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knows whether live martian organisms could be killed by removal of 0.006 bars of C02 and then 
immersion in one bar of N2 and there may not be comparable terrestrial biota to test. The samples 
will eventually be subjected to higher pressures, merely because the biota of BH tests would not 
survive in martian atmosphere. On the other hand, there are serious problems in sample handling 
and geochemistry that would be caused by immersing the samples in a model martian 
atmosphere. Sample handling and LDIBH testing at reduced pressure (the near vacuum of 0.006 
bars C02) present severe problems. Sample handling under vacuum was attempted during the 
Apollo program with lunar samples, and was found to be extremely difficult, expensive and 
contaminating (e.g., mercury or oil from vacuum pumps). Similarly, backfill with a relatively reactive 
gas like C02 will change the isotopic nature of the sample. Terrestrial carbon and oxygen will 
exchange with the sample and compromise biological and geochemical inferences from of these 
two stable isotope systems. 
This is obviously an area of future research. One possible approach would be to backfill the SRC 
and do sample handling and examination (where possible) under 1 bar of dry N2 gas with 0.006 
bars of C02 added. This might satisfy the constraints of easy sample handling and the hope of not 
killing live martian organisms. However, one wonders if bacteria are affected by unnaturally high 
partial pressures of N2. 
For the third issue, it is known that the elemental and isotopic ratios of a gas sample can be 
fractionated during transfer from one reservoir to another. With the head gas in contact witla the 
abundant surface area of the returned samples, fractionation could become a serious potential 
problem. 
Gases Track 
2.0 Gases Track: Gas withdrawn from the SRC, the "head gas," will be processed by filtering and 
subsequently any fines collected will be split for Life Detection and Biohazard testing; the filtered 
gas would be available relatively rapidly for other investigations [Race and Rummel, 2000, p. ?7]. 
2.1 Filter to <TBD Nanometer: After or during removal of the head gas from the SRC, the gas 
should be filtered to remove particles [Race and Rummel, 2000, p. 171. The purpose of filtering the 
head gas is to remove objects that could reasonably constitute viable organisms or that might 
present biohazards. The size of objects passing the filter is to be determined (TBD). Sizes 
suggested by previous sub-groups in this Workshop Series have ranged from ~ 0 . 5  pm [Race 
eta/., 2001a, p. 341 to c0.02 pm [Race et al., 2001b, p. 271, both of which are realizable with 
current technology (currently, some methods are rated to remove particles larger than 0.003prn). 
It is not clear if filtering could change the chemical or molecular composition of the head gas, for 
instance by preferential adsorption of heavy noble gases or by catalysis of reactions. This is an 
area for additional research. 
* 2.2 Distribute in Sealed Containers: The Sub-group recommended that filtered head gas could be 
released from the SRF and distributed in sealed containers. Unlike the returned solid samples 
(rock, regolith, etc.), a returned gas sample is only useful for investigation if it is contained. 
Typically, a gas sample like this would be placed in a glass bulb, which would then be sealed by 
melting the stem of the bulb. Containment at PPL-a or PPL-0 levels seems inherent in this 
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proced~re ,~~  and it is recommended that the filtered gas be available for immediate allocation from 
the SRF without further processing or steri l i~ation.~~ 
Solids Track 
* 3.0 Solids Track: After removal and filtering of head gas from the SRC, the remaining returned 
samples would be solids of various types: regolith samples, rocks, rock cores, soil cores, and 
fines. The specifics of this solid sample set are to be determined during mission design. These 
solid samples will be processed through two separate tracks, Solids Track (3.0) and Fines Track 
(4.0), for basic documentation, further preliminary testing, and selection for subsequent Life 
Detection and Biohazard tests. 
Some principles of this PIC process are worth restating here. The PIC process is a method to 
obtain the minimum data needed to adequately characterize the samples and to permit selection 
of suitable samples for LDlBH tests. The remaining samples would be preserved and made 
available for subsequent investigations and analyses. The samples will be changed from their 
original state as little as possible. 
The martian samples will be touched or come in contact with only a limited set of materials under 
controlled temperature and atmosphere. Pristine lunar samples are touched only by stainless 
steel, aluminum, and ~ e f l o n ~ ~ ;  these might also be suitable for returned Mars samples. Neal cites 
the considerations [Neal, 20001, from a geochemical perspective, for choices of materials for 
sample handling and suggests several types. Whether these materials are appropriate for returned 
martian samples should be determined through additional research with Mars simulants prior to 
sample return. 
The temperature of processing is to be determined, and will depend in great part on technical 
mission constraints. The implicit assumption here has been that temperature of processing will be 
between 0°C (273K) and ambient (-298K), for which the protocols and experience with the Apollo 
samples are relevant. On the other hand, it would be important from geochemical and biological 
perspectives to maintain the returned sample at its ambient martian temperature, -240K [Carr 
ef a/., 1999; Neal, 20001. This temperature may not be possible within mission constraints, and 
there appears to be no compelling reason to process at temperatures significantly below those 
experienced by the samples during their transit to Earth. It is not clear, at this point, what problems 
and attendant costs would be associated with sample curation and processing at sub-freezing 
temperatures. 
The atmosphere of processing, curation, and of back-filling of the SRC is suggested to be 
1 bar of un-reactive gas; the composition and pressure of the atmosphere has implications for 
biological and geochemical testing, and is an area of concern and for future research (see pages 
32 and 68 of this report). The following steps implicitly assume that processing and curation will 
22. It is assumed that the operation of sealing the gases into the bulbs will be done under appropriate PPL conditions (details 
TBD). 
23. To date, no decisions have been made about when and under what conditions sample materials will be eligible for release 
from containment at the SRF. Ultimately, it is likely that decisions about what is done with sample materials will be made 
after review by an appropriate international scientific oversight committee at the SRF in consultation with NASA's 
Planetary Protection Officer and other responsible officials. 
Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series Workshop 4 Final Report 
take place under a pure un-reactive gas (such as N2) at 1 atmosphere of pressure. It is not known 
whether this gas would present problems to Life Detection and Biohazard testing procedures. It 
must be recognized that a requirement for processing at low pressure, like the 0.006 atmospheres 
of the martian surface, would have significant implications for the design and cost of a SRF. 
* 3.1 Open SRC and Remove Samples: The SRC must be opened for retrieval and removal of solid 
samples. The procedure for opening the SRC and removing the samples are to be determined and 
will depend entirely on the design of the SRC. 
* 3.2 Preliminary Examination and Documentation: As part of the PIC processing, Preliminary 
Examination and Documentation includes the minimal investigations deemed absolutely critical for 
understanding the nature of the returned sample and initial biohazard investigation [Race and 
Rummel, 2000, pp. 14, 17; Race et a/., 2001a, p. 371. 
The sole hazard investigation at this time is measurement of sample radioactivity, because some 
forms of ionizing radiation can penetrate the curation barriers between the returned sample and 
human processors. The purpose is not to measure abundances of indigenous radioisotopes 
(e.g., 2 3 8 ~ )  nor cosmogenic radioactivities (e.g., 2 6 ~ ~ ) ,  but rather to determine whether radiation 
levels associated with the samples could pose a threat to workers at the SRF. Hazardous 
radioactivity can be measured on the bulk returned sample, and need not be measured on 
individual samples unless the bulk presents a radiation hazard. Only gamma radiation need be 
detected, as beta and alpha radiation will not penetrate the barriers between the returned samples 
and human processors. In the opinion of the Workshop attendees, it was extremely unlikely that 
returned martian samples will present a radiation hazard. 
lmaging provides the first and critical documentation of the returned sample [Race and Rummel, 
2000, p. 171. lmaging at this stage would serve multiple objectives: verification of mission 
success; correlation of specific samples with images of them taken on Mars and their sources; 
documentation of physical effects of transport to Earth (e.g., fracturing, disaggregation), 
preliminary identification of rock types, and measurement of sample volumes. It is anticipated that 
the returned samples would be imaged at a high spatial resolution (perhaps -0.1 millimeter per 
pixel), in wavelengths TBD (perhaps approximately seven-to-nine wavelengths, with at least three 
or four in the visible). These data will be critical to understanding the nature of the returned sample 
and in processing and selection of samples for Life Detection and Biohazard tests. 
Masses of samples should be measured first at this stage, and subsequently whenever a sample 
is cleaned, split or allocated. Measurement of mass is important as a mission design requirement, 
for the sample tracking and curation, and for helping allocate suitable samples for LDIBH testing. 
For instance, it is likely that a mission requirement would be return to Earth of a given mass of 
martian material, and weighing here will determine if that mission requirement has been fulfilled. 
* 3.3 Separate rock fragments and cores from fines: At this stage of processing, the solid returned 
sample would be separated into larger and smaller fragments. The former would include drill 
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cores, whole rocks, and rock fragments or rocklets2* (equivalent to the Apollo "coarse-fines"). The 
latter would include unconsolidated regolith, atmospheric dust, and dust generated by coring 
operations. This separation is necessary because the larger fragments cannot be treated as 
homogeneous powders, and must be examined individually for Life Detection and Biohazard 
analysis. It is possible that the regolith samples will include small rocks and rocklets, comparable 
to the case with the lunar regolith samples returned by the Apollo missions. As with Apollo, the 
small rocks and rocklets would be separated from the finer material, cataloged, and curated 
individually throughout subsequent processing and analyses. The cut-off size for rock fragments or 
rocklets remains to be determined. The standard cut-off size in the soil science community is 
greater than 2 millimeters. Previous sub-groups in the Workshop Series have suggested sizes 
ranging from greater than I millimeter to greater than 2 millimeters, and even "... greater than 
several millimeters ..." [Race et a/., 2001a, p. 34; Race and Rurnrnel, 2000, p. 171. It seems 
reasonable that decisions about cut-off sizes for different classes of solid materials will be made 
when the sample is returned and first examined, based on a recommendation of the Oversight 
Committee (see Appendix D3, page 145). 
Given the dusty nature of the martian surface, and the likelihood of dust generated during coring, it 
is anticipated that the surfaces of cores and rock samples will be coated with fine-grained 
materials. After separation, preliminary examination, and documentation of the returned solid 
materials, it will be necessary to remove dust from surfaces of the cores, rocks, and rocklets [Race 
etal., 200lb, p. 221. These fine materials constitute distinct samples of martian material, and will 
require different processing and curation than the solids (i.e., the fines track). In addition, the fine 
materials on solids will likely hinder identification and processing of the latter by obscuring their 
surfaces. Selection of samples for Life Detection and Biohazard assays will require knowledge of 
the mineralogy, structure, and textures of the samples. The analytical probes available (primarily 
visual and near-infrared optics) will be unable to operate effectively on dust-covered samples. 
The exact method of fines removal are to be determined. Suggested methods have included 
vacuuming the samples, blowing the dust off, a combination of vacuuming and blowing, and laser 
desorption. In all these cases, thought needs to be given to how the fines are to be collected after 
removal. The fines collected from each solid sample would be identified individually, and treated 
as a separate fines sample within the "fines track," as described in section 4.0 below. 
3.4 Sort to Groups: After removal of adhering fines, the solid samples should be sorted into 
groups of similar materials using visual clues and information from Preliminary Examination data 
[Race and Rurnrnel, 2000, p. 17; Race etal., 2001al. This step assumes that the returned sample 
will contain several cores andlor multiple millimeter-sized rock fragments ("rocklets"). Criteria for 
sorting would include size, rock type (including color), grain size, texture, and other readily 
observable properties. This sorting is an important first step towards selecting representative 
samples for Life Detection and Biohazard tests [Race et a/., 2001a, p. 261. 
24. The t e h o l o g y  used to refer to small rocky materials has varied from workshop to workshop in this Series. The terms 
rock fragments, rocklets, and pebbles have been used to identify a general class of solid material that is distinct from fines, 
larger rocks or rock cores. In addition to determining cut-off sizes at some later date, it will be advisable to use consistent 
terminology in all parts of the protocol. 
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3.5 Pristine Bank: Samples and sub-samples that are not chosen at this point for Furfher 
Screening and/or for Life Detection and Biohazard tests will be stored in a Pristine Sample Bank 
[Race and Rummel, 2000, p. 171. This "bank will serve as a containment system designed to 
maintain the physical, chemical, and biological integrity of samples while they await allocation for 
other analyses at a later date. According to recommendations by CAPTEM, the "bank should hold 
the samples under an inert atmosphere at temperatures below 240K [Neal, 20001. The pristine 
solid samples are those that have been affected by no procedures beyond those of preliminay 
examination, dust removal, and sorting. The pristine bank will serve the critical purpose of 
preserving a portion of the returned sample for analyses beyond and after the Life Detection and 
Biohazard assays associated with planetary protection. The pristine bank samples will become the 
principal resource for all subsequent chemical, geological, physical, and biological analyses on the 
returned samples. 
3.6 Further Screening: At this point, sub-samples of each rock type group sorted previously (see 
section 3.4 above) would be subjected to additional analyses in support of (and preliminary to) Life 
Detection and Biohazard tests [Race and Rummel, 2000, p. 14; Race et a/., 2001a, p. 371. The 
exact analyses needed are to be determined in conjunction with the detailed LDIBH tests that are 
also TBD (see Future Research on pages 32 and 68). Selected analyses should emphasize non- 
destructive methods that are not likely to modify or destroy biological molecules and biohazards, 
and would not be anticipated to kill or weaken live martian organisms. Once they are defined, it will 
be possible to learn what characteristics of the returned samples would affect or interfere with the 
tests, and what data are essential prior to the tests. With these data in hand, the Further Screening 
analyses can be tailored to meet the requirements of life and biohazard detection. Given these 
restrictions and uncertainties, the following screening methods have been suggested. 
Multi-spectral imagery of the samples in visible, near-infrared, and/or thermal infrared light will 
provide identification of the minerals (inorganic chemical compounds) and presence and 
distributions of organic matter and water (molecular and bound) in the sample. Raman 
spectroscopy should be considered here also, with the caveat that samples can experience 
significant heating during Raman analysis. (For instance, 514.5 nanometer green light from an 
argon laser is absorbed significantly more than 1064 nanometer infrared light from a Nd:YAG25 
laser. Heating can also be mitigated by distribution of laser power in space and time over the 
sample). The distributions of minerals on the samples' surfaces will be crucial clues to 
understanding their internal structures. X-ray diffraction analysis would also be valuable in defining 
the minerals in the samples (see Race et al., 2001a, p. 35ff, for more detail on these methods.) 
It is important to know the internal structures of the samples (especially the larger ones), because 
biogenic material could reasonably be concentrated in cracks and open spaces (analogous to 
terrestrial endolithic organisms). Building on the imagery above, tomographic analyses could 
provide three-dimensional visualizations of the internal structures of the samples. Among 
tomographic methods, the most developed at present is X-ray tomography. To provide X-ray 
tomographic maps of density (i.e., continuum absorption of X-rays) now requires only a bench-top 
instrument. X-ray tomographic maps for individual elements (like carbon) require at present the X- 
ray intensity of a synchrotron light source, and is likely impractical in this Furfher Screening step. 
25. Neodymium-doped:Yttrium Aluminum Garnet laser. 
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Abundances and distributions of major elements and several minor elements will likely be 
important for sample selection in Life Detection and Biohazard analyses. It is also possible that 
abundances of certain elements could produce false positives or negatives on Life Detection and 
Biohazard tests. A likely method for elemental analysis is X-ray fluorescence, a mature technique 
used routinely in inorganic geochemistry. 
It would be very important at this stage to have bulk analyses for carbon as a guide to sample 
selection. However, none of the Sample Handling Protocol Workshop sub-groups suggested a 
non-destructive test for bulk carbon that was sufficiently precise and had low enough detection 
limits to be useful here. This is an area for future research. 
* 3.7 Selection of Sub-samples: Based on data from the Further Screening tests (section 3.6), 
representative sub-samples will be selected for Life Detection and Biohazard tests. The remaining 
unselected samples will be stored in the Returned Sample Bank (section 3.8) for future research 
access. Selected samples will carry forward to the actual Life Detection and Biohazard 
investigations (section 5.0). 
- 3.8 Returned Sample Bank: The Returned Sample Bank, distinct from the Prisfine Sample Bank 
(see section 3.5 above), is for storage of samples that have experienced the analysis of Further 
Screening, but have not yet been allocated for Life Detection and Biohazard tests. These returned 
samples should be labeled and kept distinct from the pristine samples, as the former have had 
more chance for contamination than the latter. 
Fines Track 
* 4.0 Fines Track: Fines samples are those with particle sizes smaller than some to-be-determined 
limit; the size limit suggested by earlier sub-groups in this Workshop Series was 
1 or 2 millimeters [Race and Rummel, 2000; Race et a/., 2001a, 2001b]. In either case, it is 
anticipated that fines samples will contain so many grains, mixed homogeneously, that it will be 
readily possible to take representative splits for Life Detection and Biohazard tests. Fines samples 
may include materials from a variety of sources: material collected as such, like dust from a wind- 
deposited dune; regolith that has had coarser material removed (see section 3.3 above); dust 
filtered out of the SRC head gas (see section 2.1 above); or particulates removed from surfaces of 
rocks or cores (see section 3.3 above). 
4.? Characterizafion: Characterization of fines samples would be limited to imagery of each bulk 
fines sample (possibly including multi-spectral imagery) and weighing of each bulk sample [Race 
et a/., 2001a, p. 351. There is no need to image or otherwise characterize each individual particle 
within a bulk fines sample. Only these minimal analyses are needed to document each fine sample 
at this stage in order to select samples or representative sub-samples for Biohazard and Life 
Detection assays. Sub-groups at the first Workshop in this Series suggested that each fines 
sample be subdivided into fragments larger and smaller than 1 millimeter [Race and Rummel, 
20001, but this suggestion was not pursued by any later Sub-group. It may be an area of needed 
research. 
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4.2 Split for LD/BH Tests and Banking: At this point in PIC processing, fines samples would be 
selected for Life Detection and Biohazard tests, and split into representative aliquots. Some 
aliquots would be carried foward to Life Detection and Biohazard tests (see section 5.3 below), 
and some would be reserved in the 'Pristine Sample Bank' (see section 3.5 above). 
The methods of splitting the fines samples are to be determined. Methods used in typical terrestrial 
applications (e.g., riffle splitter or coning-and-q~artering~~), may not be appropriate or practical 
here [Race et a/., 2001a, p. 141. First, these methods involve considerable contact between the 
sample and tools and surfaces, and may be deemed too contaminating. Second, both methods 
have the potential for considerable loss of sample through embedding in metal surfaces or 
electrostatic adhesion to metal and plastic surfaces. The electrostatic adhesion problem will be 
exacerbated in the dry atmosphere of the PPL-ct spaces, as has been found with curation of lunar 
samples. In fact, neither method is now used for splitting lunar fines samples. This is clearly an 
area for research. 
In this Draft Protocol, it is assumed that a sub-sample of fines is representative, based on 
confirmation of an adequate splitting method. However, previous sub-groups [Race et al., 2001, 
p. 141 suggested that each fines sample be split into multiple sub-samples and each analyzed for 
bulk composition and mineralogy (as under Further Screening, in section 3.6) to determine 
whether splits are homogeneous. Further consideration of this issue is needed. 
Life Detection and Biohazard Analvses 
5.0 Samples for Life Detection, Biohazard Analyses: At this point, samples have been selected for 
Life Detection and Biohazard tests as well as other PIC analyses 
5.1 Split into Representative Sub-samples for LD/BH: The samples selected for Life Detection and 
Biohazard tests will be split into representative sub-samples at this point. This splitting is 
necessary to ensure that analyses are performed on similar materials, and so that the results of 
one test may be reasonably correlated with the results of another. Splits chosen for immediate 
analysis will proceed to various LDIBH analyses (see section 5.3 below). Some splits will be held 
in reserve as part of the return sample bank as described in section 5.2. below. 
5.2 Reserve: Some splits from section 5.1 will be held in reserve for Life Detection and Biohazard 
tests, in anticipation of future needs. Should a test fail or require repetition, this reserve material 
would be available. These reserve splits could reasonably be kept in the 'Return Sample Bank,' 
but labeled accordingly. 
5.3 Parallelism of Tasks: It is beyond the scope of the PIC procedure to describe the actual 
operation of Life Detection and Biohazard analyses and supporting inorganic analyses. However, 
they are included on Figure SGI-1 for completeness. It is anticipated that these three types of 
tests would be run in parallel, with the results of each influencing the interpretation and course of 
the other tests [Carr et a/., 1999, p. 91. 
- 
26. A riffle splitter is a mechanical separation device that is able to split an unconsolidated soil sample into two equal parts 
that have the same grain size distribution (and presumably composition as the parent sample). Coning-andquartering is 
another commonly used separation method (as desaibed in M a d  1968). 
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Future Research 
In the discussions about physical and chemical processing of the returned martian samples, Sub- 
group 1 identified several areas where data were not available or could readily be readily obtained 
without additional research. Each research suggestion discussed below is keyed to the particular 
narrative text section above where it is called out: 
What analyses and data do the Life Detection and Biohazard analyses require from physical 
and chemical processing processes? (see sections 3.2, 3.6, and 4.1). These requirements 
were not available, so the PIC process here reflects informed judgment (mostly from 
geochemists and geologists) about which analyses would be most useful in LDIBH studies. In 
particular, it would be very important to know what information about sample characteristics or 
the particular PIC processing would be important to know for LDIBH purposes (for example, as 
possible causes of false positives or negatives: to document abundances of specific elements 
of interest (e-g., arsenic) or minerals (e.g., saponite clay); or to characterize surface reactivity 
and constituents (e.g., super-oxidants), etc. 
Is there added value in separating each fines sample into grain size separates [Race and 
Rummel, 2000, p. 17]? What additional contamination might be introduced by this procedure? 
(see section 4.1) 
How can one remove terrestrial contaminants (including organics) from the exterior of the SRC 
before it enters PPL-a space? Laser ablation surfacing was suggested and should be studied. 
(see section 1.1) 
How can one effectively remove dust and other fines from the surfaces of rocks and rock 
cores? (see section 3.3) Three suggestions were vacuuming, blowing with compressed gas, 
and laser desorption. 
* What effects do X-rays have on biological structures and molecules? Several analytical 
methods involve interaction of X-rays with the samples (e.g., XRD, XRF, XR tomography), and 
the Sub-group 1 did not know whether these X-ray doses would affect LDIBH analyses. (see 
section 3.6) 
* How can one analyze a bulk sample for trace or ultra-trace quantities of carbon, non- 
destructively and without anticipated deleterious effects on biological molecules or viable 
organisms? (see section 3.6) 
* Is the chemical composition of the head gas affected by filtration to remove small particles? 
(see section 2.1) 
How can one produce representative splits of martian dust and fines materials without 
unacceptable contamination or loss of sample? (see section 5.2) 
How can one confirm that splits of dust or fines material are representative before biohazard 
and Life Detection analyses, or is such confirmation necessary? (see section 2.2) 
* What chemical and physical effects would removal of head gas and replacement with dry 
nitrogen have on the returned martian samples? (see section 1.2) 
* What chemical effects would removal of head gas from the returned sample canister have on 
the gas itself? (see section 1.2) 
What effects would removal of head gas and replacement with dry nitrogen have on live 
martian and terrestrial organisms in the returned martian samples? Would these effect be 
mitigated if samples were curated under dry nitrogen with 0.006 bars of CO;, gas? (see section 
1.2) 
- What effects would gas with terrestrial carbon and oxygen isotope ratios have on live martian 
and returned terrestrial organism in the returned martian sample? Perhaps, would live martian 
organism ingest the terrestrial carbon and oxygen, and become isotopically indistinguishable 
from terrestrial organisms? (see section 1.2) 
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* Using Mars simulants, determine whether materials and conditions recommended by 
CAPTEM [Neal, 20001 are appropriate for handling martian samples. (see section 3.0) 
* Petrographic thin sections are enormously valuable in characterizing the minerals, structures, 
textures and history of a rock. Can petrographic thin sections be produced in a manner 
consistent with the principles of minimal sample use and minimal contamination of the section 
material and the remaining sample? 
Areas of Concern 
Several areas of serious or general concern have been raised during discussions of physical and 
chemical processing; these issues are significant enough to affect mission design, SRC design, and 
SRF design: 
* The validity and significance of biosafety and LDIBH procedures in the SRF is strongly 
dependent on sample collection procedures on Mars, and thus on spacecraft and mission 
design. How can the Biohazard and Life Detection teams have adequate influence on the 
designs of sample return spacecraft and sample collection procedures? 
* What if the return sample container is breached or its seal is compromised? What contingency 
plans are possible to achieve PPL-a containment and biosafety? (see 'Real-Time Adjusfmenfs,' 
page 83) 
Is measurement of sample mass important as a preliminary characterization step? Should it 
be deferred until the 'Further Screening' step? (sections 3.2 and 3.6) 
* How is the head gas to be removed from the SRC without contamination? (section 1.2) Is 
backfill with non-reactive gas justifiable in terms of possible effects on martian biology? Would 
it be adequate to backfill with 6 millibars of terrestrial C02 and the remainder a non-reactive 
gas? (section 1.2) 
What should be done if a unique critical sample is smaller than the nominal requirements for 
LDIBH analyses? (section 3.4 ff) 
* What should be done if the requirements for LDIBH testing evolve to consume an inordinate 
quantity of returned sample, to preclude other biological, organic, and inorganic tests that 
further NASA's other goals? (section 5.0) 
* Although not directly relevant here, concern was expressed that sterilization measures might 
have significant adverse effects on biochemical analyses outside of PPL containment [Race 
and Rummel, 20001. 
Sub-Group 2: Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Life Detection Testing 
Charter 
The charter of Sub-group 2 was to "Review, assess, and adjust the Penultimate Working Draft 
Protocol for Life Detection, considering the following questions: Are data available from the first-tier 
physicallchemical analyses to support further analyses for Life Detection? Can the Draft Protocol be 
expected to yield evidence of living organisms within a martian sample? Can terrestrial organisms 
that might contaminate the sample be detected and identified as such? Can the Draft Protocol enable 
the detection of life-forms which are not based on Earth-biochemistry, but which have an active 
metabolism? Which analyses need to be done in containment either within the primary containment 
facility or outside of containment using sealed containers? Which analyses can be done outside of 
containment on samples subjected to a sterilizing process, involving heat, radiation, etc., or a 
combination of these agents, to ensure they are safe for analyses outside of containment?" 
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Sub-Group 2 Members 
Relman, David A. (U.S. Co-Chairperson) 
Mustin, Christian (French Co-Chairperson) 
Bada, Jeffrey L. 
Clemett, Simon J. 
Fox, George 
Friedmann, E. lmre 
Lambed, Joseph B. 
Maurel, Marie-Christine 
Sogin, Mitchell L. 
Stabekis, Pericles D. 
Voet, Donald 
Wainwright, Norman 
[Editors' note: Sub-group 2 prepared their report in the form of a list of comments and suggested 
changes to the PWDP; no attempt was made to re-write their report as prose. Any page numbers 
or figureitable numbers mentioned in this Sub-group's report refer to pages, figures, and tables in 
the PWDP.] 
Principles 
- Start with broadly-defined signatures that cover all known terrestrial life and might cover non- 
terrestrial life (modify "bio-signatures" p. 24-25, move to beginning): structural, chemical- 
structural and biosynthetic, isotopic, geochemical 
Most likely scenario for non-terrestrial life involves prebiotic mix similar to early terrestrial; but 
different evolutionary path: carbon-based, but slightly different building blocks and polymers 
De-emphasize specific focus on non-Earth-based (non-carbon-based) life (delete Table LDI) 
Will we be able to recognize prebiotic chemistry? 
Table LD2 ("Universal Properties of Life") modified: #3 - Life competes for resources, as a 
result, it replicates, evolves, etc. \ 
Table LD2: Each category might be found alone (e-g., self-sustaining catalytic system), and 
as such, could constitute a sign of life (non-terrestrial); it is the combination of all categories 
together that define life as we know it. 
Analytical Methods 
Emphasize general approach: broad survey of portion of different sample types for suggestive 
features - structure, basic chemistry (organic or complex carbon), local inhomogeneities; then, 
focussed examination for polymers, more complex structures 
* Sunley mode: microscopy, broad-band fluorescence scanning, surface scanning/chemistry, 
tomography (outside SRF?); add isotope release experiments (e.g., Viking)? 
Focussed mode: MS approaches, combustion/acid, isotope analysis; add (new) electron 
microprobe methods for cell scale elemental mapping 
Need furfber development of methods: for characterizing rare complex polymers (see earlier 
Workshop) and criteria for positive result in assessing complex carbon 
Sunfey methods: may be less sensitive to quantity or location, or less specific; but allow 
targeting (focussed methods), and most effective use of samples 
Culture: likelihood of negative results 
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* Expand: search for geochemical signatures of life, e-g., pigments (photosynthesis), other 
inorganic chemical anomalies (iron, sulfur, etc.) 
* Add: search for localized overabundance of discrete subset of related compounds (self- 
sustaining catalysis) 
* Add: finding of co-localized, multiple putative organisms increases likelihood that they 
represent life-forms 
Integration, Organization of Methods 
* Minimally-destructive methods can guide use of grossly-destructive methods 
* Start with samples least likely to contain life (surface fines); if negative, use as blanks, controls 
for spiking 
* Need elaboration of procedures for transportation of samples under PPL-a 
* Remember: if identified in a sample, Earth-based life contamination cannot necessarily be 
assumed to explain all evidence of life found in that sample, especially when using different 
methods; i.e., both Earth and Mars life may be present 
* Controls . .. more detail needed (regarding methods, and problems of heterogeneity) 
Sampling spacecraft prior to departure (archive and analyze up-front) 
Return of martian atmosphere in separate but identical container 
+ Ubiquity of terrestrial life signatures in reagents, etc.; therefore, need negative controls 
incorporated which involve blank handled in near-identical manner (what is the blank? either 
treated Earth sample, or .. . ?) 
* Because we expect many "negative" results, need to determine level of sensitivity, so that 
result can be described relative to this level 
* Exposure of sample surface to PPL-a atmosphere will (unavoidably) cause deposition of 
particulate matter; therefore, need to analyze this process over time on a "blank sample 
Other Considerations, Comments 
Include commentary on usefulness of replicate analyses after elapsed time in SRF for further 
evidence of life or bioactivity (changing signatures). Also, value of repeated measurements 
after perturbation (e-g., altered environmental conditions) 
Add commentary on relative value of specific methods for detecting on-going activity versus 
inactivity 
* Sample "treatment" (sterilization) is likely to eliminate ability to continue Life Detection 
Distinguishing terrestrial from non-terrestrial life: if former is intact or replicating - little 
problem; but if former is fragmented or evidence is fragmentary, and/or if non-terrestrial life is 
closely-related to terrestrial, then the task will be challenging 
May not be wise to include a specific time period (90 days) required for preliminary Life 
Detection 
The following are comments by Christian Mustin (Centre de Pedologie Biologique, France) regarding 
the prioritization of analytical methods for Life Detection, upon which the Sub-group largely agreed. 
Analytical methods should be arranged in a prioritized order using as criteria the most likely 
biosignatures or more restricting hypotheses of life occurrences. Moreover, minimally destructive 
methods (task 1) can guide use of destructive methods (tasks 2 and 3): 
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* First task "sfrucfural signs of life": (obvious signs of cellular structure or biomineralization) 
- Non destructive methods, done in containment: microscopy and microspectroscopy 
(Raman, IR, broad-band fluorescence); 3D tomography, surface scanninglchemistry. 
- Meeds referenced database of the characteristics of likely microbial ecosystem chemistry 
(lithotrophic, endolithic, extremophilic environments) and complex life structures 
Second task "chemical signs of life": Chemical species of life (Carbon, rare complex polymers 
and others chemicals): 
- Destructive methods: LDIMS, carbon analysis, isotopic analysis, solvent extraction 
- Define features of complex chemicals (rare polymers) 
- Measurements done outside the containment: Control of contamination, development of 
PPL-a sealed container 
Third task "biochemical and molecular signs of life": Markers of life (Earth-centric approach - 
genetic), distinguish terrestrial versus martian life: 
- Molecular methods, amplification techniques, done in containment: PCR, LAL assays, ATP 
arnalysis, flow cytometry 
- Extended databases (to be completed): Matches or mismatches with known species; 
distinguish terrestrial from non-terrestrial life 
Fourth task "Replication of structures or signs of bioactivity": 
- Culture under terrestrial or martian conditions: Detect self sustaining catalytic system or 
self-replicating system, detect structural, chemical and biochemical changes, etc. 
- Inventory media formulation, check compatibility with martian environment (mineralogy, 
energy and carbon sources) 
- Iterative approach: specific methods for detecting on-going activity versus inactivity could 
be found in Tasks 1,2, andlor 3 
Controls for L i fe  Detection 
Two levels of control (two issues for control) must be defined: 
the first one concerning the integration and the organization of the final protocol and the likely 
(or unavoidable) contamination of samples during experiments or their transport under PPL-a 
condition. 
the second, more specific concerning considered methods for the detection of life or of 
bioactivities 
For Integration o f  Protocol 
* Evaluate change in pristine atmospheric sample and estimate "spontaneous" reactivity of 
sample, by returning martian atmosphere samples in separate containers. Check effect of 
sealing. 
Development of PPL-a containers designed for outside analyses, including a specific 
procedure for control of contamination during transport. Need to analyze this process over 
time on a "blank sample 
* Evaluate adsorption of molecules (high specific surface area), effect of box material, 
atmosphere changing, terrestrial contaminants 
* Evaluate the efficiency of decontamination or sterilization procedures to reduce contaminant 
load. 
* Effect of heat and ionizing radiation treatment ("sterilization") on the chemical properties of 
samples. Ionizing radiation produces electrons, hydroxyl radical and hydride radical. Each of 
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these reactive molecules is capable of degrading and altering organic matter (polymers)27 and 
surface chemistry of mineral sample (solubility of mineral for instance). Evaluate reactivity of 
sample (solubility rate). 
Sample "treatment" (sterilization, killing or removal of all viable organisms) is likely to eliminate 
ability to continue Life Detection 
For Detection of Life and Bioactivity 
The Life Detection process is an "open box" which will be modified over time (depending on previous 
analyses). 
The choice of blank or control procedures should take into account the low likelihood of detecting life. 
It should be ordered to take into account a variety of routes of sterilization or inhibition methods to 
limiting growth of potential living organisms or to reducing bioactivity (change in conditions). 
Validate control procedures and Life Detection methods by the employment of soil simulants 
and earth microbes living in similar microhabitats 
The complete killing (cidal effect) or destruction of all organisms (i.e., lysis at high energy) is 
not necessarily required. 
Additional Issues 
Equivocal Findinas: Problems of terrestrial microorganisms evolving on Marslliving relics of earliest 
life-forrns1Earth organisms living in particular conditions (extremophilic). Perhaps, there is little latitude 
for genes to change significantly, if a self-replicating system maintains itself successfully under such 
harsh conditions. Matches with an extended genus database. 
Sensitivitv: Are we able to detect the activity of scarce life? What is the confidence of blank test 
results? To what degree are the small samples representative of the larger samples? 
* Need to determine level of sensitivity of detection methods, if many "negative" results are 
expected; 
* Results can be discussed relative to this level and blanks used to validate. 
Culfure Strateqv: Countless microhabitats (niche, heterogeneous microenvironment) exist on Earth 
and are responsible for a great metabolic diversity and biodiversity. For instance, mineral surfaces will 
be of considerable importance as likely life habitats, because nutrients can be adsorbed to them 
(nutrient levels higher than in bulk solution). We must therefore, learn "to think small and rare" and 
incorporate these considerations into the protocol methods and processing. A conceivable culture 
strategy could be: 
* Duplicate as closely as possible resources and conditions of the pristine niche; 
* Define microhabitats and the bioavaibility of nutrients ("feast or famine"). Use spiked Mars soil 
simulants. 
* Measure the activities of organisms and monitor their effects on the niche. Inventory likely life 
signatures and ubiquity (chemical changes) 
27. A 80 kGy (8 Mrad) dose degrades polymeric molecules (humic acid) in soil. 
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Comments on Relative Value of Specific Methods for Detecting On-Going 
A c t i ~ t y  Versus Inactivity 
Because physico-chemical conditions in a microenvironment can change in terms of both time and 
space, replicate analyses after elapsed time in BSL-4 containment will be useful for further evidence 
of life or bioactivity (changing chemical signatures) or repeated measurements after perturbation 
(e.g., altered environmental conditions). Sample "treatment" (sterilization, killing or removal of all 
viable organisms) is likely to effect subsequent Life Detection. 
The following sections present an elaboration by George Fox (University of Houston, Texas) on 
comments he made during the Sub-group discussion and upon which the Sub-group largely agreed, 
concerning the incorporation of concepts on the origins of life in the design of Life Detection methods. 
Fox noted that the Life Detection Sub-group had focussed much of its effort to date on defining 
properties of life and then devising experiments to determine if any of the indicator properties are 
present in a sample. An alternative way of thinking about the problem of Life Detection is to consider 
how life might have arisen on Mars and/or the Earth. When one does this it clarifies why it is so 
important to determine not only if there are complex organics but also their composition. 
lnde~endenf Origins of Martian Life: Existing theories of the origin of life on Earth suggest that life will 
arise as a consequence of chemical and physical principles anywhere prebiotic carbon compounds 
accumulate in suitable environments, e.g., water, temperature, etc. in sufficient amounts for sufficient 
time. Although the precise process for life's origins on the Earth is not known, it is perceived to have 
been a progression in complexity beginning from an original prebiotic mixture, at some stage 
involving RNA catalysis, and probably at later stages catalysis by peptides and proteins, ultimately 
culminating with the first simple organisms that had a metabolism, the ability to replicate and the 
capability of preserving useful information during the replication process. It is hypothesized here that 
if a unique carbon-based life system exists on Mars that it arose by similar processes as those which 
led to the origin of life on the Earth. A critical question for theories of the origin of life is whether the 
process is primarily deterministic, or perhaps alternatively has stochastic components. In the later 
case, evolutionary theory suggests it is extremely unlikely that there would be one precise outcome to 
the origin process, especially if it were to occur in different places with different initial conditions. 
There is no clear reason why there should be one and only one series of events that lead from 
prebiotic chemistry to true life. Thus, when life arises in other environments, e.g., Mars, it is likely to 
deviate from the path followed on Earth as soon as there is a significant possibility of doing this. In 
other words, the similarity between life systems with independent origins will to the first approximation 
depend on the extent the process is unique. In fact, current thinking about the process on Earth 
suggests that i't had many steps and stages with selection and competition acting on molecules and 
entities early on just as it later acts on the organisms. Therefore, deviations leading to dramatically 
different outcomes might have occurred at many stages. 
This theoretical framework suggests that if martian life were descended from an independent origin 
that the most likely scenario is that it would likely differ in fundamental biochemical properties such as 
the choice of fundamental amino acids or nucleotides used, types of lipids, chirality, etc. If divergence 
occurred much later in the process but still before a true organism had emerged we would expect less 
fundamental differences such as different choices for the codon assignments (not usage) or the 
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structure of tRNAs and the ribosome. The primary indicator of past or present life of this type would 
be to find unusual macromolecular assemblages, e.g., peptides or oligonucleotides with nonstandard 
amino acids, non-standard bases, non-standard linkages, etc. 
A crucial experiment in the absence of obvious indicators (e-g., structural signatures, ability to grow 
etc.) is to conduct a detailed analysis of complex carbon (if any is found). It will be essential to 
determine if there is evidence for novel amino acids, peptides containing novel amino acids, chirality 
effects, etc. However, complex carbon found in meteorites partially fulfills this condition so a positive 
result would require a comparison with controls to establish that the amount and type of compounds 
seen is outside the normal range of that found in meteorites (e.g., Lunar samples, and terrestrial 
samples). 
A related but far less likely scenario is that divergence from the origins path was excluded until true 
organisms existed, with the result being that the organisms would be fundamentally Earth-like. In 
such an instance, it would likely still be possible to recognize this by sequencing 16s rRNAs. Trees 
built from these data would likely reveal the martian organism to be as different from Bacteria and 
Archaea as these Kingdoms are from one another. 
Finally a complexity might arise. It is within the scope of imagination that an aberrant composition 
found in the complex organics might be the consequence of middle to late stage prebiotic chemistry 
that never got as far as true organisms. 
Forward/Backward Contaminafion: If life is detected directly or by Earth like biochemical patterns in 
the complex organics, then there are several possibilities. One of these is that life arose 
independently on only one of the planets (i.e., Earth or Mars) and was transported to the other billions 
of years ago much as the martian meteorites reached Earth. In this scenario, tests such as 16s rRNA 
sequencing would again reveal organisms that did not tree with any of the major kingdoms, (genes for 
novel enzymes not found on the Earth etc.). If the transfer were more recent (hundreds of millions of 
years), the organisms might tree with particular sub-clusters, but no direct match would be detectable. 
If however forward contamination associated with the mission itself were to occur, it should be 
possible to find an exact match. 
Non-Carbon Based Life: It is impossible to speculate at this stage how simple non-carbon-based life 
might arise directly from a prebiotic world (such non-carbon-based-life might arise indirectly from 
advanced carbon based systems, e.g., descendants of intelligent robotslsmart computers, etc.). It is 
clear however from the agreed properties of life that such an entity would require complex 
compounds. An important experiment here may be to detect the presence of compounds containing 
Si, Al, Fe, etc. that are of unusual complexity compared to what is normally found on the Earth, in 
meteorites or lunar samples. It is not clear to this writer whether instrumentation to do this is available 
and therefore research might be required for this purpose. 
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Sub-Group 3: Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Biohazard Testing 
Chader 
The charter of Sub-group 3 was to "Review, assess, and adjust the Penultimate Working Draft 
Protocol for Biohazard testing: Are data available from the first-tier physicallchemical analyses to 
support the analyses for infectivitylbiohazard (especially the presence of toxic materials)? Can the 
Draft Protocol be expected to yield sufficient evidence to rule out any reasonable doubt over the 
absence of biohazard in the samples? Will the Draft Protocol allow for a broad-spectrum of 
challenges with the sample material that can reasonable be expected to show a response if the 
sample displays infectivity or a similar biohazard? Can the Draft Protocol results provide indications of 
the potential for chronic effects that should be assessed separately? Can terrestrial organisms that 
might contaminate the sample be detected and identified as such if a biohazard is detected? Which 
analyses need to be done in the primary containment facility, and which canlshould be done outside 
of the primary containment facility using samples selected and shipped to another containment 
laboratory or kept in sealed containers?" 
Sub-Group 3 Members 
Richmond, Jonathan (U.S. Co-Chairperson) 
Sourdive, David J.D. (French Co-Chairperson) 
Battista, John 
Bielitzki, Joseph 
Chamberlain, Virginia 
Fishbein, William N. 
Foster, Virginia 
Fultz, Patricia 
Gabriel, Dean W. 
Grange, Jacques 
Khan, Ali S. 
Malling, Heinrick 
McSweegan, Edward 
Pardee, Arthur B. 
Schad, Jack 
Stanbridge, Eric 4. 
Viso, Michel 
Sub-group 3 examined the PWDP for format, wording, content, and present limitations related to 
Biohazard testing. Since many key issues had already been addressed during previous Workshops, 
Sub-group 3 focused on perfecting parts that had already been substantially worked through, and on 
identiwing and addressing pending issues. The changes described below refer to changes to be 
made to the PWDP. 
Simple Modifications to the Penultimate Working Draft Protocol 
Defininitions and Terminoloav: Sub-group 3 started by addressing the issue of definitions and 
terminology used in sections relating to Biohazard testing. Several recommendations were made to 
clarify terminology in particular sections, and to suggest 'global' changes throughout the PWDP and 
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all subsequent documents on the topic. Sub-group 3 recommended the following changes to specific 
words or phrases: 
Change "replicating" to "replicating or amplifiable by a biological system." This new 
terminology will not limit biohazard to "living" entities which, depending on the perception of 
the dogma, may not include genuine biohazard such as viruses. 
* Change "adverse effect" to "significant alteration." This new terminology will not limit 
biohazards to entities that are immediately or acutely toxic. 
* Change "non-biohazardous to humans" to "non-biohazardous" (in the paragraph "If the initial 
Biohazard tests and Life Detection tests are all negafive, it would be appropriate to conduct 
subsequent tests under less strict containment conditions once sample materials have been 
shown to be non-biohazardous to humans."). This new terminology still includes biohazard to 
ecosystems. 
COMPLEX Report: Sub-group 3 also suggested a change in the location within the PWDP for 
recommendations by the Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration (COMPLEX). The 
Conclusions from the COMPLEX report [SSB 2 0 0 2 1 ~ ~  should be taken out of the body of the PWDP 
text on pages 7 and 8. The information from the COMPLEX report should be placed in an appendix 
and referred to at the beginning of page 7. 
Sequence of Tesfs: Sub-group 3 discussed the section of the PWDP on "Sequence of Tests" and 
agreed on two important conclusions. First, any particular test proposed today will likely be 
unacceptably obsolete at the time that samples are returned and the final protocol is implemented. 
Therefore no tests should be dictated ten years ahead. Second, the criteria for selecting tests, which 
was discussed in Workshop 2 of this series [Race etal., 2001a1, will still be valid even with 
improvements. Thus, Sub-group 3 made the following recommendations: 
The criteria for choosing tests (the 7 points from page 25 of the final report of Workshop 2, 
[Race et al., 2001aJ) should be included at the top of page 30. 
Change the sentence on page 30 "The following specific initial tests were recommended by 
Workshop 2 to be included in the Draft Protocol." to read "The following specific initial tests 
were suggesfed by Workshop 2 to be included in the protocol should i t  be carried out today." 
This change of wording in the Draft Protocol will make it consistent with the actual charter of 
the Biohazard Sub-group during Workshop 2. 
Levels of Containment and Number of Facilities: Sub-group 3 discussed the issue of levels of 
containment throughout the sessions. For the sake of clarification, and in order to keep a coherent set 
of definitions throughout the documents (and all further documents), Sub-group 3 made the following 
recommendations: 
* Include the PPLs matrix from page 45 of the Workshop 2 final report in the Draft Protocol, 
before Figure BH1 .29 
* Explicitly define the levels of cleanliness associated with the different levels of containment 
envisaged. 
28. At the time of Workshop 4, the COMPLEX report was stiU 'in press' but advance copies were available to the participants 
for reference. 
29. The final version of the figure referred to here as "BH1" appears as Figure WDP-4 on page 109 of this document. 
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* Change the term "BSL-3" to "BSL-3-Ag."30 Level 3 laboratories abide by different standards 
within the U.S. and Europe. The actual level 3 standard required for Mars samples is 
equivalent to U.S. BSL-3-Ag. 
Include a clear statement that only the primary Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) will have to 
provide PPL-a conditions. If facilities beyond the SRF are used as part of the Draft Protocol 
testing, these other facilities will be certified for conducting studies and tests at PPL-P, PPL-y, 
and PPL-6 conditions. 
* Sub-group 3 discussed the level of containment and cleanliness required for each kind or 
stage of testing in the Draft Protocol, and recommended that BSL-3-Ag facilities should be 
built around large instruments, rather than miniaturizing instruments to fit into a pre-existing 
lab. Both the cost and the feasibility of transforming instrumentation are unfavorable relative to 
the well-known and well-documented procedure of upgrading facilities to biosafety level 3. 
Modify flow chart BHI in the Draft Protocol as follows: 
- Move "in vivo tests" and "in vitro cells" upwards into the PPL zone. 
- Take out the "gas" text box 
Mobile containers should be certified at the appropriate PPL levels (as opposed to BSL 
requirements exclusively) to allow transport of samples. Sub-group 3 noted that procedures for 
routine transportation of biohazardous material(s) are already used by BSL-4 and BSL-3-Ag 
facilities. 
irradiation of Samples: Sub-group 3 discussed the issue of possible irradiation of samples, although 
it is not part of Biohazard testing per se. Two divergent points of view emerged during the discussion. 
Some Sub-group 3 members argued that even in absence of evidence of biohazard, samples should 
be gamma irradiated at substantial doses (equivalent or higher to those used for present day BSL-4 
sample release) prior to gradual de-containment and release. 
Those with a second perspective argued that, if Life Detection and Biohazard test results allow the 
conclusion that samples are safe enough for release, there is nothing in them that can be made safer 
by irradiation. Resorting to such treatment will unnecessarily destroy information and shed suspicion 
on the entire Final Protocol. In addition, the word "sterilization" should be STRICTLY reserved for the 
situation where a genuine organism can actually be grown prior to irradiation and can demonstrated 
as no longer active after such treatment. In all other instances, this wording ("sterilization") should be 
avoided because it implies there is conclusive evidence of biohazard inactivation, which may be 
misleading or provide a false sense of safety in communications with decision makers and the public. 
Despite lengthy discussion, Sub-group 3 did not reach any consensus and could not make any 
recommendations regarding irradiation or sterilization of samples. 
Pending Issues to be Addressed and Added to the Draft Protocol 
There are three issues to be addressed and added to the PWDP in order to finalize it: Sub-sampling, 
Decision Making, and Communication of Results. 
30. For the most current definition of BSL-3-Ag, consult the web site of the US Department of Agriculture 
<http://www.afm.ars.usda.gov/ppweb/242-01m.hW 
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Sub-samolinq: Sub-group 3 noted that the difficult issue of sub-sampling procedures for Biohazard 
testing, which although mentioned repeatedly in earlier reports, was not addressed in detail in the 
PWDP. In their discussions, the Sub-group attempted to identify methodological approaches that 
could provide reasonable statistical relevance for tests performed on sub-samples. Sub-group 3 
recommended that this crucial issue should be addressed more thoroughly in the PWDP. 
Sub-group 3 concluded that if no characterization of samples is provided, only random sub-sampling 
can be performed and for some samples (rocks, pebbles, etc.) it may be questionable, and release 
may never be recommended. 
Since fines can be considered "homogeneous" and can be sub-sampled as one category in a 
statistically relevant way, Sub-group 3 recommended that Biohazard testing be initiated using sample 
materials in the 'fines' category. 
Decision Makinq: Sub-group 3 also noted that in the PWDP, no procedure was described for data 
interpretation or decision making, both of which are crucially important issues. It is likely that test 
results will not lead to unanimous consensus in all instances. Sub-group 3 emphasized the 
importance of following a strict scientific procedure in reaching conclusions as well as the need to 
involve selected, multidisciplinary experts and expert groups in the decision-making. The Sub-group 
noted the importance of addressing the overall decision making process as well as procedures for 
drawing conclusions, certifying results, and deciding that samples are safe enough to be released to 
lower containment levels. 
Sub-group 3 recommended adding to the PWDP sections on decision-making and choice of expert 
panels in charge of decisions associated with Biohazard testing. At a minimum, the principles of 
decision-making should be outlined in the final protocol document. 
Communication of Results: Since Biohazard testing is unlikely to provide certainty about returned 
samples, it will be important to address publicly the subject of acceptable risks and benefits 
associated with any release of martian materials. Sub-group 3 emphasized the importance of 
developing a strong public communication plan far in advance of sample return to keep both the 
public and the scientific community informed of results during Life Detection and Biohazard testing. In 
recognition of the inherent problems associated with dissemination of partial results or inconclusive 
observations, Sub-group 3 also noted the need for procedures and criteria (e.g., level of certainty, 
consensus or majority, etc.) for determining how observations and data will be designated as 'results' 
suitable for formal announcement. 
A public communication plan should be developed well in advance of sample return to keep both the 
public and the scientific community informed of results during Life Detection and Biohazard testing. In 
addition, specific plans for a formal/official 'Announcement of Results' should be included as part of 
the Draft Protocol. 
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Sub-Group 4: Environmental and Health Monitoring and Safety Issues 
The charter of Sub-group 4 focused on "Environmental and health monitoring and safety issues to be 
considered in the Penultimate Working Draft Protocol: What sort of monitoring capabilities both within 
and outside of the containment area should be required to ensure the health and safety of the human 
workers in the primary receiving laboratory and any secondary facilities? What sort of capabilities 
should be required to ensure the adequacy of containment and the safety of the environment outside 
the primary receiving laboratory? Even if no biohazard is found in the samples, and they do contain 
non-biohazardous toxics or radioactive material - what measures should be required or 
recommended to ensure the safety of those working with samples that are analyzed outside of 
containment (both in the case of samples subjected to a sterilizing process to ensure they are safe for 
analyses outside of containment, and in the case of samples that have been released for scientific 
study during or after sample recovery)?" 
Sub-Group 4 Members 
Cambon-Thomsen, Anne (French Co-Chairperson) 
Leonard, Debra (U.S. Co-Chairperson) 
Crissman, Harry 
Daly, Michael 
Dawson, Sandy 
Debus, Andre 
Emmett, Edward 
Race, Margaret 
Rummel, John 
Ryan, Margaret 
Scannon, Patrick 
Vasil, Indra 
In essence, the charter for Sub-group 4 was to determine methods for monitoring the health and 
safety of the personnel of the SRF and the environment in and around the SRF, as well as at 
secondary sites, if any, in implementing the final protocol. The Sub-group considered monitoring over 
time, beginning prior to the arrival of Mars samples, during work on the Mars samples at the SRF and 
at secondary sites, and considered how long to continue monitoring. 
Assumptions 
The real risks associated with the Mars samples are unknown. 
The greatest potential risk is biological and includes "life as we don't know it." 
- The potential exposure in the SRF will be of a small group of trained professionals until more 
information about the nature of the specimens is available. 
A high level of security for the SRF and the samples will be maintained as part of the PPL 
designation. 
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Recommended Principles for Development of Monitoring Program for SRF 
Whenever possible, the monitoring plan should use existing regulations and standards. Since 
international teams will be working on the Mars samples, the regulatory standards from all 
participating countries should be reviewed and considered when developing the final monitoring plan. 
During the consideration of existing regulatory standards, the strictest standards, as appropriate for 
the anticipated hazards, should apply. Exemptions from existing regulations may be necessary 
because of, for example, differences in the protection of medical information between the participating 
countries. Achieving the maximum protection possible from the anticipated hazards for the individuals 
involved should be the leading principle for personnel monitoring and safety. Because of the unique 
nature of the potential hazards, additional controls than routinely used for hazard monitoring may be 
required. The monitoring plan should be designed to maintain a balance between the estimated risks 
to individuals, the environment or the general population and the personal impositions of the 
monitoring program. The monitoring plan should allow for cross-correlation of the data from the Life 
Detection and Biohazard testing of samples with the data from the monitoring of the SRF personnel 
and environment and allow for modification of either set of procedures. 
Potential Hazards Considered in the Discussions 
Five categories of potential hazards were considered: physical hazards, potential chemical hazards 
from non-biological toxins, biological hazards; failure or breach of containment; and psychological 
hazards. The physical hazards include hazards associated with equipment within the SRF labs and 
radiation from the Mars samples (which -- is expected to be negligible). The potential chemical hazards 
are predominantly from non-biological toxins. The biological hazards will clearly be the most difficult 
to monitor. The psychological hazards are those that may arise for personnel working under PPL 
conditions. Finally, monitoring of containment is a significant part of the monitoring program. 
Recommendations for monitoring for all hazards are as follows: 
Physical Hazard Monitoring (Radiafion and Equipment): Radiation is a standard hazard with well- 
established protocols for protection, handling and monitoring. To confirm the expectation that the 
Mars samples will not present a radioactivity hazard, a radioactivity measurement should be one 
of the initial measurements in the physical/chemical assessments. The measurement should be 
at a level appropriate to assess for a biohazard risk, and not to assess the absolute level of 
radioactivity present. Therefore, standard radiation safety protocols should be in place prior to the 
arrival of the Mars samples. If the radioactivity level does not represent a biohazard, then the 
monitoring for radioactivity can be discontinued, unless required for equipment used in the SRF. If 
a biohazardous level of radioactivity were detected in the Mars samples, then the radioactivity 
monitoring program would be continued. Other risks from equipment or facilities can be 
addressed by standard procedures of training and maintenance. 
2. Chemical Hazard Monitoring: A chemical hazard from the Mars samples is most likely from non- 
biological, non-replicating toxins, if present. The presence of toxins will be assessed early in 
physical/chemical testing. If an unusual substance or chemical is identified, specific monitoring 
methods for that substance can be designed and the substance could then also be used as a 
marker for breach of containment monitoring. 
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3. Monitoring of Containment: Standard methods for monitoring of containment in BSL facilities can 
be adapted for use in PPL facilities and can be used to define a breach of containment or 
potential personnel exposure. If a breach occurs within the SRF, the breach can be corrected by 
standard procedures and personnel exposures can be assessed. If a breach occurs to the 
environment outside the SRF, a procedure should be developed to assess for possible 
environmental andlor human consequences. Procedures for handling a breach to the outside due 
to differing causes (e.g., leak, disaster, security breach, etc.) should be considered in the 
development of the plans for handling a breach. 
4. Monitoring of fhe Environment: 
Before Mars Sample Arrival: A baseline assessment of the environment around the SRF 
should be made prior to the arrival of the Mars samples. The assessment should survey the 
pre-existing environmental conditions, and include an assessment of the water, air, flora, and 
fauna. This type of survey will likely be accomplished as part of the Environmental Impact 
Statement required prior to building SRF. During the baseline survey, sentinel species 
(microbes, insects, plants, animals) can be identified to use for monitoring for environmental 
changes. Consideration should be given to including some of the same organisms in 
Biohazard Testing. In case of noted changes in the environment around the SRF after arrival 
of the Mars samples, the Biohazard Testing results could assist in determining if the changes 
were related to the Mars samples. 
- During Mars Sample Handling at the SRF: Once the Mars samples are in the SRF, 
environmental monitoring could focus on the identified sentinel species and any novel 
components of the Mars samples, if identified. It may be useful also to track and record the 
weather conditions in area of SRF, for correlation in case of reports of a breach to the outside 
or any unusual events. If changes in the environment are noted on routine monitoring, assess 
if a breach has occurred. If a breach did occur, the breach procedures should be followed to 
reestablish containment and clean up any contamination. If changes in the environment are 
noted and a breach did not occur, assist with investigating the cause for the environmental 
change to establish that it either is or is not related to the SRF and Mars samples. 
* A fler Complefion of Life Detecfion/Biohazard Testing: The level of continued environmental 
monitoring required should be reassessed based on the conclusions of the Mars sample 
testing protocols. Consideration should be given to maintaining the security and containment 
within SRF for assuring the proper curation of the Mars samples. 
5. Moniforing of the SRF Personnel: 
- Before Mars Sample Arrival: A process of certification for people who will work in the SRF 
should be developed that includes education about procedures and risks for employment, 
security clearance, and medical examinations and tests. Clear inclusion and exclusion criteria 
based on the results of the certification procedures should be developed prior to the hiring of 
personnel. 
Baseline medical evaluations of personnel should use the existing medical evaluation 
standards appropriate at the time the evaluations are performed. Since the SRF will be 
functional for a period of time prior to the arrival of the Mars samples, monitoring before the 
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arrival of the Mars samples could include several evaluations (a period of two years was 
proposed). Recommended baseline evaluations include a medical history, physical 
examination, tests on the person (e.g., chest X-ray), and tests on samples from the person 
(e-g., blood and urine). All testing should be as non-invasive as possible and maintain a 
balance between estimated risks from the Mars samples and the risks associated with the 
tests. Specimens should also be archived for future comparison, if needed, and may include 
serum, lymphocytes, semen and/or hair. In addition neuro-psychological evaluations using 
standard testing techniques with well-established interpretation methods should be 
administered. Symptom data should be obtained using standardized instruments such as the 
Millennium Cohort survey (USA) or the GAZEL Cohort survey ( F r a n ~ e ) . ~ ~  
During Mars Sample Handling af fhe SRF: A schedule for regular evaluations of personnel 
should be established, using the same evaluation methods as used for the baseline data 
collection. Procedures for standard medical management of personnel illnesses shauld be 
available either on site or with adequate transportation to a medical facility, as needed. 
Intervention should be correlated with an identified or risk of exposure to the Mars samples. I f  
an exposure occurs and the exposed individual has or develops symptoms, the person should 
be transferred to a medical facility with BSL-4 containment capabilities, until proper 
assessment of the individual is accomplished. If an exposure occurs and the individual does 
not have or develop symptoms, procedures for quarantine of the individual should be 
developed with specific guidelines as to the length of quarantine required if the person 
remains asymptomatic. If an individual becomes symptomatic and there is no evidence of an 
exposure, the individual should be treated as appropriate for the symptoms and monitoring 
should continue as prescribed by the Draft Protocol. 
= After Complefion of Life Defecfion/Biohazard Tesfing: The question of how long to continue 
monitoring has to be addressed. Certainly the duration of monitoring will be influenced heavily 
by the outcomes of the Life Detection and Biohazard Testing. Several factors may need to be 
considered in this decision, such as the protection of the workers versus the protection of the 
general population. Clearly articulated decisions will be needed on whether to have lifetime 
surveillance for the personnel or a mandatory period followed by optional reporting, if the risk 
was determined to be low. Certainly monitoring may become optional if the samples are 
deemed safe by the Life Detection and Biohazard Testing. Whether or not surveillance is 
needed for relatives or people living close to the workers should be considered. A distinction 
should be made between monitoring for risk management and continued collection of data far 
a research study. The interpretation of personnel evaluations may require the use of a control 
group or population-based estimations of frequencies of different events. If so, sources for this 
information should be defined. 
Monitoring at Secondary Sites 
The level of monitoring to be used at secondary sites receiving and working on portions of the Mars 
samples should be based on the results of the Life Detection and Biohazard testing. If the Mars 
samples are still potentially hazardous, several points should be considered in the development of a 
procedure for monitoring at secondary sites. First, secondary sites should be identified prior to the 
31. Information on the Millennium Cohort can be found at http://millenniumcohort.org. 
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arrival of the Mars samples, to allow for pre-certification of personnel and collection of baseline data. 
Second, all distributions should be tracked and procedures for monitoring of containment at the 
secondary sites should be developed. Third, consider monitoring personnel at secondary sites using 
the same procedures as used at the SRF. The number of personnel at secondary sites is expected to 
be a small number of individuals. 
If the Mars samples are deemed safe either through "sterilization" or by biohazard test results, then 
methods should be used for tracking all sample distributions and all individuals in contact with the 
samples. In this case, only event reporting is needed. 
Database Issues 
A central database facility with data analysis capabilities and procedures should be used to gather 
and maintain an (e-g., baseline, monitoring), personnel data (e.g., baseline, in-process, follow-up), 
secondary site data and sample tracking data. Procedures for regular data analysis and reporting 
should be developed. Access to and confidentiality of the data should be defined and assured. Data 
analysis should distinguish between surveillance and research, with consideration given to the need 
for ethical review and approval for research procedures. 
Points of Consensus 
Personnel should be educated about procedures and risks for working in the SRF. 
* Baseline and monitoring data should be collected using standardized tools. 
* Surveillance of personnel and environment is an important component of the Draft Protocol. 
- A central database facility should be available. 
Safety and surveillance issues should be included in public reporting. 
Points of Discussion Without Consensus 
* Should monitoring be restricted to relevant public health measures as opposed to extending 
the Draft Protocol to allow for epidemiological research? 
* What time frame should be used for monitoring of personnel: lifetime versus limited period 
(according to hazards)? 
* If long term monitoring is implemented, what parameters should be monitored on a long term 
basis? 
What level of medical facilities are needed at the SRF? 
What level of baseline and testing is required for secondary site workers versus primary site 
workers? 
Summary 
Monitoring procedures for personnel and the environment should be developed considering 
international regulatory, cultural, and ethical issues. Procedures for the monitoring of personnel 
should include procedures for education and certification. The radiation and chemical risks are 
considered of low probability and can be assessed early in the chemi~al testing procedures to reduce 
the monitoring burden. Develop procedures for database management and data analysis with 
assurances for confidentiality and security of the data. 
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Sub-Group 5: Requirements of Draft Protocol for Facilities and Equipment 
Charter 
The charter of Sub-group 5 was to examine the "Requirements of the Penultimate Draft Protocol for 
facilities and equipment: What? Where? When? What if [a life-form or biohazard is detected]? What 
are the advantagesldisadvantages of distributing the protocol activities among more than one 
containment facility? What factors should be considered in sizing the primary containment facility? 
What requirements should be met by secondary (PPL-a, BSL-4) facilities? Are there any other 
considerations that should be taken into account in providing a facility the capability to enact the final 
protocol?" 
Sub-Group 5 Members 
Khan, Ali (U.S. Co-Chairperson) 
Bibring, Jean-Pierre (French Co-Chairperson) 
Allen, Carlton C. 
Battista, John 
Bradley, John 
Clemett, Simon 
Collins, Mary E. 
Council, Jean-Louis 
Fox, George 
Friedman, E. lmre 
Grange, Jacques 
Johnson, Dale 
Lindstrom, David 
Malling, Heinrick 
McSweegan, Edward 
Stabekis, Pericles D. 
Size and Scope of the Facility: The size and scope of the facility will depend on the decision whether 
to conduct all final protocol tests at the primary site or to distribute the final protocol functions and 
activities to secondary labs outside the facility. A cursory review of the proposed tests and probable 
equipment requirements from the PWDP suggests that the facility must be expandable and flexible. 
Where to Locate the Facilitv: The decision of where to locate the primary facility was not considered 
to be a scientific issue, excluding obvious cautions to avoid placement at sites subject to severe 
natural hazards (e.g., active faults, flood plains, etc.). The Sub-group reviewed the recent COMPLEX 
report on a Mars Facility [SSB 20021 and did not concur with their decision that this facility should 
necessarily be co-located with a BSL-4 facility. However, given the importance of maintaining this 
facility as an international resource for exploratory science studies, the Sub-group favored a location 
with ready access to an existing labor pool of scientists. 
When to Begin Design of the Facility: Regarding the question of when to begin design of the primary 
facility, the Sub-group recommended as soon as the mission is certain and the funds have been 
allocated. Ideally, the design of the primary facility should begin now. . 
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Distributina Profocol Activities Between Mulfiple Facilities: In discussing the question of whether or 
not to distribute final protocol activities and functions to more than one laboratory or facility, the Sub- 
group compiled the following lists of advantages and disadvantages: 
Presumed Advantages: 
Corroborating scientific results 
Possible cost savings by use of existing facilities 
Simplifies design of initial facility 
Ability to have increased instruments 
Better participation of international partners 
Presumed Disadvantages: 
Logistic and transportation difficulties 
Management difficulties (e.g., loss of control, uncertain cooperation) 
Potential danger of discovering biohazard after distribution 
The need for increased sample volume for testing 
More staff potentially exposed in the event of biohazard 
What if a Life-Form/Biohazard is Defected? The facility must have the flexibility and be able to expand 
quickly to accommodate scientific research by principal investigators and researchers. Samples 
should not be released from containment for broader distribution. 
What Reauirements Should be Met bv Secondatv Facilities? Secondary Facilities must follow the 
same standard operating procedures (e.g., for staff monitoring). All work must meet the PPL 
containment guidelines based on testing needs. A "chain of custody" must be established for all 
samples transported between facilities. Security assessments must be performed. 
The deliberations of Sub-group 5 were based on two primary assumptions: 1) Initial Life Detection is 
primarily for extant life (e.g., active or dormant) or biomaterials. The search for evidence of fossil life 
will likely intensify and continue after the samples are released from containment; and 2) Any extant 
life should be considered a biohazard. 
The Sub-group failed to reach consensus on whether to endorse the notion of distributing protocol 
activities and functions to laboratories and facilities outside the primary facility. The majority opinion 
was to limit Protocol activities and functions to one major facility, perhaps with the exception of having 
a duplicate back-up holding facility for the banked Mars samples. This initial facility should have the 
ability to receive the samples and perform all tests at containment levels ranging from PPL-a through 
y before distribution to any PPL-6 laboratories. However, the Sub-group agreed that there is nothing 
inherent in planetary protection requirements that would preclude the use of multiple facilities or sites 
to receive and process these samples. Therefore, the final decision about having a single or multiple 
facilities may depend on political considerations and finances. However, there was also a broad 
based consensus on two additional issues: 1) given the anticipated cost and unique design of the 
SRF, it would be advisable to build the facility for continuous operation to support other astrobiology 
research activities or those in biological or micro-circuitry sciences; and 2) the primary facility must be 
expandable and flexible. 
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The Sub-group also reviewed the Penultimate Working Draft Protocol and from it developed a 
schematic showing the sequential containment in which the samples will be processed prior to 
distribution to the broader scientific community (see Figure SG5-1). 
Using the PWDP for Physical/Chemical tests, Life Detection analyses, and Biohazard assessments, 
the Sub-group compiled a rough inventory of the proposed tests and bench-top footprint of the 
requisite instruments. Based on this inventory, the Sub-group suggested that any individual PPL 
laboratory will not need to be large. 
Physical/Chemical 
* Simulated martian environment 
Figure SG5-1. Sequential containment requirements by test category 
(see page 74 for the definitions of PPL-a, PPL-P, PPL-y, and PPL-6). 
Recommendations on Additional Issues: Finally, additional issues identified by Sub-group 5 resulted 
in the following recommendations: 
* Completely define the PPL containment guidelines. 
* Develop schematics for a self-contained containment structure that could be placed in a 
BSL-4 laboratory and as a composite could meet PPL-a containment requirements. This 
structure should be able to use remote robotics to handle the specimens. 
* Develop a comprehensive list of equipment required for all proposed tests. 
* Anticipate the need to do some Life Detection tests under simulated martian environmental 
conditions while maintaining PPL-aIP containment. 
* Put agreements in place with any anticipated PPL-6 labs prior to receipt of Mars samples. 
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Sub-Group 6: Contingency Planning for Different Draft Protocol Outcomes 
Charter 
Sub-group 6 examined the Penultimate Working Draft Protocol to consider contingency plans for 
various outcomes of the protocol: "Given the various possible outcomes of the different protocol 
elements, what should be done atJin1around the containment facility(ies) if: 1) Absolutely no evidence 
of organic material is found in the sample? 2) The results from the protocol (especially Life 
DetectionIBiohazard testing) are contradictory/inconsistent? 3) A self-replicating entity or 
biomaterial(s) indicative of extant life is discovered within the sample materials? and, 4) That self- 
replicating entity cannot be shown to represent a terrestrial contamination." 
Sub-Group 6 Members 
Wainwright, Norman (U.S. Co-Chairperson) 
Maurel, Marie-Christine (French Co-Chairperson) 
Bada, Jeffrey L. 
Chamberlain, Virginia 
Daly, Michael 
Fishbein, William N. 
Foster, Virginia 
Gabriel, Dean W. 
Holland, Heinrich D. 
Lambert, Joseph B. 
Mills, Aaron L. 
Mustin, Christian 
Relrnan, David A. 
Schad, Jack 
Sourdive, David J.D. 
Stanbridge, Eric J. 
Sub-group 6 was asked to anticipate how the scientific community would react under a variety of 
possible scenarios following the return and testing of martian samples. In addition to considering the 
scenarios in the original charter, the Sub-group also included the question of how to respond in the 
face of possible breaches in containment. 
'Lessons Learned' From Workshop 3 
Sub-group 6 began its discussions by considering information from the plenary discussion of 
Workshop 3 and identifying several points relevant to their charge.32 In particular, analogies with the 
public reaction to the announcement of possible evidence of life in meteorite ALH-84001 should be 
anticipated. Press coverage is likely to be intense, reflecting public interest. An oversight committee 
may be necessary to handle the public dissemination of information in an orderly way and this may 
represent an opportunity for public education about how science works. 
32. "What if Life is Detected" [Race et al., 2001b, pg. 411. 
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The Sub-group identified a number of other issues needing additional discussion. If evidence for any 
life exists in the samples, then containment for an indefinite time should be considered. There may 
then be a need for changes in the anticipated procedures as well as the equipment and facilities 
required. Ethical, legal, and social issues should be considered seriously, and expertise in these 
areas should be reflected in the membership on the oversight committee. Other important issues will 
include concerns about security, especially from potential disruptive activities of any "radical" groups 
that may be opposed to sample return. Although it is difficult to anticipate the kinds of practical 
applications that might result from discovery of new forms of life, it will be important to protect the 
public's rights to any intellectual property potentially associated with extraterrestrial samples. 
Findings and Recommendations 
After considering the specific scenarios and questions in the charter, Sub-group 6 made the following 
findings and recommendations, presented here in a reverse order from how they were listed in the 
charter: 
Breach of Containment: The responses to a breach will depend on where it occurs and what 
happens. Conceivably, it could occur in an area with a high population density or in a remote location. 
The breach could be a result of an accident or a crime - as a result of activity either outside or within 
containment. The consensus of the Sub-group was that we know basically how to handle breaches 
based on long term experience and emergency plans for handling pathogenic biological material 
under BSL-3 and BSL-4 containment. Additional information for responding to breaches and 
containment problems has been gained through decades of experience in handling lunar and 
extraterrestrial materials. 
Clearly, an emergency plan will be needed well in advance to develop recommended responses to 
various breach scenarios. The first steps would involve investigation of the degree of compromise, 
considering both biosafety and sample integrity. Full documentation of any breach event will be 
required as well as identifying the degree of sample compromise, what organizations or personnel 
should be involved in all phases of a response, and how notifications and communications should be 
handled. The plan should focus on all aspects of mitigation, cleanup, and recovery from perspectives 
of both biosafety and sample integrity (e.g., decontamination of the area; sample recovery, 
re-packaging and labeling as compromised, or destruction if required, etc.) 
Containment Facilities: Based again on experience with handling of pathogenic biological material, 
multiple locations for facility functions may be beneficial. This would add a redundancy, and also 
increase the security of the samples by distributing the collection in case of loss at a single site 
(e-g., from natural disasters, accidents, or illegal acts). The biohazard, curation and security 
equipment is well known, and should be based on current biomedical and counter-bioterrorism 
efforts. 
Facilitv Manaaement: A Facility Administrator should be present on site to make day to day decisions 
about facility management, acting under final protocol guidelines established by an oversight 
committee. The committee should be on call as needed by the Facility Administrator, especially for 
non-anticipated scenarios. Every effort should be made to coordinate the administration with relevant 
government agencies. 
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Non-Terrestrial Life Confirmed: In keeping with the SSB recommendations [SSB 19971, sample 
materials will be released from containment only if they are shown to contain no extraterrestrial life- 
forms, or they are sterilized prior to release. If a portion of a sample is confirmed as positive for non- 
terrestrial life, subsequent testing and analyses on all samples materials will continue in containment. 
This means that all physical, chemical, and geological characterization, as well as Life Detection and 
Biohazard tests requiring un-sterilized material should continue to be done in strict containment, 
either at the SRF or any other test facilities that may be used. Experimentation on conditions to 
sterilize the newly discovered life should begin immediately. Once sterilization procedures can be 
confirmed and re-validated, detailed plans for distribution of samples should be developed or revised 
based on the latest findings. Management issues will include administrative and technical procedures 
for scientific study and curation, as well as informing the public. 
Exfanf Life or Biomaferial Positive: If extant life or evidence of biomaterials are detected in the 
samples, all work on the samples will be done in containment facilities. Maximum effort should be 
made to determine if the positive results are originating from Earth life or Mars life. Information 
management becomes an issue both for scientific communication and debate among scientists as 
well as how initial information, with its attendant uncertainties, is disseminated to the public. 
Oraanic Carbon: It is extremely likely that carbon will be found in sample materials. The sensitivity of 
current and future methods will be very high, so that at least some degree of contaminants will be 
detected. The existing base of knowledge on meteorites and other material collected from space will 
be useful in providing baseline information to help guide the investigations. Since the Viking results 
focused on volatile organics, in situ measurements of non-volatile organics would be useful to 
predictions of anticipated sample organic content. 
Contradictow/lnconsistenf Results: Given the number of techniques, spanning several scientific 
disciplines, it is very likely that contradictory or inconsistent results will be found. Differences in the 
sensitivity of methods will exist and confidence in the level of controls will differ. It will be important to 
stress replication of experiments and duplication of results among multiple sites to add confidence to 
the results assessed. 
No Oraanic Material Detected: There was disagreement among the Sub-group members as to how 
to handle samples that were devoid of organic material and had no evidence of life. According to the 
COMPLEX Committee, [SSB 20021: "If the samples are shown to be altogether barren of organic 
matter, to contain no detectable organic carbon compounds and no other evidence of past or present 
biological activity, release of un-sterilized aliquots of the samples for study beyond the confines of the 
Quarantine Facility is justified." 
Despite the recommendations from COMPLEX, some members of the Sub-group felt that an 
increased assurance should be given prior to any sample distribution and that some sterilization 
procedure would be advised. The method of 'prophylactic sterilization' proposed would involve 
gamma radiation and minimal heating. An opposing view was that the scientific method inherent to 
the Draft Protocol is designed to test for significant biohazards and thus, the Draft Protocol should be 
followed. Blind changes to the Draft Protocol would destroy some significant scientific value of the 
sample while unnecessarily eroding public trust, and adding nothing to the assurance of public safety. 
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Because Sub-group 6 was unable to reach consensus on the question of 'prophylactic sterilization,' 
their arguments and counter arguments are presented in the accompanying Text Boxes 1 and 2. 
Sub-Group 6, Text Box 1: 
Argument In Favor of 'Prophylactic' Sterilization of Mars Samples 
The rationale for 'prophylactic' sterilization of Mars samples prior to distribution for 
geochemical studies is based on the following facts and logc: 
First, the samples that have been subjected to life and biohazard detection analysis cannot 
be sent out to the geologists because they have been consumed or saved for further long- 
term or verification studies. The samples that will be sent out, will not have been 
subjected to this analysis. The detection analyses cannot be assumed to represent all of 
the material, because it is not homogeneous. Every pebble and rock has anomalies which 
are unique, and represent likely sites to look for unusual geochemistry (and for life). Even 
sand grains, although randomized by mixing, are unique, one from another, and are 
laboriously sorted by hand for Earth studies. 
Second, a dozen or so cell systems and organisms will be tested for biohazard, out of 
about a million extant terrestrial species. Ecosystem interactions cannot be tested in any 
feasible manner in a high containment lab, nor can the possibility be excluded that some 
Earth agent (e.g., virus, viroid, prion, plasmid) might establish an interaction with a Mars 
organism to produce an otherwise absent danger (e.g., bacteriophage). Thus, while the 
finding of l i e  or biohazard gives a new and dramatic area for further study, negative 
results cannot assure either the safety of the remaining material, or the absence of danger 
to the vast majority of non-studied earth species and the possible consequent effects on 
Now, we recognize that these possibilities are very unlikely, but if they are not credible at 
all, then why are we mandated to build an exquisite containment facility for the initial 
studies? If we are obliged to consider these dangers as credible, then why not provide an 
increased level of security by employing a sterilizing level of irradiation, especially if it is 
virtually harmless to geochemical characteristics? Published studies indicate that 30 
Megarads, an enormous dose for biological sterilization, is virtually harmless for geologic 
studies. Further experiments might push this to 100 Megarads. This would satisfy all but the 
most extreme extremists among biologists. 
Nor must we plead ignorance in dealing with the possibility of non-carbon based life. Unless 
we believe in disembodied spirits (hopefully rare among scientists), we can place obvious 
constraints on possible life-forms regardless of their atomic basis. The chemical elements on 
Mars are the same as those on Earth, and the strength of interatomic bonds are all quite 
similar. In order to defeat entropy, life must contain polymers to provide specific 
information and reactions, and must be separated from the environment by a membrane 
(viroids and prions are parasitic, and could not have originated life, which must begin with 
an autotrophy). Irradiation breaks bonds, whether carbon-based or other element-based, 
yielding monomers to small oligomers, which cannot provide the information, specificity, or 
isolation essential for life. Thus, the abundant data on sterilization of terrestrial items by 
destruction of microbes is directly applicable to martian 'life-as-we-don't-know-it.' 
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Sub-Group 6, Text Box 2: 
The Hazards of 'Prophylactic' Sterilization of Mars Samples 
Sample lots that have been subjected to life and biohazard detection analysis can be sent out 
to the geologists and to other scientists (e.g., exobiologists, etc.) after they are tested, if 
representative sub-samples can be allocated to each purpose. Whether this can or cannot be 
done for a particular sample portion is entirely dependent on the nature of that portion. 
Real-time judgment will have to be applied to the decision on whether the release of a 
sample can be made based on the tests on a representative sub-sampling. 
c Life-detection protocol testing is expected to detect organic materials at the femtomole 
level, both destructively and non-destructively. This screening will be combined with 
elaborate biohazard challenge testing-which is not designed to stand alone, but as a 
complement to life-detection testing. Viruses, viroids, plasmids and prions all need to 
have organic material (even living organic material) to replicate. Organic material 
associated with these Earth-entities will be a special target of the life-detection protocol. 
It is simply not the case that heating above 80°C or the application of 30 Megarads of 
radiation are harmless to geological studies. What may not affect geochemistry can be 
devastating to mineralogical or petrographic studies of a sample material-or the 
detection and interpretation of potential biochemical evidence of past life. These 
processes may not provide any additional "security" in the release of a sample for 
outside study---especially if there are no credible risks remaining after protocol 
testing-but they may have serious negative effects on sample science. 
A goal of the protocol development should be to develop a process whereby rational 
testing for known or suspected biomaterials and biohazards can be accomplished--even 
if those hazards eminate from "life as we don't know it." A sterilizing process that is 
thought to be effective against envisioned carbon-based or non-carbon-based life is useful 
in certain phases of such a Draft Protocol to allow for specialized sensitive analyses 
outside of containrnent-but such a process is not a magic wand. Heat and/or radiation 
break bonds to be effective, and as such they destroy evidence that may otherwise lead to 
the very discoveries that the Mars sample return mission is being designed to seek. 
Resolving these arguments about prophylactic sterilization will be essential to an evaluation of a Mars 
sample handling protocol - and indeed ultimately to effectiveness of a Biohazard testing altogether. 
Central to the arguments for and against sterilization, however, is the question of risk - can any 
protocol be guaranteed to be absolutely risk-free? 
If not, what is an acceptable level of risk (for example, one that approximates the risk from the natural 
influx of martian materials into the Earth's biosphere)? And is there any treatment method that can 
eliminate all risks from the returned samples while preserving them for the detailed scientific study 
envisioned by scientific community? These questions were debated in the plenary session during the 
report of this Sub-group. Clearly, the issue of sterilization will require serious additional attention and 
research well in advance of sample return. 
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Sub-Group 7: Personnel Management Considerations in Implementing the Draf t  Protocol 
Charter 
Examine personnel management considerations for implementation of the protocol: What are the 
requirements for personnel to complete the Penultimate Working Draft Protocol, as written? When do 
personnel need to be hired and trained? What considerations can be given to the qualifications of 
required personnel, and the selection process by which personnel are chosen to: 1) conduct the 
various elements of the Draft Protocol? 2) provide for the appropriate biosafety considerations and 
containment at the primary and any secondary facilities? and 3) conduct any required analyses that 
are of scientific interest or are also necessary to support preservation and curation of the martian 
samples (e.g., time, processing-dependent studies)? What external adviceloversight capabilities 
should be available to support the execution of the sample handling protocol (e.g., to ensure that the 
Draft Protocol is executed according to plan, and that if modifications are necessary they are 
approved and documented)? 
During the course of the general sessions of Workshop 4, the Sub-groups were also requested to 
address personnel and communication management considerations associated with the design and 
construction of the facility(-ies) and the implementation of the final protocol. 
Sub-Group 7 Members 
Vasil, lndra K. (U.S. Co-Chairperson) 
Viso, Michel (French Co-Chairperson) 
Allton, Judith H. 
Cambon-Thomsen, Anne 
Crissman, Harry A. 
Debus, Andre 
Edelson, Martin C. 
Giroir, Brett P. 
Leonard, Debra G.B. 
Richmond, Jonathan 
Voet, Donald 
The Sub-group had a thorough discussion about the alternative methods for staffing the facility(-ies), 
either through the recruitment of scientists in permanent positions or through the presence of working 
scientists on-site at the facilities, selected though a competitive grants process. The conclusion was 
reached that various categories of personnel will be required depending on the different tasks that 
need to be implemented. The management of the Mars Sample Return (MSR) program will then 
propose the different origins of the personnel. The Sub-group agreed to the following: 
= Personnel should be hired progressively during the development of the project and the 
facility(-ies). After considering the many functions that will be needed for implementation of 
tasks during the design, building and operation of the facility(-ies), the Sub-group suggested 
that the functions and responsibilities of the director's position may be carried out by 
appropriate committees until a Director is hired which should not be later than about five years 
before the return of samples from Mars. 
The required methods and procedures outlined in the Protocol should be applied to any facility 
or site handling martian samples during the implementation of the Final Protocol; 
* The international character of the program should be respected throughout the whole process. 
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The Sub-group developed its suggestions on the design and construction of a dedicated Mars 
Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) without precluding the possibility tha: some activities during the 
containment could be performed in other existing facilities, perhaps remote from the SRF. They 
interpreted the outcomes of previous workshops as leaning towards the design and the construction 
of a dedicated facility(-ies) to handle the samples and to perform some (most) of the tasks of 
containment. In their deliberations, Sub-group 7 developed an overview of the functions, staffing 
requirements, and organization that will be needed to design, build and operate a Mars SRF. Figure 
SG7-1 shows a high level schedule and overview of the process leading up to sample receipt. 
Overall Timetable Samples 
Figure SG7-1. Possible overall timetable of the activities required to design, build, and 
operate the SRF. The double-headed arrows indicate the time of the possible staff 
organization described in the subsequent figures. (EVTs = Experiment Verification Tests). 
In developing their suggestions for management and staffing of the SRF, the Sub-group used the 
following assumptions behind their working hypotheses: 
* The Protocol must be fully and successfully tested before actual handling of martian samples. 
* It is estimated that a complete series of Experiment Verification Tests (EVTs) will last' 
approximately 6 months and one complete series of EVTs must be successfully demonstrated 
before actual handling of the returned samples. The first series must begin no later than 
18 months before the returned Mars samples arrive in order to allow enough time to adjust 
and repeat the series if necessary (at least 9-10 months before experiments begin on actual 
returned samples). 
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* The EVTs are consistent with the recommendation of the SSB (1997) and earlier workshops in 
this series that the SRF be operational two years before the arrival of the actual Mars 
samples. The EVTs are part of the normal operational testing. 
* Based on experiences at other BSL-4 laboratories in the United States and France, no less 
than one-year is required to properly staff and train the technical and scientific personnel. 
* Commissioning of the SRF, which must be performed in parallel with the staffing and training, 
will last at least 18 months. 
* In order to accommodate the staffing, training and commissioning requirements of the SRF, 
construction of the facility must be finished 3 years before the actual operations. From past 
experiences in both France and the United States, construction of the facility itself will also 
require 3 years. 
It is estimated that about 3 years will be needed to develop design specifications and plans for 
the SRF and obtain necessary authorizations for the facility. To accommodate all the activities 
necessary to design, build and operate an SRF, the entire process must begin fully ten years 
in advance of sample return. 
Figures SG7-2 - SG7-4 provide details on possible organizational and staffing levels at three key 
times identified in Figure SG7-1: 10 years, 5 years, and 3 years prior to sample return. Specific 
details related to the possible staffing and organizational plans are provided below; exact positions, 
job descriptions, and expertise requirements for various positions are all TBD. 
As soon as the decision is made to build and/or update a Mars sample receiving facility, typically 
10 years before the actual operations, four positions must be filled in order to prepare the 
specifications and review the design of the facility (see Figure SG7-2): the Director, Deputy Director 
of Administration, Deputy Director of Science, and an Environment, Health and Safety Officer. 
Figure SG7-2. Staffing requirements and structure of the SRF at 10 years prior to arrival of the 
returned sample(s) (permanent positions are in plain boxes; committees are in stippled boxes). 
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The Director will work under the scrutiny of an Oversight Committee that will check the compliance of 
the project development with the Final Protocol. The Deputy Director of Administration will be 
assisted by the Environment, Health and Safety Officer who will deal with the actual design 
requirements related to these critical topics. In addition, the Communication Officer will be in charge 
of risk c~mmunication and outreach, keeping the community informed and answering questions 
regarding the SRF. A Deputy Director in charge of Science will coordinate the work of four scientific 
committees that will develop specifications and follow the design process for their respective 
disciplines or areas. A Facility Engineer will work with appropriate design committees to coordinate 
planning, design, and building of the SRF. 
At roughly midway through the construction of the facility, the Sub-group recommends hiring the 
Heads of Staff (H of S) for each scientific discipline required (see Figure SG7-3). These people will 
ensure that construction is properly completed to accommodate the specific needs of their disciplines. 
With the help of their respective advisory committees they will prepare the general and specific 
operating procedures to handle the martian samples and the training program for staff to be hired. At 
this point, an Administrative Manager will also be hired to organize the actual staff and prepare for 
future administrative and personnel needs. 
Figure SG7-3. Staffing requirements and structure of the SRF at 5 years prior to arrival of the 
returned sample(s) ("H of S = Head of Staff; permanent positions are in plain boxes; 
committees are in stippled boxes). 
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In order to have a fully operational facility two years before samples are returned, the final staffing 
and training of various operational positions must begin three years prior to actual operations (see 
Figure SG7-4). At this time the Institutional Bio-Safety Committee (IBSC) and the Institutional Animal 
Care and Use Committee (IACUC) will be installed. 
Staffing at 3 years Prior to Receiving Sample 
Figure SG7-4. Staffing requirements and structure of the SRF at 3 years prior to arrival of the 
returned sample@) ("H of S = Head of Staff; permanent positions are in plain boxes; extemal 
committees are in grey boxes; committees of staff and extemal members are in stippled boxes). 
From the beginning of the process, the Sub-group recommends that three different of committees be 
installed to help the Directors and Heads of Staff in overseeing their changing responsibilities: 
* Scientific design committees will be specialized in the four disciplines (Life Detection, 
Biohazard testing, Geo-curation and Geochemistry). The members, who will be prominent 
scientists, will be designated by the agencies. These committees will prepare the design, 
review the project and oversee the project to ensure the facility can operate consistent with the 
operational aspects of the Protocol. As soon as the Heads of Staff are hired, these committees 
will shift to become Discipline Advisory Committee helping the Heads of Staff. 
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* The Science Working Group will be in charge of reviewing the project and the construction to 
ensure its compliance with the scientific requirements and the Final Protocol; they report and 
comment to the SRF director in coordination with the Deputy Director of Science. 
* Finally the Oversight Committee is to be composed of 12 to 15 members selected through the 
same method as the members of the NASA Planetary Protection Advisory Committee or the 
French Planetary Protection Committee. This committee will be charged with reviewing the 
overall process and the proposed measures to comply with the requirements of the Final 
Protocol. The committee will report to the Director of the SRF and above. 
It was recommended that membership on the various committees be staggered to insure an 
appropriate turnover without losing the memory of the project (e.g., two people rotate off every year). 
In addition, the Sub-group recommended that the agencies set up an international search committee 
for recruitment of the Directors, functional officers, the Facility Engineer and the Heads of Staff. 
Finally, the Sub-group identified three major issues for further consideration: 
* Currently, no one has experience in simultaneous operations or activities in BSL-4 and clean 
room conditions as will be needed for maintaining PPL-a through PPL-y. The advice of experts 
from the pharmaceutical or the microprocessor industries would be helpful. 
* Details on the optimal staffing mix at the SRF must be considered further. It is not clear what 
mix af civil servants, semi-permanent employees, contractors, and guest scientists will be 
needed to staff the facility and implement the Final Protocol. However, international access 
and participation should be considered throughout planning for staffing and operations. 
* In order to comply with planetary protection constraints and final protocol requirements, a 
sustained and adequate budget will be needed throughout the design, building and 
implementation phases of this project. 
Sub-Group 8: Draft ~rotocol Implementation Process and Update Concepts 
Charter 
Sub-group 8 addressed issues related to the processes to implement and update the Penultimate 
Working Draft Protocol: "How should the final review and modification of the protocol be conducted? 
What steps should be taken in gaining, approval of the final protocol by national and international 
bodies important to its acceptance/implementation? How should the protocol be maintained after its 
initial approval and promulgation? What steps should be available to the protocol implementers to 
provide for proposed changes in the details and/or framework of the protocol once it has received 
initial approval? What process should be followed to reaffirm acceptance/approval of the final protocol 
to be used for the actual samples? What regulatory steps (if any) should be taken to certify the 
samples are safe for release from containment after the protocol is completed?" 
Sub-Group 8 Members 
Bielitzki, Joseph (US. Co-Chairperson) 
Carnbon-Thomsen, Anne (French Co-Chairperson) 
DeVincenzi, Donald L. 
Fultz, Patricia 
Hog, Diana 
Race, Margaret 
Rummel, John 
Sogin, Mitchell 
Treiman, Alan 
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The scope of the assigned task as seen by Sub-group 8, is summarized in Figure SG8-1. A narrative 
explanation of recommendations and activities at each stage is provided in the text that follows. 
Several fundamental issues were raised prior to the discussion of the specific charge to the Sub- 
group. Because of their importance to the overall Protocol, they are also detailed as follows: 
Review Process 
Proposed changes 
Accepted changes 
ApprovaUScripting 
Figure SG8-1. Protocol Implementation and Up-date Process. 
Clarifv of Meanina and Terrninoloav: Sub-group 8 agrees with several other Sub-groups that clarity of 
meaning is essential to the implementation of any process especially when the process involves 
international agreements. Therefore, it is again recommended that absolute consistency be used in 
the language for these documents and that when the actual definition of a word or phrase is in 
dispute, reference should be made to those definitions or meanings that are standard and accepted 
when interpreted at the international level. 
Use of Planefaw Protecfion Levels fPPL1 rafher fhan Biosafefv Levels (BSLL: A second area of 
concern is the use of "Planetary Protection Level (PPL)" synonymously with "Biosafety Level (BSL)." 
The PPL designation is intended to define a safety system consistent with the needs of the Mars 
Sample Handling and Return Mission that take into account pristine isolation of the samples, 
personnel safety and environmental safety. The BSL system varies in definition between the United 
States and Europe, and varies even within the U.S. between the CDC definitions and requirements, 
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(which focus on protection of people), and the agricultural definitions (which have less emphasis on 
people and greater emphasis on the environment). Sub-group 8, therefore, recommends that a 
uniform system of nomenclature and definition be used throughout the process that stipulate only the 
PPL designations. This will prevent confusion and result in more uniform application of safety 
standards and practices. 
Planetarv Protection Level Delta: In addition to noting the discrepancies in BSL terminology above, 
the Sub-group also identified the need for naming a new level of containment, PPL-6. This newly 
defined and named containment level would apply to situations at the point in the protocol where 
samples do not require atmospheric isolation and may be moved to external laboratories with proper 
facilities for further analysis. Sub-group 8 recommends this additional PPL definition, Planetary 
Protection Level 'delta,' as: 
'TPPL-61 Provides a level of containment for the samples that allows investigators to work 
with samples in a laboratory situation, which provides protection to personnel through an 
engineered environment providing HEPA filfered air entering and leaving the area, 
containment of water and/or waste to the laboratory and protection to personnel through 
personnel protective equipment consistent with the most protective standards referring to 
the 'U.S. BSL-3 Agriculture' and 'French P4' requirements." 
Final Scientific and Policv Reviews: Sub-group 8 recommends that the final review of the Protocol be 
subjected to the highest degree of scientific scrutiny and evaluation. The evaluation should be 
conducted jointly by scientific organizations from both the United States and France to avoid 
prolonged negotiations and resolutions that may arise when such reviews are conducted separately. 
This review should probably occur at the level of the National Research Council in the United States, 
and its equivalent scientific organization in France. The French participants agreed to investigate 
which of the French institutions is most appropriate (among the French institutions discussed were 
CNRS or representatives of various EPST, Etablissements Publics a Caractere Scientifique et 
Technique [including but not exclusively CNRS] or Academie des Sciences). Final decisions about 
which institutions should be involved in scientific reviews is TBD. 
Ethical and Public Reviews: Evaluations of the proposal should be conducted both internal and 
external to NASA and CNES and the space research communities in the nations participating in the 
mission. An ethical review should be conducted at least at the level of the Agencies participating and 
these reviews made public early in the process (in France, the National Consultative Bioethics 
Committee, CCNE, is the appropriate independent organization). The Final Protocol should be 
announced broadly to the scientific community with a request for comments and input from scientific 
societies and other interested organizations. Broad acceptance at both public and scientific levels is 
essential to the overall success of this research effort. 
Future Modifications fo the Draff Protocol: When a Final Protocol has been adopted and approved by 
a consensus of appropriate scientific organizations, few changes should be made to its content. 
Changes should be made as scientific information, methodology andlor technology improve between 
the time of the approval and the actual physical implementation of the Final Protocol within the 
laboratory. The Sub-group recommended that changes in the Final Protocol methodology may be 
considered if a proposed change would meet the following criteria: 
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increases the sensitivity or selectivity of the test, 
reduces the length of time necessary for a test without a reduction in sensitivity or selectivity, 
reduces the complexity of the sample handling process, 
* increases the overall safety of the process, 
reduces the chances of contamination to the sample or the environment, 
- reduces the cost of the process, or 
= represents a new technology or method that has the broad general acceptance of the scientific 
community. 
Advisory Committees and Ex~er t  Panels: Changes to scientific methodology and instrumentation are 
inevitable due to the long development time envisioned for this mission. This necessitates long term, 
consistent input and advice from the external scientific communities of all the partners engaged in the 
process. To facilitate this process, it is recommended that a standing Planetary Protection Advisory 
Committee (PPAC) be appointed in the U.S. to provide input to the Planetary Protection Officer and 
that a similar standing committee (Planetary Protection Committee, PPC) be appointed in France as 
tentatively planned. 
The Sub-group also recommends that standing joint (French and U.S.) working committees or 
specialized expert panels should be appointed with appropriate expertise to provide support and 
advice to the U.S. PPAC and French PPC in each of three specific areas: technical processes, 
scientific procedures, and safetylbiosafety issues. To provide the highest level of support to the 
process, these groups should be individual panels comprised of members with expertise in a 
particular area of concern. Individual experts should be limited to a single panel. The overall 
membership of the committees and expert panels should meet the specific needs of the Agencies 
and should represent the scientific goals of the Agencies and the external science communities. Their 
work should aim at providing the respective agencies with information essential to the success and 
safety of the Mars sample return missions. These panels and committees may function jointly or 
independently depending on the specific need. 
The PPAC and French PPC will receive the annual reports of the three panels, who will also provide 
annual written reviews to the Planetary Protection Officer and, in France, to the appropriate Minister 
to which the committee reports. These reviews should include relevant operational issues and 
concerns and provide risk assessments of the technical processes, scientific procedures, and 
safetylbiosafety plans and processes. These reviews should be made available to scientific and 
professional organizations with interests in the mission activities. 
Communications: Unusual or unprecedented scientific activities are often subject to extreme scrutiny 
at both the scientific and political levels. Therefore a communication plan must be developed as early 
as possible to minimize the dissemination of misinformation and to provide the highest level of public 
assurance about the issues addressed by the mission. Communications should clearly inform about 
the extensive efforts to protect the environment, health and safety through facility designs, 
procedures, and personnel training. This information on risk management and planetary protection 
should be balanced with educationloutreach about the anticipated benefits of Mars exploration and 
sample return from the scientific perspective. The communication plan needs to address the concerns 
of both the scientific community and those external stakeholders who will raise valid concerns on 
behalf of the world's population. In order to minimize long-term criticism and concerns, it will be 
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important to inform the public openly and honestly about all aspects of the mission in a way that 
provides accurate, timely details about scientific benefits, expectations, risks, and uncertainties. In 
particular, both the public and scientific community should be informed of results during Life Detection 
and Biohazard testing at appropriate times in the process based on procedures and criteria (e-g., 
level of certainty, consensus or majority, etc.) for determining how observations and data will be 
designated as results suitable for formal announcement. Details about who will be in charge of this 
communication plan and the release of information are TBD. 
Flow Charts and Timelines: In order to assure the rational utilization of both the facilities and sample 
materials, appropriate flow charts and time lines must be developed to coordinate the complex series 
of interrelated procedures. Safety issues must be prominent at all significant decision points in the 
process (e.g., release from containment, downgrading to lower level of containment); these critical 
points must be identified and agreed upon in advance. Such flow diagrams are intended to coordinate 
complex testing and inclusion of all required elements, especially those concerning biosafety and 
biohazards leading to the sharing of sample material with the external scientific communities. Such 
flow charts, and time lines, should also include key decision points for changing the status of the 
sample to a less restrictive PPL and for proceeding in a particular direction along branches of the 
decision tree. Each such chart should contain an incorporated risk tree and assessment process. 
Workshops/Reviews: The need to change schedules and procedures may be anticipated during the 
time between now and sample return. To provide assurance that rules exist between the involved 
international partners and the scientific communities, two workshops/reviews should be scheduled 
prior to sample return to Earth in order to reaffirm details about process, methodology, safety and 
release criteria. The first review should be conducted at the conclusion of the facilities design phase 
to determine if the physical structure meets the scientific and safety standards as defined within the 
specifications. In addition, the first workshop should review the existing procedures that will be 
conducted within the facility to confirm the specific flow chart outlining the approved sequence of tests 
and analyses. A second similar workshop/review should occur after the samples have been collected 
on Mars but in advance of their actual return to Earth for evaluation. Details about who should 
coordinate these workshop/reviews and modify schedules or procedures are TBD. 
Preparations and Processes for Decision Makina about Release of Samples: It will be important to 
prepare in advance for data interpretation and decision making in an organized way. This will be 
especially critical in the event that a distinctly martian life-form is found within returned samples. 
While it is impossible to develop details of the Final Protocol at this time, it will be crucial to have 
considered how decisions will be made, by whom, and based on what principles if an extraterrestrial 
life-form is (discovered. A specific committee should be established at least a year ahead of sample 
return to develop contingency protocols and processes that will be in place if and when martian life is 
found and verified. 
It is likely that protocol test results will not lead to unanimous decisions in all instances. It will thus be 
important to have a review and approval infrastructure for handling decisions about whether or not to 
release sample materials from containment, or reduce containment to a lower level, upon completion 
of tests. Addressing the overall decision making process in a formal manner will be critical for drawing 
conclusions, certifying results, and deciding whether samples qualify for release or not. Any decision 
to release samples should involve selected multidisciplinary experts and groups, as well as an 
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Interagency Committee on Back Contamination (ICBC), similar to that used in the Apollo program. 
The U.S. PPAC and French PPC should be involved in reporting to relevant bodies in their respective 
countries. Details on the organizational structure(s) associated with decision making are TBD. 
The organizational structures, management plans, charters and reporting lines for many of the 
proposed committees and groups will need to be developed in the coming years. Many questions 
cannot be resolved until additional details on facility design, operational logistics, mission architecture 
or anticipated schedules are made available. 
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What Areas of Research and Development are Needed for Protocol Implementation? 
During a one-hour session on the final day of the Workshop, the participants explored the areas of 
research and development that would facilitate and/or enhance the implementation of the analytical 
aspects of the Draft Protocol. A number of areas were identified; they currently exist in varying 
degrees of development and are presented here in a brief outline-style (no attempt was made to 
specify details or parameters). 
1. Improved Controls 
On samples and tests - need both positive and negative 
On personnel - requirements on clothing, operating procedures, handling of contingencies, 
etc. 
Staff health and safety monitoring 
2. Equipment for using Synchrotron Tomography 
* Refine and improve - bench top equipment (for both inside and outside of SRF) 
3. Ecological Microcosms 
4. Post-Radiation Detection of Biosignatures 
How to make sense of organic molecules etc. after high doses of radiation 
5. Further Discussion/Descriptions of Endolithic Communities 
* Taxonomy of rocks and where life is found in them (where to look; cracks, pores, etc.) 
6. Microbiological Community Cultures 
Characterization of cultures; un-culturable 
* How to find un-culturable microbes 
Mixed Culture research 
* Containment Implementation 
* Micro-arrays for detection of microbes in rock 
7. Robotics 
Remote manipulation for use in BSL4/clean room conditions (no experience) 
How to disinfect suits, tools, equipment etc. in ways that don't mess up cleanliness materials 
Procedures; manipulations; high through-put screening 
Robotics to help maintain cleanliness and biocontainment 
8. Transport and remote containment methodology/requirements 
* Sample containers for transport - IF materials transported beyond SRF 
holders for samples to go from instrument to instrument 
Resolve problems of lubricants, etc.; other potential contaminants 
Feasibility of a transportable PPL lab 
Need to consider both biocontainment and cleanliness 
Need to link containment & transport mechanisms with SRF design architecture 
9. Organic Detection on Surfaces 
"Remote" and non-destructive 
lrnprove detection limits and resolution on both samples and lab surfaces 
10. Miniaturization - nanoscale 
- Especially for testing and assaying techniques as part of the Protocol 
1 1. Social Science Research 
Psychology of working in maximal containment, highly restrictive environment 
Operator short cuts; risk taking etc. 
Sociological research on how communities respond to proposals for high containment labs 
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12. Sample Preparation and Handling 
Tracking locations within samples 
Sample register techniques - repeatability 
* Correlation with other sample features 
13. Communications 
- When to release data; announcement processes 
Criteria for determining quality data (interpretation) 
* Procedures for updating of raw datalwhen does data become 'findings'? revised findings? 
Risks of announcing too early; too late? etc. 
Rewards to individual - who gets credit? 
14. Sterilization of surface adhering microbes 
15. Remote sharing of data; telepresence 
16. Research on rock materials using BH testing procedures 
17. Cognitive 'protheses" - nanobots in diagnostics 
18. Combined BSL and cleanroom (i.e., PPL) capability 
19. Appropriate protective gear for staff working in PPL environment. 
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APPENDIX A 
A DRAFT TEST PROTOCOL FOR DETECTING POSSIBLE 
BIOHAZARDS IN MARTIAN SAMPLES RETURNED TO, EARTH 
Introduction to the Draft Protocol 
For upcoming Mars sample return missions, NASA is committed to following the recommendations 
developed by the Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council (NRC) in its report on 
sample handling and testing [SSB 19971. In particular, the NRC recommended that: 
a) "samples returned from Mars by spacecraff should be contained and treated as 
potentially hazardous until proven otherwise, " and b) "rigorous physical, chemical, and 
biological analyses [should] confirm that there is no indication of the presence of any 
exogenous biological entity." 
To develop the requirements for sample hazard testing and the criteria for subsequent release of 
sample materials from containment, NASA's Planetary Protection Officer convened the Mars Sample 
Handling Protocol Workshop Series (MSHP) held over the time-period from March 2000 to June 
2001. In addition to U.S. and international participants invited by NASA, significant participation and 
support by French scientists was provided through arrangement with the Centre National d'~tudes 
Spatiales, who participated in all aspects of the Workshops. The stated objective for the Workshop 
Series was: 
"For returned Mars samples, develop a recommended list of comprehensive tests, and 
their sequential order, that will be performed to fulfill the NRC recommendations that 
'rigorous analyses determine that the materials do not contain any biological hazards. "' 
Therefore the MSHP Workshop Series33 was designed to devise a protocol that could rigorously 
analyze returned martian sample material(s) to determine that those material(s) are free from 
biohazards andlor and extraterrestrial life-forms and are therefore safe to be released from 
containment in their native state for further scientific research. To accomplish this, participants 
focused on a variety of questions such as: "What typeslcategories of tests (e.g., Biohazard (BH), Life 
Detection (LD)) should be performed upon the samples? What criteria must be satisfied to 
demonstrate that the samples do not present a biohazard? What constitutes a representative sample 
to be tested? What is the minimum allocation of sample material required for analyses exclusive to 
the protocol, and what PhysicallChemical (PIC) analyses are required to complement biochemical or 
biological screening of sample material? Which analyses must be done within containment and which 
can be accomplished using sterilized sample material outside of containment? What facility 
capabilities are required to complete the protocol? What is the minimum amount of time required to 
complete a hazard-determination protocol? By what process should the protocol be modified to 
accommodate new technologies that may be introduced in the coming years (i.e., from the time that a 
sample receiving facility would be operational through the subsequent return of the first martian 
samples?) The Working Draft Protocol, as a composite, is intended to incorporate the answers 
developed to those questions.34 
33. Appendix F includes citations for all the workshops and reports contributing to this Working Draft Protocol. 
34. The reader is referred to the final reports from the prior Workshops in the Series for full documentation of the detailed 
discussions held by the Sub-groups in those Workshops. As a framework and proof-of-concept, the Working Draft Protocol 
is a distillation of those discussions and therefore does not include the level of detail brought out in those discussions. 
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To keep the Workshop Series focused, a set of basic assumptions (see Appendix B, page 133) were 
given to the participants at each of the Workshops to guide and constrain their deliberations. 
Subsequent to the failure of the Mars Surveyor 1998 missions, these assumptions were subject to 
some modification during the re-planning process that NASA and its international partners undertook 
(note italicized item in assumption #2, Appendix B), however, none of the modifications affected the 
basic premises under which the Workshop participants undertook their task. These assumptions are 
consistent with the plans of NASA and its international partners as of the publication of this report. 
In addition to the development of this Working Draft Protocol through the NASA-led Workshop 
Series,35 in early 1999 the Space Studies Board was asked by NASA to develop its own 
recommendations for the containment and certification of martian samples - both as input to the 
NASA Workshop Series, and as recommendations to NASA to be assessed in their own right. Their 
repod [SSB 20021 was released in preliminary form in May 2001, just prior to Workshop 4 therefore 
this Working Draft Protocol also reflects, to a great degree, the findings and recommendations of the 
Space Studies Board study on this subject. 
Why a "Draft' Protocol? 
What is reported here is termed a 'Draft' Protocol because it is and is intended to be just that. While it 
is a responsibility of NASA's Planetary Protection Officer [NASA 79991 to prescribe "standards, 
procedures, and guidelines applicable to all NASA organizations, programs, and activities" to achieve 
the policy objectives of NASA's planetary protection program, including ensuring that the Earth is 
"protected from the potential hazard posed by extraterrestrial matter carried by a spacecraft returning 
from another planet or other extraterrestrial sources," (in this case, Mars), it is neither practical nor 
useful for this Working Draft Protocol to be developed into a final form at this point in time. On one 
hand, the final protocol that guides the process of assessing the martian samples should owe much 
to new knowledge about Mars that will be gained in robotic surface operations on Mars leading up to 
the sample-return mission, as well as to detailed information available only on the sample-return 
mission itself. On the other hand, the final protocol should take into account the specific nature of the 
receiving facility that is developed for the initial processing and testing of the returned samples, as 
well as the requirements and abilities of the specific instrumentation and personnel finally selected to 
undertake the challenging task of testing the samples to protect the Earth from possible hazards, 
while preserving the scientific value of the sample-return undertaking. 
Accordingly, this Working Draft Protocol is intended to provide a proof-of-concept model of the final 
protocol, demonstrating one approach (and more importantly, a sufficient approach) to testing 
returned Mars samples for possible biohazards or exogenous biological activity. This Working Draft 
Protocol has been developed to provide a series of tests that can be applied to martian samples to 
provide data to address stated criteria for the release of un-sterilized samples from containment - 
either wholly or partially - while allowing for the earlier release for samples subjected to a 
decontamination process, to ensure they are safe for analyses outside of containment. 
35. This Working Draft Protocol is a compilation of input from all 5 Workshops in the MSHP Series. Prior to Workshop 4, 
materials developed in all the earlier Workshops in the Series were compiled into a version of the Draft Protocol 
subsequently designated the "Penultimate Working Draft Protocol." That Penultimate Working Draft Protocol was 
distributed to the Sub-groups of Workshop 4 and they were asked to refine and finalize it. The Working Draft Protocol is 
the result of incorporating the comments and changes from the Workshop 4 Sub-groups into the Penultimate Working 
Draft Protocol (see the Preface for a list of all the versions of the Draft Protocol). 
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Containment in the Sample Receiving Facility and Elsewhere 
The capability is required to handle and process Mars samples to prevent their terrestrial 
contamination (i.e., clean-room conditions) while maintaining strict biological containment. This 
requirement is a major challenge in the design of a Sample Receiving Facility (SRF),36 and to some 
degree is likely to constrain the working space inside a SRF even more than might normally be 
experienced in a "typical" Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) facility of similar size. An SRF will require an 
amalgam of technologies currently found in maximum containment microbiological laboratories 
(e.g., BSL-4, BSL-3) and in clean-rooms used to preserve the pristine nature of rare samples. Such 
an integrated facility is not currently available anywhere. Some of the design challenges may be 
alleviated through a design and development process that will include mock-ups of 
containmentlclean-room combinations whose efficacy can be tested thoroughly. Some of the space 
constraints may be lessened through the use of multiple containment facilities to accomplish different 
aspects of the final protocol. It is anticipated that samples will be able to be shipped among 
appropriate containment facilities wherever necessary, and under procedures developed in 
cooperation with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, and appropriate international authorities. Nonetheless, it is envisioned that all 
samples initially returned from Mars will be placed in a single SRF and held there through the 
preliminary examination phase, and for those subsequent steps compatible with SRF design and 
capacity. 
BSL-4 is required for work with dangerous and exotic agents that pose a high individual risk of 
aerosol-transmitted laboratory infection and life-threatening disease. The unknown nature of any 
possible biohazard in returned martian samples demands, at least initially, the most stringent 
containment presently afforded to the most hazardous biological entities known on Earth. In the 
biomedical community, Biohazard testing is a pathway towards gradual "decontainment" of 
dangerous and exotic bioagents when supported by experimental evidence. Decisions about the 
appropriate biosafety level for a particular bioagent can be made when sufficient data are obtained to 
support either the need for continued work at a high level of containment or allowance to conduct 
work at a lower level. 
Generally, lower biosafety levels are assigned to agents with less human virulence. If sufficient data 
are gathered to rule out concerns about human virulence and infection, a decision could later be 
made to allow subsequent work at a lower containment level during tests investigating possible 
environmental effects. A lower level of containment would potentially enhance sample access within 
the scientific community while still providing adequate biosafety  condition^.^^ 
In addition to blending biosafety and cleanliness needs, the SRF will need to provide different types of 
laboratory environments for carrying out the various aspects of protocol testing. During the \Norkshop 
Series, a new term 'Planetary Protection Level' (PPL) was developed to be used for the purpose of 
36. A variety of names have been used in reference to the place where returned samples will initially be handled and tested 
(e.g. Sample Receiving Facility (SRF), the Quarantine Facility, the Mars receiving laboratory, primary containment facility, 
quarantine facility, etc.). A recent NRC report fSSB 20021 has used "Quarantine Facility," but it is more useful in this report 
to use the generic SRF. The actual name and location(s) of the facility or facilities where the protocol will be executed is 
TBD, though its use beyond the receipt of martian samples may be antiapated. 
37. "BSL" levels are a North American convention. European equivalents will be considered and described as necessary in 
implementation of the final protocol. 
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categorizing and describing the different combinations of containment and cleanliness conditions 
required within the SRF for different testing needs. Although details of various PPL designations will 
require further definition, it is possible to anticipate a number of laboratory conditions that may be 
required during the protocol testing. The four PPLs are described here and in Table WDP-1. 
PPL-a - for incoming samples and archived samples; maximum biocontainment and 
cleanliness; maintains samples in an inert gas environment and Mars-like  condition^.^^ 
PPL-f3 - maintains maximum biocontainment and protection for workers and the environment; 
maximum cleanliness, but allows exposure to ambient terrestrial conditions. 
PPL-y - maintains maximum biocontainment with moderate cleanliness and ambient terrestrial 
conditions (i.e., for animal testing scenarios). 
* PPL-6 - maintains "BSL-3-Ag" containment conditions with less emphasis on cleanliness and 
ambient terrestrial  condition^.^^ 
Table WDP-1. Anticipated Laboratory Conditions and PPL Types. 
PPIL-ee 
PPL-a 
PPL-@ 
PPL-y 
PPL-8 
It is important to note that regardless of cleanliness requirements or ambient conditions, all initial 
testing will be done under maximum biocontainment equivalent to United States BSL-4 [CDC-NIH, 
19931. In addition, Biohazard testing will not require the extreme cleanliness levels to be used for 
38. It is anticipated that only the primary SRF will be required to have PPL-a conditions. If other facilities beyond the SRF are 
used as part of the protocol testing, they will be certified for conducting particular tests or studies at the appropriate PPL 
conditions. 
Biocontainment 
Maximum (BSL-4) 
Maximum (BSL-4) 
Maximum (BSL-4) 
Strict BSL-3-Ag 
39. PPL-6 provides a level of containment for the samples that allows investigators to work with samples in a laboratory 
situation that provides protection to personnel through an engineered environment providing HEPA filtered air entering 
and leaving the area, containment of water and/or waste to the laboratory and protection to personnel through personnel 
protective equipment consistent with standards U.S. BSL-3 Agriculture and French P4. It was recommended that BSL-3-Ag 
facilities should be built around large instruments, rather than miniaturizing instruments to fit into a preexisting lab. 
40. Note: Levels of cleanliness associated with each PPL type are TBD and should be defined explicitly and well in advance of 
sample return. 
cleanliness40 
Maximum 
Maximum 
Moderate 
Ambient 
'Ambient' Conditions 
Mars-like (pristine) 
Although at 1 A T M  w/inerf 
gas environment 
Earth-like 
Earth-like 
Earth-like 
Used For: 
Incoming Container and 
materials; some 
preliminary tests; sample 
bank/storage; some Life 
Detection. 
Life Detection; some 
Physical/Chem; TBD 
Some Biohazard, some 
Physical/Chemical tests, 
and animal testing 
Some 'post-release' tests 
TBD 
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initial sample processing, or certain PIC or LD tests. The majority of biohazard tests will be done in 
PPL-y. If results of initial BH tests and LD tests are all negative, it may be appropriate to conduct 
some subsequent tests under less strict containment conditions. The first step in downgraded 
containment for untreated samples has been designated as PPL-6, which is equivalent to 
BS L-3-Ag .41 
"Sterilization" of Martian Samples 
Recognizing that a species' adaptation to physiological stress may evolve through natural selection, it 
is expected that possible extant life on Mars could be able to survive extremely hostile conditions. 
Surface temperatures at the equator of Mars range from -100°C during the martian winter to 20°C 
during the martian summer. Mars is extremely dry; the partial vapor pressure of water on the surface 
is approximately 0.1 Bar. The martian atmosphere is 95% CO;! and provides no protection against 
exposure to 200-300 nanometer ultraviolet light, which may generate strong oxidants in the surface 
material. It is believed that organic compounds on the surface of Mars are subject to oxidation by this 
UV-induced photochemistry. Since this combination of conditions cannot be found anywhere on 
Earth, it is unlikely that a single terrestrial species will be found that can serve as a surrogate for a 
putative martian organism when evaluating methods for sterilizing martian samples. There are 
terrestrial environments, however, that are sufficiently similar to the martian environment to allow the 
isolation of species that exhibit extreme resistance to a subset of the conditions (e.g., desiccation 
radiation, or cold) to be encountered on Mars. As an item for further research, it is anticipated that an 
effort will be made to identify and characterize terrestrial species from environments as similar as 
possible to those on Mars, and that these species will be used to validate sterilization processes. 
In the context of this Working Draft Protocol and the relevant NRC reports [SSB 1997; SSB 20021, the 
term "sterilization" may be used to connote the decontamination process that is used to ensure that 
the samples are safe for analyses outside of containment. It is possible, though very unlikely, that 
martian organisms are not carbon based, and martian biology could conceivably be based on other 
elements (e.g., Si, N, P, 0, H, S, Al, B). But overall, it should be noted that the chemical elements on 
Mars and the forces holding molecules together are the same as on Earth. If there were a life-form on 
Mars based on other than carbon-containing molecules, the energies holding such molecules 
together would not be much different than those for proteins and polynucleotides. Hence, bond 
breakage by heat or gamma radiation should be similar for Earth and Mars life-forms, and sterilization 
conditions for Earth microorganisms should eradicate microorganisms of similar size from Mars. 
There is no absolutely optimal approach to decontamination under these conditions, but enough is 
known about the relationship among organism size, repair mechanisms, and survivability, that the 
maximum survivability of any martian organisms can be estimated with some confidence. 
So whether we assume that life on Mars is based on the same building blocks as terrestrial life, or on 
other covalently bonded complex molecules, only two methods of sterilization are considered viable 
options at present - dry heat and gamma radiation, either alone or in combination. These methods 
will penetrate the sample and, therefore, provide the highest level of assurance that putative 
41. PPL-6 applies at the point in the protocol where samples do not require atmospheric isolation and may be moved to 
outside laboratories with suitable facilities for further testing. In general, level 3 biosafety laboratories @SL-3) abide by 
different standards within the U.S. and Europe. For clarity, the U.S. standard for BSL-3-Ag will be used. 
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organisms will be destroyed. It is recognized that the application of heat, and in some cases gamma 
irradiation, will modify the geological properties of the sample. Within reason, every effort should be 
made to develop and implement a method of sterilization that protects the scientific integrity of the 
sample. 
Many of the key parameters measured by geochemists are unaffected by sterilizing gamma doses. 
[Allen eta/., 20001 Gamma photons from 6 0 ~ o  (1 -17 - 1.33 MeV) in doses as high as 30 Mrads do 
not induce radioactivity in rock and mineral samples. Such doses also produce no measurable 
changes in isotopic compositions, elemental compositions, or crystallographic structures. The only 
detectable effects are changes in albedo, color, and thermoluminescence in selected minerals. 
Isotopic and elemental compositions will not be affected regardless of gamma dose. Sterilization at 
doses significantly above 30 Mrads may induce changes in crystallographic structure (caveat: 
research required) and dose-dependent changes in albedo, color and thermoluminescence are 
expected. On balance, if samples returned from Mars require biological sterilization, exposure to 
gamma rays or high-energy electrons may provide a feasible option. 
For the development of a final protocol for use with martian samples, a program of research should 
be initiated to determine the effects of varying degrees of treatment by heat and by gamma irradiation 
on organic compounds in rocky matrices, and also on microscopic morphological evidence of life. 
This research should be started well in advance of the return of the Mars samples, so that the 
decontamination process can be designed to allow data obtained from analyses of sterilized samples 
to be interpreted with minimal ambiguity. Research should also be conducted to determine the 
efficacy of various supercritical fluids and commonly used organic solvents in killing model 
microorganisms, allowing the possibility that solvent extracts might be safe to remove from 
containment without the damage to dissolved biomarker compounds that would be caused by heat or 
ionizing radiation. Whether or not decontamination is systematically achieved by any supercritical 
fluids used in making extracts is a matter that must be investigated further, prior to the removal of any 
such samples from the SRF. 
The aim of a sterilizing process is to reduce the risk of significant adverse effects of samples 
distributed to the scientific community. These levels are defined to be such that the likelihood of 
exposure to adverse effects for humans, animals, and the environment is less than 1 oa6. A suggested 
process for sterilization consists of irradiation with gamma rays at temperatures up to approximately 
105°C. This procedure has the advantage of being able to kill all known terrestrial organisms, while 
doing minimal damage to the non-biologic constituents of the Mars samples. 
The survival rate of a large number of terrestrial organisms exposed to 6 0 ~ o  gamma rays has been 
determined as a function of dosage, dose rate, and temperature. There are no terrestrial organisms 
known whose probability of survival is >I 0- at a dose of 20 Mrads at room temperature. 
Nonetheless, populations of individual organisms may require higher doses to ensure that the 
probability of finding any survivor is <los. The survival rate at a given total dose decreases with 
increasing temperature during irradiation. For example, the sensitivity of dry T I  bacteriophage to 
inactivation by X-rays increases, or the D37 decreases by -1 0-fold between 60 and 105°C [Pollard 
4 953,'. 
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If martian organisms returned to Earth are similar to terrestrial organisms, a dose of 20 Mrads at 
105°C should reduce their number to <loe6 of their initial number. It is not clear, however, that 
martian organisms should be similar to terrestrial organisms. It is possible, for instance, that they 
could be much more resistant to gamma radiation. A good deal is known about the relationship 
between the size and the biochemistry of terrestrial organisms and their resistance to gamma 
radiation. It has been shown that smaller organisms tend to survive higher radiation doses, and the 
strategies used by microorganisms to increase their resistance to radiation are not all understood. It 
might therefore be a useful exercise to explore hypothetical possibilities for the evolution of martian 
organisms adapted to the much higher radiation fluxes to which they would be subjected, compared 
to terrestrial microbes. The radiation dose at various temperatures required to reduce the probability 
of the survival of a single organism below per sample could then be estimated and could 
become the basis of irradiation protocols for the sterilization of returned Mars samples. 
Protocol "Sterilization" Conditions - First, we note that a large number of geochemical tests will be 
carried out in the SRF upon arrival of the samples. These tests will likely include X-ray tomography to 
determine loci of cracks and other separations where life-forms most likely would be, and Total 
Organic Carbon (TOC), which permits a limit on the density of carbon-based organisms. Irrespective 
of the chemical basis of any life-form, a confidence level of sterilization can be provided, with only two 
assumptions: 1) Any reproducing life-form must be based on macromolecules (i.e., polymers) with 
interatomic covalent bonds (not crystal lattices), and 2) Since all such bonds have similar strength, 
destroying these bonds destroys the life-form. 
Evidence shows that 55 Mrads radiation will destroy almost all known bacteria, viruses, spores, and 
prions (e.g., causative agent of Scrapie) by 1 million-fold. Using 100 Mrads would give a 10-fold 
safety margin. If worst-case estimates are used (1 o6 -1012 organisms/gram of martian sample and a 
tiny target, such as a virus) sterilization would require 400 Mrads. Even this may be satisfactory for 
most geologic studies (100 Mrads appears to be OK). This amount of radiation could be safely 
reduced if the irradiation were carried out at elevated temperature (e.g., 105"C), and/or if the TOC is 
low enough to rule out large numbers of organisms being present in the sample. 
Criteria For Release 
As part of the charge to the recent NRC study of The Quaranfine and Certificafion of Martian Samples 
[SSB 20021, the Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration (COMPLEX) was asked to study 
"What are the criteria that must be satisfied before martian samples can be released from the 
facility?" 
The following statements and recommendations were contained in the report of the Committee: 
"COMPLEX considered the possible results of initial searches for evidence of life in the 
martian samples, especially analyses of the samples for total organic carbon. The 
Committee's Recommendation is: 
If the samples are shown to be altogether barren of organic matter, to contain no 
detectable organic carbon compounds and no other evidence of past or present biological 
activity, release of unsterilized aliquots of the samples for study beyond the confines of the 
Quarantine Facility is justified." 
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* If the samples contain evidence of life, or if evidence of life is equivocal (e.g., organic 
matter is present), aliquots that have been sterilized by heat andlor gamma radiation to 
levels more than adequate to kill any known terrestrial organism (Chapter 5) can be 
certified for release from the Quarantine Facility." 
If the samples contain evidence of life, or if evidence of life is equivocal, removal of 
unsterilized aliquots from the Quarantine Facility for transfer to approved containment 
facilities elsewhere should not be excluded, on the condition that containers and transfer 
procedures conform to protocols established by a panel of experts (e.g., from the Center 
for Disease Control) in containment." 
and also, 
"The possibility that the martian samples will contain unequivocal evidence of life is very 
remote, and for this reason COMPLEX'S response has been based on the far more likely 
contingency that evidence of life will be equivocal or absent altogether. Unequivocal 
evidence of life would dictate a very elaborate plan of handling, curation, and study, which 
COMPLEX has not attempted to develop." 
* "If unmistakable evidence of life is found in the Mars samples, they should be dedicated to 
biological studies. Studies of the biosignatures in them should be minimal until an optimal 
study plan has been developed, and an appropriate research facility set up and staffed. In 
the interim, no aliquots of the samples should be released from the confines of the 
Quarantine Facility unless warranted by ongoing biological studies, and the samples are 
sterilized." 
as well as, 
"In the likely event that initial examination of the Mars samples can neither prove nor 
definitively rule out evidence of life in them, plans should be in place to promptly sterilize 
aliquots of the samples and remove them from the Quarantine Facility for biological and 
geochemical studies in specialized laboratories elsewhere. This action should not be 
deferred pending some hypothetical future resolution of the question of whether the 
samples contain life or artifacts of life." 
In addition, a footnote in the report [SSB 20021 states that, "The word 'life,' when used in the context 
of martian life, should always be understood to mean 'Life as we know it,' to allow for the possibility of 
life-forms distinctly outside our terrestrial experience." 
This is an important footnote, because it allows for a possibility that is not, in fact, accounted for by 
the release criteria that COMPLEX stated in the first recommendation quoted above. It may, in fact, 
be quite likely that life we may find first on Mars should be "life as we know it," yet there is no 
assurance of that. 
Additionally, COMPLEX'S recommendations place a heavy emphasis on "sterilization" of Mars 
samples as a key to their release prior to "some hypothetical future resolution" of the question of their 
containing life - yet the report states in a number of places that the effects of sterilizing doses of heat 
and/or gamma radiation on the geochemical and biological signals the samples may carry are not 
known. As a result, the release criteria listed in the Working Draft Protocol are slightly more stringent, 
as well as somewhat more comprehensive, than those recommended by COMPLEX. 
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Table WDP-2 below gives the basic overview of the questions that need to be answered prior to the 
release of un-sterilized samples from the SRF. These questions will be asked of a representative sub- 
sampling of the material returned from Mars. 
Table WDP-2: Sequence of Questions and Possible Strategies 
for Decisions about Release of Sample Material from Containment. 
Item 
1 
2 
3 
4 
In any event, only evidence of real, measurable, biohazards or genuine, active, martian life-forms or 
their biomaterials should be regarded as relevant criteria for decisions about releasing or not 
releasing any un-sterilized samples. Depending on results of biohazard and life detection tests, 
remaining portions of samples will either be released for allocation outright, or sterilized and then 
released for allocation. Hence, the following criteria are intended to govern the release of samples 
evaluated using this Working Draft Protocol. 
Sam~le  Release Criteria: 
Question 
Is there anything that looks like a life- 
form? 
Is there a chemical signature of life? 
Is there any evidence of self 
replication or replication in terrestrial 
living organism? 
Is there any adverse effect on workers 
or the surrounding environment? 
- No solid sample shall be released from containment in the Mars receiving laboratory until it or 
its parent sample undergoes preliminary examination, baseline description, cataloguing, and 
any necessary repackaging. 
Strategy 
Microscopy; Beam synchrotron or other non- 
destructive high-resolution analytic probe, 
particularly one that would allow testing un- 
sterilized (yet still contained) samples outside main 
facility. 
Mass spec. or other analytical measurement 
systems (to be used in containment) that would 
identify biomolecules, chiral asymmetry, special 
bonding, etc. 
Attempts to grow in culture, in cell culture, or in 
defined living organisms. 
Microcosm tests; medical surveillance; evaluation 
of living systems in proximity of the receiving 
facility. 
> Samples to be used for life detection procedures or to be released from containment will be 
screened for: 
+ Radioactivity; 
+ Potential chemical hazards; 
> Additionally, samples to be used for biohazard testing will be screened for: 
+ Known toxicity to bacterial and eukaryotic cells; 
Samples containing any genuine active martian form of life, be it hazardous or not, will be kept 
under appropriate level of containment, or be thoroughly sterilized before release. 
* Samples providing indications of life-related molecules, including proteins, nucleic acids, or 
molecular chirality will require more extended testing, including additional Biohazard testing, 
prior to their release. 
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Samples may be released if they are first subjected to a sterilizing process involving heat, 
radiation, or a combination of these agents to ensure they are safe for analyses outside of 
containment. A sample that is 'safe' is stipulated to be free of any viable self-replicating 
entities or entities able to be amplified. 
* Samples may be released if Biohazard testing does not yield evidence of live, extraterrestrial, 
self-replicating entities or entities able to be amplified and capable of propagating on Earth 
(and possibly interacting with people, animals, plants, or microbes). 
> Biohazard testing will involve assays for: 
+ Replication in enriched media (liquidlsolid); 
+ Effectlgrowth on various cell cultures; 
+ Effectlgrowth on whole organisms (i.e., murinelspecified rodent; plant); and, 
+ Effect on the ecosystem level. 
> Basic Biohazard testing will be required even in the absence of evidence of organic carbon 
in a sample returned from Mars. 
Ovemlew of the Draft Protocol 
The Mars Sample Handling Protocol has one basic purpose -to ensure that a representative set of 
sub-samples undergoes sufficient testing to evaluate them against the release criteria. Samples must 
be characterized, categorized, and analyzed to ensure that they can be sorted according to a 
procedure providing 'statistical relevance' to any sub-sampling (whether homogenized or pre-sorted 
for 'biologically interesting features'), and then to test them within a reasonable time using a minimal 
amount of sample. Early results from Biohazard testing will need to be screened to ensure that 
potentially chronic effects are not overlooked, and the tests themselves need to be ordered to take 
into account the relative harm posed by a potential biohazard (e.g., to humans, animals, 
environments) and to consider a variety of routes of exposure and infection. Samples must be tested 
for biomolecules (known or suspected), other organic compounds, and for non-carbon evidence of an 
active metabolism being present. Life Detection and Biohazard testing partially overlap, and both will 
depend on the processing of the samples and data from the Physical/Chemical processes to evaluate 
their results and how to seek them. 
The Working Drafi Protocol has three main segments: Physical/Chemical Characterization, Life 
Detection, and Biohazard testing. A simplified overview of how the segments are related is given in 
Figure WDP-1. The overall process of testing can be summarized as the following basic series of 
steps: first, the sample(s) will be removed from the return container and documented under 
maximum biocontainment gloveboxes filled with an inert gas atmosphere and housed within a 
combination clean room/biosafety lab. Following the initial documentation, samples will undergo 
preliminary characterization, splitting, and detailed examination using a variety of different 
methodologies. Ultimately, data from Life Detection and Biohazard testing will be used to determine 
whether or not to release materials from biocontainment. All sample materials not selected for further 
testing will be archived in sealed containers in an inert atmosphere glovebox within the lab and 
reserved for future scientific purposes. 
The Working Draft Protocol also addresses issues related to facilities, personnel management, 
monitoring, contingency planning, decision-making, protocol review, implementation, and approval 
processes. 
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PhysicaYChemical Processing 
The overall objective for PhysicalIChemical (PIC) processing is to specify information about the 
samples that will be required to enable effective Life Detection, Biohazard testing, and curation. The 
focus will be on sample characteristics that could be determinative in understanding the results of 
both the in vitro and in vivo testing that may be required, as well as for sample preservation purposes. 
PIC processing includes actions affecting the returned samples between the time the SRC arrives in 
the SRF and the time that sample aliquots are apportioned for Life Detection and Biohazard (LDIBH) 
tests. Physical and chemical processing should include only those actions required in support of 
planetary protection and future sample utilization. The details of the proposed PIC processing, which 
draws heavily from protocols proposed or used by  other^,^ is outlined in Figure WDP-2 on page 85. 
Princi~les: The selected steps and investigations in the PIC processing tracks are motivated by the 
following principles as functions of the SRF: know what the returned samples are, preserve sample 
integrity, document everything, anticipate that different types of samples (e.g., gases, fines, rocks and 
cores) require different treatment, recognize that all data obtained in the PIC processing must serve 
later scientific investigations, use the minimum sample possible, and provide real-time guidance and 
adjustment to the process. These principles, initially outlined by the report of the Mars Sample 
Handling and Requirements Panel (MSHARP) [Carr et a/., 19991, have been endorsed by all the Mars 
Sample Handling Protocol Workshops [Race and Rummel, 2000; Race eta/., 2001a; Bruch et at., 
2001; Race et a/., 2001bl. 
The first two principles (know the sample; preserve sample integrity) are, to some extent, inconsistent 
because every characterization method or action on the returned samples will affect them in some 
way. This inconsistency has been addressed in two ways. First, all initial characterization procedures 
in PIC processing are nominally non-contact and non-destructive - all the sample mass remains in 
the same physical and chemical state after each analysis. Second, most of the returned sample is 
subjected to only minimal investigations, while only a representative portion of the sample is 
subjected to more specific (and potentially sample-altering) analyses. The PIC processing and 
screening methods, except for weighing, involve sample interactions with electromagnetic radiation, 
principally near-visible wavelengths (near ultraviolet, visible, and near infrared). Several methods use 
X-rays to probe the samples, but it was recognized that X-rays can (at some dosages) affect 
biologicallorganic systems. 
42. This Working Draft Protocol is based on the framework previously developed by sub-groups at the first Workshop in this 
Series [Race and Rummel, 2000, p. 14191, and on an earlier report by MSWARP [Car et al., 19991, which are in tum based on 
the protocols developed at Johnson Space Center for handling and processing of Apollo lunar samples, Antarctic 
meteorites, and cosmic dust. During various Workshops in this Series, modifications to the draft protocol have been 
suggested by various sub-groups [Race et al., 2001a, 2001b1, and several of those have been included here. The present 
Working Draft Protocol does include several significant differences from the framework developed in the first Workshop 
in this Series [Raceand Rummel, 20001, which are duly noted. In general, the Working Draft Protocol i s  consistent with the 
requirements and conditions set forth by the Space Studies Board [SSB 19971, MSHkRP Committee [Carr et al., 19991, an  
earlier workshop on sample quarantine protocols [Devincenzi ef  al., 19991, and CAPTEM [Neal, 20001. 
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PENING OF CANISTER 
RELlMlNARY EVALUATION (Samples, Gases, etc.) 
Initial Sub-sample Allocations 
MORPHOLOGY? 
REDOX COUPLES/ 
"BIOHAZARD TESTING 
(Minimal Assumptions 
& Regulatory Requirements) 
CHALLENGE TESTING ON 
EARTH ORGANISMS 
SEQUENCES? Functional Anomalies 
Pathological Indications 
Null TestingIDead Mars 
In Vivo vs. In Vitro Testing 
How Many Phyla? 
Ecosystem Testing? 
Figure WDP-I: A simplified overview of the Working Draft Protocol showing the 3 main segments: 
Physical/Chemical, Life Detection, and Biohazard testing. 
This Working Draft Protocol attempts a compromise between the desire to affect only a small 
proportion of the returned sample by planetary protection testing, and the need to assure safety by 
testing all portions of all samples. A range of strategies have been advocated to deal with the sample 
testing issue: from "characterize everything with all available non-destructive methods," to "store 
most of the sample uncharacterized, and do only the minimum with the rest" (see discussions in Carr 
et al., 1999, p. 37; Race and Rummel, 2000, p. 18; Race et a/., 200la, p. 35; Race et a/., 2001b, 
p. 34). Here it is stipulated that it will be essential to examine all the returned material in at least a 
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minimal fashion, to confirm spacecraft operations in sample transfer from Mars to the Sample Return 
Canister (SRC), to correlate returned samples with documentation made on Mars, and to provide 
enough data to make informed choices about samples for LD/BH analyses. Examining all returned 
materials in at least a minimal fashion will help avoid a worst case scenario where an obviously 
biogenic sample could be stored unexamined and only discovered after nominal LDIBH tests were 
completed. 
Documentation: All treatment and actions with the returned samples need to be documented fully. 
Without a high level of documentation, it would be impossible to establish which samples are 
representative or particularly interesting, and to indicate what had been done to which sample during 
processing. 
Different Samples: It was clear that the different types of samples will require different processing 
techniques. Gases and bulk fines samples are expected to be inherently homogeneous to some level, 
and will require only minimal processing to derive characteristic and representative samples. 
However, solid materials are anticipated to be potentially heterogeneous and will require more 
extensive study and real-time decisions about processing. 
Minimum Sample Mass: The amount and size of returned Mars samples will be small, and it will be 
desirable to subject sample materials to a great range of biological, physical, and chemical tests. 
Thus, by necessity, each test on a returned sample must use the minimum mass consistent with 
achieving the scientific goal of the test. 
Real-Time Adiustments - Oversiuht Committee: Provisions must be made to adjust the PIC 
processes in response to changing technology and mission specifics, to monitor the processes in 
progress, and to adjust them in real time to fit the actual returned samples [Carr et al., 1999, pp. 7, 91. 
This current Working Draft Protocol is being written thirteen years before nominal return of Mars 
samples to Earth. We do not know the spacecraft configuration, the types of martian samples that will 
be collected, their return configuration, and the exact nature of planetary protection measures. 
Similarly, we cannot anticipate the advances in instrumentation and analytical methods that are likely 
between now and the time of sample return. 
It is likely that the returned samples will not be exactly as we imagine them now, and may include 
materials that are complex (e.g., breccias) or unusual (e.g., a possible stromatolite fossil). Treatment 
of these types of samples would be sample-specific, and cannot be defined in advance. Thus, there 
must be a mechanism like a Scientific Oversight Committee to adjust the final protocol to fit the 
samples. 
Assum~tions: in preparing the PIC portion of the Working Draft Protocol, we have assumed the 
mission profile and constraints outlined in the initial Workshop of this Series [Race and Runamel, 
20001. It is worth reiterating a few of the key assumptions with particular relevance to physical 
chemical processing: the SRCs will be received at the SRF intact and with no breaches of 
containment; the returned samples will include gas, fines material (bulk regolith), and solids; and total 
sample mass is expected to be approximately 500 to 1000 grams. 
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Overview of Phvsical/Chemical Processinq: Physical and chemical processing are the priority actions 
taken with the returned Mars samples between arrival of the SRC at the SRF and initial examination 
for biohazard and LDIBH of fines and solids. These anticipated steps in PIC processing are shown 
schematically in Figure WDP-2 which is based on portions of Figures 6-2 and 6-3 of Carr et a/., 
(1999), Figure 1 on page 18 of Race and Rummel(2000), and the narrative of Race et al., (2001a). 
The numeric annotations in Figure WDP-2 refer to similarly numbered sections of text below, which 
elaborates on the proposed PIC processing in narrative form. 
PIC processing can be divided into three phases in roughly sequential order: 
Initial pre-processing, before preliminary examination of the samples; 
* Preliminary examination and screening of gas, fines, and solids, to permit informed choices 
about samples for later detailed testing, banking or curation; and 
* Sub-division of those samples selected for Biohazard and Life Detection tests. 
Following PJC processing, Life Detection and Biohazard testing will begin. Those processes may 
require information developed during preliminary examination and screening, and may also require 
subsequent more detailed information of a physical or chemical nature. Analyses to obtain these 
latter data are supplemental to the PIC processing and are not included here. 
The steps of preliminary examination and screening were judged different for three types of samples: 
gases; homogeneous particulate samples; and inherently inhomogeneous samples like rocks, rock 
cores, and regolith cores. Each of these sample types will follow a different track through preliminary 
examination and screening as described in the text below and shown on Figure WDP-2 as the 'Gases 
Track, ' 'Solids Track, ' and 'Fines Track. ' 
Pre--nrocessin_e Samples 
* 1.0 Pre-Processing Steps: Pre-processing steps outlined here are those between arrival of the 
SRC at the SRF, and initial examination of gas, fines and solids. Preprocessing steps refer to 
cleaning and decontaminating the exterior of any containers holding samples, as well as the initial 
steps in each of the gases-, fines-, and solids-tracks involving opening of containers and removal 
of samples. 
- I. I Clean and Decontaminate Exferior of SRC: It is imperative that the exterior of the any sample 
return containers or vessel(s) carry no terrestrial microorganisms and are organically clean. (It is 
assumed that the exterior of the SRC is not contaminated with martian materials.) If these states 
are not achieved, all subsequent analyses for life or biohazard are severely compromised. The 
actual methods of cleaning and decontamination are to be determined. An interesting new method 
is laser ablation of the SRC exterior. 
Procedures for opening sample containers are mission specific, as to number, types, and contents 
of containers. At a minimum, we assume that some solid materials with surrounding gas will be in 
the container(s). It is recommended that the gas be extracted for separate treatment, and that the 
solid samples be contained thereafter in an inert gas like dry nitrogen. 
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trace element; petrography 
Figure WDP-2. The Physical/Chemical Analyses will occur in four sequential stages 
leading into the Life Detection and Biohazard testing. 
(The numbers in circles correspond to numbered paragraphs in the text). 
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1.2 Extract Head Gas and Back-fill: The returned solid samples will arrive on Earth with some gas 
surrounding them. Presumably, this "head gas" would consist originally of martian atmosphere. By 
the time of arrival on Earth, the gas might have been affected by chemical and physical reactions 
with the solids (rock and soil), by out-gassing from the solids (especially if the temperature rises 
above 25°C during return), and possibly by biological activity in the sample. Thus, this gas may 
contain information important to understanding the thermal, chemical, and biological histories of 
the solid rieturned samples. Therefore, extraction and analysis of the head gas is a high priority. 
In this step of pre-processing, the head gas would be extracted from the SRC, and the SRC back- 
filled with a chemically un-reactive gas to ambient "room" pressure. Exact procedures for 
extraction and back-filling will depend on the SRC design and construction, but might (for instance) 
include p~~ncturing the SRC at an intentional thin point, extracting the head gas to a pre- 
determined vacuum pressure, and refilling the SRC with dry clean N2 gas. The extracted head gas 
would be processed as below (see 2.0 - 2.2). 
Three issues related to gases were identified for further consideration and possible research: 
* the effects of vacuum and non-martian gas on the chemical properties of the sample; 
* the effects of vacuum and non-martian gas on any live martian biota; and 
the effects of extraction on gas isotope ratios. 
For the first issue, experience with curation of the Apollo lunar samples has shown that few 
geochemical and other inorganic investigations are materially affected holding and processing the 
samples in dry N2 gas at 7 bar. Of course, the lunar samples originated at hard vacuum on the 
Moon. It is not clear, however, what changes might be wrought on returned Mars samples 
(possibly containing clays or other hydrous materials) by vacuum pumping and then by immersion 
in dry N2 gas. This is an area for research. 
For the second issue, there is reason to want the returned solid samples to be treated under 
atmosphere as near to martian as possible - both to preserve key geochemical signatures [Neal, 
2000, p. 22,492fq and to maintain potential micro-organisms in their native environment. No one 
knows whether live martian organisms could be killed by removal of 0.006 bars of C02 and then 
immersion in one bar of N2 and there may not be comparable terrestrial biota to test. The samples 
will eventually be subjected to higher pressures, merely because the biota of BH tests would not 
survive in martian atmosphere. On the other hand, there are serious problems in sample handling 
and geochemistry that would be caused by immersing the samples in a model martian 
atmosphere. Sample handling and LDIBH testing at reduced pressure (the near vacuum of 0.006 
bars 602) present severe problems. Sample handling under vacuum was attempted during the 
Apollo program with lunar samples, and was found to be extremely difficult, expensive and 
contaminating (e-g., mercury or oil from vacuum pumps). Similarly, backfill with a relatively reactive 
gas like GO2 will change the isotopic nature of the sample. Terrestrial carbon and oxygen will 
exchange with the sample and compromise biological and geochemical inferences from of these 
two stable isotope systems. 
This is obviously an area of future research. One possible approach would be to backfill the SRC 
and do sample handling and examination (where possible) under 1 bar of dry N2 gas with 0.006 
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bars of C02 added. This might satisfy the constraints of easy sample handling and the hope of not 
killing live martian organisms. 
For the third issue, it is known that the elemental and isotopic ratios of a gas sample can be 
fractionated during transfer from one reservoir to another. With the head gas in contact with the 
abundant surface area of the returned samples, fractionation could become a serious potential 
problem. 
Gases Track 
2.0 Gases Track: Gas withdrawn from the SRC, the "head gas," will be processed by filtering. 
Subsequently, any fines split off for Life Detection and Biohazard testing, and the filtered gas, 
would be available relatively rapidly for other investigations [Race and Rummel, 2000, p. 171. 
2.1 Filter to <TBD Nanometer: After or during removal of the head gas from the SRC, the gas 
should be filtered to remove particles [Race and Rummel, 2000, p. 171. The purpose of filtering the 
head gas is to remove objects that could reasonably constitute viable organisms or that might 
present biohazards. The size of objects passing the filter is to be determined (TBD). Sizes 
suggested by previous sub-groups in this Workshop Series have ranged from <0.5 pm [Race ef 
a/., 2001a, p. 341 to <0.02 pm [Race et al., 20016, p. 271, both of which are realizable with current 
technology (currently, some methods are rated to remove particles larger than 0.003pm). It is not 
clear if filtering could change the chemical or molecular composition of the head gas, for instance 
by preferential adsorption of heavy noble gases or by catalysis of reactions. This is an area for 
additional research. 
* 2.2 Distribute in Sealed Containers: The Sub-group recommended that filtered head gas could be 
released from the SRF and distributed in sealed containers. Unlike the returned solid samples 
(rock, regolith, etc.), a returned gas sample is only useful for investigation if it is contained. 
Typically, a gas sample like this would be placed in a glass bulb, which would then be sealed by 
melting the stem of the bulb. Containment at PPL-a or PPL-$ levels seems inherent in this 
pr~cedure:~ and it is recommended that the filtered gas be available for immediate allocation from 
the SRF without further processing or ~terilization.~' 
Solids Track 
* 3.0 Solids Track: After removal and filtering of head gas from the SRC, the remaining returned 
samples would be solids of various types: regolith samples, rocks, rock cores, soil cores, and 
fines. The specifics of this solid sample set are to be determined during mission design. These 
solid samples will be processed through two separate tracks, Solids Track (3.0) and Fines Track 
(4.0), for basic documentation, further preliminary testing, and selection for subsequent Life 
Detection and Biohazard tests. 
43. It is assumed that the operation of sealing the gases into the bulbs will be done under appropriate PPL conditions. 
44. To date, no decisions have been made about when and under what conditions sample materials will be eligible for release 
from containment at the SRF. Ultimately, it is likely that decisions about what is done with sample materials will be made 
after review by an appropriate international scientific oversight committee at the SRF in consultation with NASA's 
Planetary Protection Officer and other responsible officials. 
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Some principles of this PIC process are worth restating here. The PIC process is a method to 
obtain the minimum data needed to adequately characterize the samples and to permit selection 
of suitable samples for LDIBH tests. The remaining samples would be preserved and made 
available for subsequent investigations and analyses. The samples will be changed from their 
original state as little as possible. 
The martian samples will be touched or come in contact with only a limited set of materials under 
controllecl temperature and atmosphere. Pristine lunar samples are touched only by stainless 
steel, aluminum, and ~ e f l o n ~ ~ ;  these might also be suitable for returned Mars samples. Neal cites 
the considerations [Neal, 20001, from a geochemical perspective, for choices of materials for 
sample handling and suggests several types. Whether these materials are appropriate for returned 
martian samples should be determined through additional research with Mars simulants prior to 
sample return. 
The temperature of processing is to be determined, and will depend in great part on technical 
mission constraints. The implicit assumption here has been that temperature of processing will be 
between 0°C (273K) and ambient (-29810, for which the protocols and experience with the Apollo 
samples are relevant. On the other hand, it would be important from geochemical and biological 
perspectives to maintain the returned sample at its ambient martian temperature, -240K [Carr ef 
a/., 1999; Neal, 20001. This temperature may not be possible within mission constraints, and there 
appears lo be no compelling reason to process at temperatures significantly below those 
experienced by the samples during their transit to Earth. It is not clear, at this point, what problems 
and attendant costs would be associated with sample curation and processing at sub-freezing 
temperatures. 
It is suggested that processing, curation, and back-filling of the SRC be performed at an 
atmosphere of 1 bar of un-reactive gas; the composition and pressure of the atmosphere has 
implications for biological and geochemical testing, and is an area of concern (see pages 33). The 
following steps implicitly assume that processing and curation will take place under a pure 
un-reactive gas (such as N2) at 1 atmosphere of pressure. It is not known whether this gas would 
present problems to Life Detection and Biohazard testing procedures. It must be recognized that a 
requirement for processing at low pressure, like the 0.006 atmospheres of the martian surface, 
would have significant implications for the design and cost of a SRF. 
3.1 Open SRC and Remove Samples: The SRC must be opened for retrieval and removal of solid 
samples from it. The procedure for opening the SRC and removing the samples are to be 
determined and will depend entirely on the design of the SRC. 
- 3.2 Preliminary Examinafion and Documenfafion: As part of the PIC processing, Preliminary 
Examination and Documentation includes the minimal investigations deemed absolutely critical for 
understanding the nature of the returned sample, and initial hazard investigations [Race and 
Rummel, 2000, pp. 14, 17; Race ef al., 2001a, p. 371. 
The sole hazard investigation at this time is measurement of sample radioactivity, because some 
forms of ionizing radiation can penetrate the curation barriers between the returned sample and 
human processors. The purpose is not to measure abundances of indigenous radioisotopes 
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(e-g., 2 3 8 ~ )  nor cosmogenic radioactivities (e.g., 2 6 ~ ~ ) ,  but rather to determine whether radiation 
levels associated with the samples could pose a threat to workers at the SRF. Hazardous 
radioactivity can be measured on the bulk returned sample, and need not be measured on 
individual samples unless the bulk presents a radiation hazard. Only gamma radiation need be 
detected, as beta and alpha radiation will not penetrate the barriers between the returned samples 
and human processors. In the opinion of the Workshop attendees, it was extremely unlikely that 
returned martian samples will present a radiation biohazard. 
lmaging provides the first and critical documentation of the returned sample [Race and Rurnrnel, 
2000, p. 171. Imaging at this stage would serve multiple objectives: verification of mission 
success; correlation of specific samples with images of them taken on Mars and their sources; 
documentation of physical effects of transport to Earth (e.g., fracturing, disaggregation), 
preliminary identification of rock types, and measurement of sample volumes. It is anticipated that 
the returned samples would be imaged at a high spatial resolution (TBD; perhaps -0.1 millimeter 
per pixel), in wavelengths to TBD (perhaps approximately seven-to-nine wavelengths, with at least 
three or four in the visible). These data will be critical to understanding the nature of the returned 
sample and in processing and selection of samples for Life Detection and Biohazard tests. 
Masses of samples should be measured first at this stage, and subsequently whenever a sample 
is cleaned, split or allocated. Measurement of mass is important as a mission design requirement, 
for the sample tracking and curation, and for helping allocate suitable samples for LD/BH testing. 
For instance, it is likely that a mission requirement would be return to Earth of a given mass of 
martian material, and weighing here will determine if that mission requirement has been fulfilled. 
3.3 Separate rock fragments and cores from fines: At this stage of processing, the solid returned 
sample would be separated into larger and smaller fragments. The former would include drill 
cores, whole rocks, and rock fragments or rocklets45 (equivalent to the Apollo "coarse-fines"). The 
latter would include unconsolidated regolith, atmospheric dust, and dust generated by coring 
operations. This separation is necessary because the larger fragments cannot be treated as 
homogeneous powders, and must be examined individually for Life Detection and Biohazard 
analyses. It is possible that the regolith samples will include small rocks and rocklets, comparable 
to the case with the lunar regolith samples returned by the Apollo missions. As with Apollo, the 
small rocks and rocklets would be separated from the finer material, cataloged, and curated 
individually throughout subsequent processing and analyses. The cut-off size for rock fragments or 
rocklets remains to be determined. The standard cut-off size in the soil science community is 
greater than 2 millimeters. Previous sub-groups in the Workshop Series have suggested sizes 
ranging from greater than I millimeter to greater than 2 millimeters, and even "... greater than 
several millimeters ..." [Race et a/., 2001a, p. 34; Race and Rummel, 2000, p. 171. It seems 
reasonable that decisions about cut-off sizes for different classes of solid materials will be made 
when the sample is returned and first examined, based on a recommendation of a science 
oversight committee. 
45. The terminology used to refer to small rocky materials has varied from workshop to workshop in this Series. The terms 
rock fragments, rocklets, and pebbles have been used to identify a general class of solid material that is distinct from fines, 
larger rocks or rock cores. In addition to determining cut-off sizes at some later date, it wiU be advisable to use consistent 
terminology in all parts of the protocol. 
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Given the dusty nature of the martian surface, and the likelihood of dust generated during coring, it 
is anticipated that the surfaces of cores and rock samples will be coated with fine-grained 
materials. After separation, preliminary examination, and documentation of the returned solid 
materials, it will be necessary to remove dust from surfaces of the cores, rocks, and rocklets [Race 
et a/., 2051b, p. 221. These fine materials constitute distinct samples of martian material, and will 
require different processing and curation than the solids (i-e., they will be treated as in the fines 
track). In addition, the fine materials on solids will likely hinder identification and processing of the 
latter by obscuring their surfaces. Selection of samples for Life Detection and Biohazard assays 
will require knowledge of the mineralogy, structure, and textures of the samples. The analytical 
probes available (primarily visual and near-infrared optics) will be unable to operate effectively on 
dust-covered samples. 
The exact method of fines removal is to be determined. Suggested methods have included 
vacuuming the samples, blowing the dust off, a combination of vacuuming and blowing, and laser 
desorption. In all these cases, thought needs to be given to how the fines are to be collected after 
removal. The fines collected from each solid sample would be identified individually, and treated 
as a separate fines sample within the "fines track," as described in section 4.0 below. 
3.4 Sort to Groups: After removal of adhering fines, the solid samples should be sorted into 
groups of similar materials using visual clues and information from Preliminary Examination data 
[Race and Rummel, 2000, p. 17; Race ef a/., 2001al. This step assumes that the returned sample 
will contain several cores and/or multiple millimeter-sized rock fragments ("rocklets"). Criteria for 
sorting would include size, rock type (including color), grain size, texture, and other readily 
observable properties. This sorting is an important first step towards selecting representative 
samples for Life Detection and Biohazard tests [Race et a/., 2001a, p. 261. 
3.5 Pristine Bank: Samples and sub-samples that are not chosen at this point for Further 
Screening and/or for Life Detection and Biohazard tests will be stored in a Pristine Sample Bank 
[Race and Rummel, 2000, p. 771. This "bank" will serve as a containment system designed to 
maintain the physical, chemical, and biological integrity of samples while they await allocation for 
other analyses at a later date. According to recommendations by CAPTEM, the "bank" should hold 
the samples under an inert atmosphere at temperatures below 240K [Neal, 20001. The pristine 
solid samples are those that have been affected by no procedures beyond those of preliminary 
examination, dust removal, and sorting. The pristine bank will serve the critical purpose of 
preserving a portion of the returned sample for analyses beyond and after the Life Detection and 
Biohazard assays associated with planetary protection. The pristine bank samples will become the 
principal resource for all subsequent chemical, geological, physical, and biological analyses on the 
returned samples. 
* 3.6 Further Screening: At this point, sub-samples of each rock type group sorted previously (see 
section 3.4 above) would be subjected to additional analyses in support of (and preliminary to) Life 
Detection and Biohazard tests [Race and Rummel, 2000, p. 14; Race ef a/., 2501a, p. 371. The 
exact analyses needed are to be determined in conjunction with the detailed LD/BH tests which 
are also TBD (see Fufure Research page 32). Selected analyses should emphasize non- 
destructive methods that are not likely to modify or destroy biological molecules and biohazards, 
and would not be anticipated to kill or weaken live martian organisms. Once they are defined, it will 
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be possible to learn what characteristics of the returned samples would affect or interfere with the 
tests, and what data are essential prior to the tests. With these data in hand, the Further Screening 
analyses can be tailored to meet the requirements of life and biohazard detection. Given these 
restrictions and uncertainties, the following screening methods have been suggested. 
Multi-spectral imagery of the samples in visible, near-infrared, and/or thermal infrared light will 
provide identification of the minerals (inorganic chemical compounds) and presence and 
distributions of organic matter and water (molecular and bound) in the sample. Raman 
spectroscopy should be considered here also, with the caveat that samples can experience 
significant heating during Raman analysis. (For instance, 514.5 nanometer green light from an 
argon laser is absorbed significantly more than 1064 nanometer infrared light from a Nd:YAG 
laser. Heating can also be mitigated by distribution of laser power in space and time over the 
sample). The distributions of minerals on the samples' surfaces will be crucial clues to 
understanding their internal structures. X-ray diffraction analysis would also be valuable in defining 
the minerals in the samples (see Race eta/., 2001a, p. 35ff, for more detail on these methods.) 
It is important to know the internal structures of the samples (especially the larger ones), because 
biogenic material could reasonably be concentrated in cracks and open spaces (analogous to 
terrestrial endolithic organisms). Building on the imagery above, tomographic analyses could 
provide three-dimensional visualizations of the internal structures of the samples. Among 
tomographic methods, the most developed at present is X-ray tomography. To provide X-ray 
tomographic maps of density (i.e., continuum absorption of X-rays) now requires only a beneh-top 
instrument. X-ray tomographic maps for individual elements (like carbon) require at present the X- 
ray intensity of a synchrotron light source, and is likely impractical in this Further Screening step. 
Abundances and distributions of major elements and several minor elements will likely be 
important for sample selection in life-detection and biohazard analyses. It is also possible that 
abundances of certain elements could produce false positives or negatives on Life Detection and 
Biohazard tests. A likely method for elemental analysis is X-ray fluorescence, a mature technique 
used routinely in inorganic geochemistry. 
It would be very important at this stage to have bulk analyses for carbon as a guide to sample 
selection. However, none of the sub-groups in the MSHP Workshop Series suggested a non- 
destructive test for bulk carbon that was sufficiently precise and had low enough detection limits to 
be useful here. This is an area for future research. 
* 3.7 Selection of Sub-samples: Based on data from the Furfher Screening tests (section 3.6), 
representative sub-samples will be selected for Life Detection and Biohazard tests. The remaining 
unselected samples will be stored in the Returned Sample Bank (section 3.8) for future research 
access. Selected samples will carry forward to the actual Life Detection and Biohazard 
investigations (section 5.0). 
* 3.8 Returned Sample Bank: The Returned Sample Bank, distinct from the Pristine Sample Bank 
(see section 3.5 above), is for storage of samples that have experienced the analysis of Further 
Screening, but have not yet been allocated for Life Detection and Biohazard tests. These returned 
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samples should be labeled and kept distinct from the pristine samples, as the former have had 
more chance for contamination than the latter. 
Fines Truck 
* 4.0 Fines Track: Fines samples are those with particle sizes smaller than some to-be-determined 
limit; the size limit suggested by earlier sub-groups in this Workshop Series was 
1 or 2 millimeters [Race and Rummel, 2000; Race eta/., 2001a, 200161. In either case, it is 
anticipated that fines samples will contain so many grains, mixed homogeneously, that it will be 
readily possible to take representative splits for Life Detection and Biohazard tests. Fines samples 
may include materials from a variety of sources: material collected as such, like dust from a wind- 
deposited dune; regolith that has had coarser material removed (see section 3.3 above); dust 
filtered out of the SRC head gas (see section 2.1 above); or particulates removed from surfaces of 
rocks or cores (see section 3.3 above). 
* 4.1 Characterization: Characterization of fines samples would be limited to imagery of each bulk 
fines sample (possibly including multi-spectral imagery) and weighing of each bulk sample [Race 
et a!., 2001a, p. 351. There is no need to image or otherwise characterize each individual particle 
within a bulk fines sample. Only these minimal analyses are needed to document each fine sample 
at this stage in order to select samples or representative sub-samples for biohazard and Life 
Detection assays. Sub-groups at the first Workshop in this Series suggested that each fines 
sample be subdivided into fragments larger and smaller than 1 millimeter [Race and Rummel, 
20001, but this suggestion was not pursued by any later Sub-group. It may be an area of needed 
research. 
4.2 Split for LD/BH Tests and Banking: At this point in PIC processing, fines samples would be 
selected for Life Detection and Biohazard tests, and split into representative aliquots. Some 
aliqusts would be carried forward to Life Detection and Biohazard tests (see section 5.3 below), 
and some would be reserved in the 'Pristine Sample Bank' (see section 3.5 above). 
The methods of splitting the fines samples are to be determined. Methods used in typical terrestrial 
applications (e-g., riffle splitter or coning-and-q~artering~~), may not be appropriate or practical 
here [Race et a/., 200la, p. 141. First, these methods involve considerable contact between the 
sample and tools and surfaces, and may be deemed too contaminating. Second, both methods 
have the potential for considerable loss of sample through embedding in metal surfaces or 
electrostatic adhesion to metal and plastic surfaces. The electrostatic adhesion problem will be 
exacerbated in the dry atmosphere of the PPL-a spaces, as has been found with curation of lunar 
samples. In fact, neither method is now used for splitting lunar fines samples. This is clearly an 
area for research. 
In this Working Draft Protocol, it is assumed that a sub-sample of fines is representative, based on 
confirmation of an adequate splitting method. However, previous sub-groups [Race et a/., 2001, 
46. A riffle splitter is a mechanical separation device that is able to split an unconsolidated soil sample into two equal, parts 
that have the same grain size distribution (and presumably composition as the parent sample). Coning-and-quartering is 
another commonly used separation method (as described in Maxwell 1968). 
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p. 141 suggested that each fines sample be split into multiple sub-samples and each analyzed for 
bulk composition and mineralogy (as under Further Screening, see section 3.6) to determine 
whether splits are homogeneous. Further consideration of this issue is needed. 
Life Detection and Biohazard Analvses 
5.0 Samples for Life Detecfion, Biohazard Analyses: At this point, samples have been selected for 
Life Detection and Biohazard tests as well as other PIC analyses 
* 5.1 Split into Representative Sub-samples for LD/BH: The samples selected for Life Detection and 
Biohazard tests will be split into representative sub-samples at this point. This splitting is 
necessary to ensure that analyses are performed on similar materials, and so that the results of 
one test may be reasonably correlated with the results of another. Splits chosen for immediate 
analysis will proceed to various LDIBH analyses (see section 5.3 below). Some splits will be held 
in reserve as part of the return sample bank as described in section 5.2. below. 
5.2 Reserve: Some splits from section 5.1 will be held in reserve for Life Detection and Biohazard 
tests, in anticipation of future needs. Should a test fail or require repetition, this reserve material 
would be available. These reserve splits could reasonably be kept in the 'Return Sample Bank,' 
but labeled accordingly. 
5.3 Parallelism of Tasks: It is beyond the scope of the PIC procedure to describe the actual 
operation of Life Detection and Biohazard analyses and supporting inorganic analyses. Iiowever, 
they are included on Figure WDP-1 for completeness. It is anticipated that these three types of 
tests would be run in parallel, with the results of each influencing the interpretation and course of 
the other tests [Carr et al., 1999, p. 91. 
Future Research: In the discussions about physical and chemical processing of the returned martian 
samples, several areas were identified where data were not available or could readily be obtained 
without additional research. Each research suggestion discussed below is keyed to the particular 
narrative text section above where it is called out: 
What analyses and data do the Life Detection and Biohazard analyses require from the 
physical and chemical processing? (sections 3.2, 3.6, and 4.1). These requirements were not 
available, so the PIC process here reflects informed judgment (mostly from geochemists and 
geologists) about which analyses would be most useful in LDIBH studies. In particular, it would 
be very important to know what information about sample characteristics or the particular P/C 
processing would be important to know for LDIBH purposes (for example, as possible causes of 
false positives or negatives); to document abundances of specific elements of interest (e.g., 
arsenic) or minerals (e.g., saponite clay); or to characterize surface reactivity and constituents 
(e-g., super-oxidants), etc.). 
In implementing the final protocol there should be close collaboration between biohazard, 
toxicology, and pathology disciplines with those conducting testing in chemistry, biochemistry, 
geochemistry, physics, and geophysics to coordinate a truly integrated testing outcome, 
pursuant to augmenting what physical sciences data should be ruled in or ruled out in ultimate 
interpretations of sub-sample biohazard and/or toxicity. 
* Trial testing initiatives should be developed before the final protocol is fully implemented in a 
sample return mission. These trials should be refinements that take into account the 
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prospective chemical and physical properties of martian soil and rock(s) (andlor use martian 
surrogates where applicable), as well as evaluate biohazard containment facility needs. 
Is there added value in separating each fines sample into grain size separates [Race and 
Rummel, 2000, p. 17]? What additional contamination might be introduced by this procedure? 
(section 4.2) 
* How can one remove terrestrial contaminants (including organics) from the exterior of the SRC 
before it enters PPL-a space? Laser ablation surfacing was suggested and should be studied. 
(section 1 .I) 
How can one effectively remove dust and other fines from the surfaces of rocks and rock 
cores? (section 3.3) Three suggestions were vacuuming, blowing with compressed gas, and 
laser desorption. 
What effects do X-rays have on biological structures and molecules? Several analytical 
methods involve interaction of X-rays with the samples (e.g., XRD, XRF, XR tomography), and 
the Sub-group 1 did not know whether these X-ray doses would affect LDIBH analyses. 
(section 3.6) 
- How can one analyze a bulk sample for trace or ultra-trace quantities of carbon, non- 
destructively and without anticipated deleterious effects on biological molecules or viable 
organisms? (section 3.6) 
* Is the chemical composition of the head gas affected by filtration to remove small particles? 
(section 2.1) 
* How can one produce representative splits of martian dust and fines materials without 
unacceptable contamination or loss of sample? (section 4.2) 
* How can one confirm that splits of dust or fines material are representative before Biohazard 
and Life Detection analyses, or is such confirmation necessary? (section 4.2) 
* What chemical and physical effects would removal of head gas and replacement with dry 
nitrogen have on the returned martian samples? (section 1.2) 
- What chemical effects would removal of head gas from the returned sample canister have on 
the gas itself? (section 1.2) 
What effects would removal of head gas and replacement with dry nitrogen have on live 
martian and terrestrial organisms in the returned martian samples? Would these effects be 
mitigated if samples were curated under dry nitrogen with 0.006 bars of C02 gas? (section 1.2) 
What effects would gas with terrestrial carbon and oxygen isotope ratios have on live martian 
and returned terrestrial organisms in the returned martian sample? Perhaps, would live martian 
organism ingest the terrestrial carbon and oxygen, and become isotopically indistinguishable 
from terrestrial organisms? (section 1.2) 
Using Mars simulants, determine whether materials and conditions recommended by CAPTEM 
[Neal, 2000] are appropriate for handling martian samples. (sections 3.0 and 4.0) 
* Petrographic thin sections are enormously valuable in characterizing the minerals, structures, 
textures and history of a rock. Can petrographic thin sections be produced in a manner 
consistent with the principles of minimal sample use and minimal contamination of the section 
material and the remaining sample? (section 5.3) 
Areas of Concern: Several areas of serious or general concern have been raised during discussions 
of physical and chemical processing; these issues are significant enough to affect mission design, 
SRC design, and SRF design: 
* The validity and significance of biosafety and Life Detection procedures in the SRF is strongly 
dependent on sample collection procedures on Mars, and thus on spacecraft and mission 
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design. How can the biohazard and Life Detection teams have adequate influence on the 
designs of sample return spacecraft and sample collection procedures? 
* What if the return sample container is breached or its seal is compromised? What contingency 
plans are possible to achieve PPL-a containment and biosafety? (see Appendix B, 
Assumptions, page 133). 
* Is measurement of sample mass important as a preliminary characterization step? Should it be 
deferred until the "Further Screening" step? (sections 3.2 and 3.6). 
* How is the head gas to be removed from the SRC without contamination? (section 1.2) Is 
backfill with non-reactive gas justifiable in terms of possible effects on martian biology? Would it 
be adequate to backfill with 6 millibar of terrestrial C02 and the remainder a non-reactive gas? 
(section 1.2) 
* What should be done if a unique critical sample is smaller than the nominal requirements for 
LDIBH analyses? (section 3.4 ff) 
What should be done if the requirements for LDIBH testing evolve to consume an inordinate 
quantity of returned sample, to preclude other biological, organic, and inorganic tests that 
further NASA's other goals? (section 5.0) 
Although not directly relevant here, concern was expressed that sterilization measures might 
have significant adverse effects on biochemical analyses outside of PPL containment [Race 
and Rummel, 20001. 
Life Detection 
lnfroducfion: The proposed Life Detection (LD) analyses will use a broad definition and set of criteria 
for life (and an approach for detecting life) that are not limited by the specific features of life as we 
know it on Earth. The approach should begin with, and rely on 'signatures' of various types that 
encompass all known terrestrial life, and that might encompass non-terrestrial life. These signatures 
should be based on macromolecular structures, structural and biosynthetic chemistry, isotopic 
patterns and geochemical features that help define the underlying principles of life (see Biosignafures 
below). We will take advantage of our knowledge regarding the structural and metabolic intricacies of 
earthly life, but will not be constrained by these terrestrial examples. In particular, the recent 
recognition of our inability to cultivate nearly all terrestrial microbial life emphasizes the importance of 
relying on methods beyond in vifro cultivation for detecting extraterrestrial life. Life is likely to be 
catalytic and carbon-based. The most easily-conceived scenarios for the existence of extraterrestrial 
life posit the presence of a prebiotic mix similar to that which existed on this planet. Evolutionary 
paths different from those that occurred on this planet may have led to the generation of slightly 
different building blocks and polymers. Life Detection methods should be potentially capable of 
recognizing the products of these variant paths, as well as proven to be capable in recognizing the 
various known forms of life on Earth. An overall strategy for life detection is shown in Figure WDP-3 
on the next page. 
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Laser Raman 
instrument 
* Non destructive 
Figure WDP-3. Life Detection Process Flowchart. 
Table WDP-3 on the next page, lists what could be considered 'universal' properties of life. Many of 
these properties are directly measurable, although some of them, such as replication or evolution, 
can, in all likelihood, only be inferred. Evidence for only a subset of these properties in an 
extraterrestrial specimen might constitute a sign of life (e-g., evidence for a self-sustaining catalytic 
system); however, it is the combination and presence of all of these properties that define life as we 
know it. 
Biosiunafures: Signatures and signs of life may be defined through different prisms, perspectives, 
and methods. Broadly-defined signatures (see below) offer the greatest opportunities for detecting life 
that is unfamiliar to us in its detail; however, broad signatures also carry the greatest chance for 
misleading or false-positive findings. In general, the greater the number of independently-defined 
signatures that are detected, the greater the spatial co-localization of these signatures, and the 
greater the number of separate but clustered co-localized signatures, the more strong is the evidence 
for life. As a simple example, self-sustaining catalytic processes should create a localized . 
overabundance of a discrete set of related compounds. Conceptual and analytical approaches must 
recognize that if evidence of extraterrestrial life is found, it is most likely to reflect life that is now 
extinct or inactive. Useful biosignatures may exist in a variety of types: 
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* Morphological: As we know them, all forms of life are defined by a boundary (e.g., a wall) that 
delineates them from the surrounding environment. This "spatial-physical incongruity" often 
contains patterns, complexity and recognizable features (e.g., size, shape, structure, 
morphological indicators of replication or specialized features such as attachment and motility 
structures, septae, etc.). 
* Structural Chemistry: Life can be defined by basic chemical features, such as organic or 
complex carbon, or by higher-order features, such as polymers, membranes, attachment and 
motility structures. Methods need to be improved for characterization of complex polymers, 
and criteria developed for interpreting the patterns associated with complex carbon. We are 
even less well-informed about the possible structural complexity that can be incorporated into 
silica and silica-carbon polymers. 
* Metabolism and Bioenergetics: The waste products that are released, and the energy 
expended by all forms of life as we know them, can be detected with physical and cl?ernical 
methods. More work is needed to assess the range of metabolic mechanisms and products 
that occur on Earth, as well as those that occur in the absence of carbon. Some products are 
created through specific enzyme catalyzed reactions, such as the reduction of nitrogen that 
can occur from inorganic reactions. Other products are predicted to result from reactions in the 
absence of protein-enzymes, such as those involved in energy and C02 reduction. 
Table WDP-3: Universal Properties of Life (?) 
Life is catalvtic 
+ There should be significant deviations from what is predicted by chemical kinetics 
+ Life consumes energy 
+ Life creates waste products 
+ Life is exothermic 
+ Life modifies its environment 
+ Life uses thermodynamic disequilibria to build and maintain other thermodynamic 
disequilibria (in open systems or within a "wall") 
Life is ~enetic - 
+ There will be some system for storing and propagating information 
+ There will be molecular distributions with significant capacity for complexity 
Life replicates and evolves 
+ There will be evidence for replication of structures and complexity 
+ There will be evidence (structural and chemical) for evolution of form and function 
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* Biosynthefic Mechanisms: All life has mechanisms to synthesize structural, metabolic and 
replicative macromolecules. Carbon-based life utilizes protein-enzymes and to a limited 
extent, ribozymes (catalytic RNA). The synthesis of macromolecules involves a sequence of 
reactions that depends on the availability of basic organic components such as amino acids 
(for protein synthesis). In taking a broader view, we must consider the possibility of 
biosynthetic mechanisms and pathways that are catalyzed by inorganic metals and minerals, 
or are that are dependent on physical gradients (temperature, pH, Eh, magnetism), catalytic 
mineral surfaces, and various energy sources (UV and other forms of radiation and light). 
a lsotopic Signatures: All forms of life with which we are familiar fractionate various elements; 
thus, fractionation patterns can be indicative of life. Organisms that express different metabolic 
capabilities display distinctive patterns in the fractionation of carbon, nitrogen and sulfur. This 
might be particularly important in assessing the possible origins of organic compounds and 
various volatiles such as methane, carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide, if detected on Mars. 
While one cannot assume that extraterrestrial life will fractionate elements in the same manner 
as terrestrial life, it is reasonable to assume that local patterns of fractionation within or at sites 
of life-forms will vary from those measured in the surrounding environment. 
Some isotopes, such as those for oxygen (detected in carbon dioxide and phosphate), can be 
indicators of environmental temperature. There is promising new technology for measuring 
carbon isotope fractionation patterns in single organic molecules and fractionation patterns in 
transition metals. The latter may be very important in identifying a biological source for various 
minerals such as magnetite. 
Geochemical Signatures: This family of signatures includes findings such as magnetite, and 
other minerals out of equilibrium with their normal distribution in the environment, Redfield-like 
ratios47 of key elements (e.g., C, H, 0, N, P, and S) found in the pigments of terrestrial life, 
such as those known to be associated with photosynthesis, and other inorganic chemical 
anomalies (e.g., based on iron, sulfur, etc.). When specific biologically important elements are 
limited in the environment, there will be higher concentrations associated with iife-forms or 
colonies of life-forms. Usually, the limiting element in the environment will limit the extent of 
growth and productivity of organisms (known as Liebig's Law of the Minimum). Some key 
elements that are limited in terrestrial environments include iron and molybdenum (essential 
for nitrogen cycle reactions), and tungsten (essential for specific enzymes in hyperthermophilic 
archaea). 
One factor that may complicate Life Detection efforts is the difficulty in detecting or interpreting many 
of these signatures if the life-forms are inactive, or have been for long periods of time 
(e.g., hibernation or quiescence), or have become fossilized. One of the large challenges in Life 
Detection is a more complete understanding of the stability of various biosignatures over time and 
their dependence on continued metabolic activity. 
47. The 'Redfield Ratio' describes the ratio of carbon to nitrogen to phosphorous (C:N:P) found in marine organisms. 
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There are three possible outcomes of the Life Detection procedures: 
1. Failure to detect any of the biosignatures described above, and absence of any carbon or 
complex carbon in representative samples. This result would lead to proposals for 
downgrading of containment level for controlled distribution. 
2. Clear and overwhelming evidence of living organisms that appear to be of non-terrestrial 
origin. This finding would likely mandate containment of all samples for an indefinite period of 
time. Biological experimentation and biohazard assessment would be given highest priority. It 
must be emphasized that the most likely source of life detected in the martian specimens is 
terrestrial contamination (just prior to, or following the space mission). 
3. The third and most likely scenario lies between these extremes, and would be exemplified by 
situations in which complex carbon-containing compounds are detected in the sample, but 
without other evidence of life. 
Princi~les: General principles to follow in searching for life are shown in Table WDP-4. Methods can 
be divided into those that facilitate a wide survey of a representative portion of different sa,mple types, 
and those can facilitate a more focussed but high-resolution examination of areas of interest. Survey 
methods are less destructive of samples, and include microscopy, broad band fluorescence, surface 
scanning and chemistry, tomography, and isotope release experiments. These methods seek 
structural and basic chemical signatures, and local inhomogeneities. Higher resolution methods are 
generally more destructive, and include mass spectroscopic methods, combustion, isotope analysis, 
and electron microprobe procedures for elemental mapping. These methods seek to characterize 
inhornogeneities, and more complex structures. An estimate of the sample requirement for the 
survey, less-destructive methods is 200 milligrams. 
I General Principles Guiding the Search for Life: 
Begin with a broad survey of a portion of different sample types for more general features suggestive of 
life, then turn to a higher resolution examination of sites with suggestive features for more complete 
characterization 
Emphasize structural signatures of life and other inhomogeneities that can be easily detected as a first: 
order task 
Emphasize less destructive methods in the early stages of investigation, since they can guide the use of 
more definitive but destructive methods 
Start with samples which are the least likely to contain life (e.g., surface fines); if negative, use these as 
blanks and controls for spiking experiments 
Recognition of life will require the coincidence of multiple independent signatures 
Inactive or "past" life will be treated as potentially active life 
Generalize a carbon-centered methodology to other chemical species 
Use an iterative approach for the Life Detection protocol 
Invest significant time to the design of controls and blanks, as early in protocol developmenlt as possible 
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Some indicators, either structural and/or chemical, which may indicate "past" or inactive life should be 
treated as potential indicators of active life. One potentially useful strategy for detecting active life- 
forms is based on replicate measurements over time. Repeated analyses for any of the biosignatures 
described above may reveal changes in the sample due to metabolic activity. The search for 
significant changes in these signatures offers an important potential source of information, and does 
not require a thorough understanding of the signature. The probability of life based on another 
chemical species than carbon is rare, but cannot be eliminated. With this in mind, carbon centered 
methodologies and approaches which dominate our present thinking need to be generalized to other 
chemical species whenever possible. An iterative general approach is recommended for the Life 
Detection tests, with results obtained by one analysis being used to specify and direct any 
such subsequent methods or analyses. 
Analvfical Methods: Because deep and surface mineral particles are common micro-environments 
for microbial life on Earth, the chemical analysis of Mars samples at a micrometer scale can yield 
information about the presence of active or fossil life on Mars. Raman, IR, and fluorescence micro- 
spectroscopy are valuable tools to perform non-destructive analysis of mineral matrices and surface 
compounds. 
Microscopy: As part of the preliminary examination of returned samples, light microscopy of 
fines as well as surfaces of pebbles or rock should be used to look for obvious signs of cellular 
structure and mineral deposits associated with microbial life. 
* Analysis of Gases in Head Space: Analysis of a pristine atmospheric sample should be 
compared to a similar analysis of gas occupying the head space above collected soil and rock 
samples. Differences may be due to chemical interaction of the gas with samples, or may be 
signs of metabolic activity within the specimens. 
* Laser Desorption Mass Spectroscopy and Laser Raman: Laser desorption mass 
spectroscopy (LDIMS) and Laser Raman analysis are rapid, non-destructive methods for 
detecting low levels of organic matter in geological specimens. They have been successfully 
used to analyze PAHs in meteorite and interplanetary dust particles. Minimal sample 
preparation is required and small particles as well as fresh fracture surfaces of larger 
specimens can be analyzed. In LDIMS, a 10-40 micron diameter spot is positioned on the 
specimen, organic species are thermally desorbed from the outer few microns of the 
specimen, they are photo-ionized and directed into a time-of-flight mass spectrometer. 
Continuing developments offer the prospect of high selectivity in detection of specific classes 
of organic compounds, (e-g., amino acids). Automated scanning technology will be critical for 
application of these techniques to the maximum amount of sample. The techniques are limited 
to surface analysis. 
* 3 0  Tomography: Given the present state of the art, 3 0  tomography would require transport of 
a specimen outside of maximum containment facilities to a synchrotron; however, the 
specimen can remain in a sealed container, under the equivalent of PPL-c(, containment 
conditions. 
* Carbon Analysis: High priority should be given to quantitative analysis of carbon, especially 
organic carbon. Techniques having the greatest sensitivity should be applied, including 
progressive heatingloxidation, coupled to GCIMS. It is anticipated that multiple samples and 
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sites with suspicious findings from survey methods will be analyzed to detect and characterize 
localized organic or inorganic carbon. 
* Flow Cyfometry: An aliquot of the aqueous slurry will be subjected to flow cytometry. Flow 
cytometry will be used to analyze single particles in the range of 2 to 100 microns in diameter 
at rates of tens to hundreds of thousands of particles per second. Based on initial, non- 
destructive characterization of laser light scatter and auto-fluorescence, particles vvill be re- 
analyzed, with or without staining with fluorochromes specific for DNA, proteins or functional 
viability assays. During subsequent analysis, at least four pre-selected sub-populations can be 
sorted from each sample for further analysis by other techniques. Positive fraction:; can be 
sorted and directed toward further chemical and biochemical testing. 
Extraction of Representative Sample: It is anticipated that sample material will differ in size and 
composition. A representative aliquot of approximately 1 gram should be subjected to extraction for 
further destructive tests. The initial extract will use ultra-clean water. Mechanical disruption may be 
necessary, but should be kept to a minimum so as not to damage cellular structures or potentially 
viable cells. A fraction of this aqueous slurry should be designated for organic solvent extraction. 
Culfivation: Elaborate forward-contamination controls will be used on the mission, however it is still 
possible that viable terrestrial microbes may be detected in returned Mars samples (either from 
contamination on the original spacecraft, the sample container that made a round-trip, or t.hrough 
sample handling contamination). To rule out possible terrestrial microbial contamination, an aliqeroi: of 
the sample should be subjected to the standard microbiological examination currently used for 
Planetary Protection, as well as other routine methods for detecting and identifying terrestrial 
organisms. Culture conditions that would be compatible with martian micro-environments are not mrell- 
understood, yet attempts should be made to create such, and propagate life-forms. The composition 
of gases in the martian atmosphere, both present and ancient, should be replicated, especially with 
C02 as a carbon source. Given the extremely dry conditions on Mars presently, the degree of sample 
hydration should be varied. The range may fluctuate from partially hydrated specimens to totally 
aqueous conditions. Energy sources should include light for any possible photosynthetic alrganisms 
and pairs of electron donors and acceptors for chemosynthetic organisms. Mineralogical information 
from samples should be integrated into the decisions in media formulations. Likewise, any organic 
compounds detected in the samples should be considered as carbon sources. 
Cultures will be monitored by simple microscopy as well as through multiple sequential anialyses by 
GCIMS, LCIMS, micro-calorimetry, nucleic acid amplification and other methods. 
Distinauishina Earth-based from Mars-based Life: If viable cells are found in the samples, it will be 
important to first rule out the possibility of terrestrial microbial contamination. Cells will be subjectecl to 
phenotypic and genotypic analyses. Searches against databases with known terrestrial organisms will 
quickly identify contaminants. In a similar fashion, the most likely source for familiar complex 
polymers such as nucleic acids is from terrestrial contamination. Amplification techniques such as the 
polymerase chain reaction (with broad range primers directed against targets such as rDNA, and with 
random oligomers) and subsequent sequencing methods offer a sensitive and rapid mean:s for 
detecting and characterizing DNA and RNA (as a marker for terrestrial contamination), and should be 
applied to the outbound spacecraft, container surfaces before and after return, as well as the samples 
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themselves. Other assays, such as the Limulus Amoebocyte Lysate (LAL) assay, may assist in 
detecting extremely small amounts of terrestrial contamination, but are less specific. One should keep 
in mind that detection of terrestrial contamination in a specimen does not exclude the possibility that 
the same specimen also contains martian life. 
Considerafions Concernina Controls and Blanks: 
* Prior to departure, the spacecraft and specimen containers should be examined, and samples 
should be archived. Witness plates should be employed. 
- Stror~g consideration should be given to the return of a sample of martian atmosphere in a 
separate, but identical container. If collected and stored under increased pressure, extra 
aliquots of atmosphere could be used for replication of martian conditions in other experiments 
after specimen return. 
Early determination of negative findings for life in low-likelihood martian samples may allow 
these samples to be used as negative controls. 
Because negative results are expected in many of the Life Detection procedures, 
determinations of assay sensitivity using known specimens of terrestrial life would aid in the 
interpretation of these negative results. 
* Methods should be validated and evaluated using a wide variety of terrestrial life-forms. 
Simulants of martian samples and conditions should be refined for protocol development prior 
to sample return. Particular attention should be given to the probability of highly-oxidizing 
sample surfaces. 
Expolsure of the sample surface to PPL-a conditions will inevitably lead to deposition of 
particulate matter from the surrounding environment. The features of this process should be 
characterized prior to specimen return. 
* Finally, an effort should be made to ask questions that yield interpretable answers, 
(e.g., answers for which a statistical assessment of confidence can be performed). 
Life As We Don? Know It: Assumptions about the nature of life are listed in Table 3. The possibilities 
of dealing with "life as we don't know it" were also considered, including a composition devoid or 
organic carbon, the unconventional reliance on "non-biological" elements such as Si, Fe, and Al, 
structures less than 100 nanometers in diameter, and a composition based on organic monomers. It 
is difficult to evaluate the probability of encountering forms of life with these features. 
Discussions of the possibility of non-carbon based life has had a rich history, especially in the realm 
of science fi~ction.~~ Life based on organic monomers has recently been proposed as a model for the 
'metabolism-first' scenario for the origin of life.49 According to this model, a set of self-sustained 
chemical reactions might be considered 'living' if metabolism is considered to be more important than 
replication as a fundamental basis of life (see discussion and Table WDP-3 above). Some of these 
unlikely scenarios might require alternative laboratory conditions for proper study (e.g., the use of 
ine~t gases).. 
48. H.G. Web., writing in the Pall Mall Gazette in 1894, scolded scientists for thinking of only carbon-based life: "It is narrow 
materialism that would restrict sentient existence to one series of chemical compounds - and the conception of living 
creatures with bodies made up of the heavier metallic elements and living in an atmosphere of gaseous sulfur is no means 
so incredible as it may, at first sight, appear." 
49. WachtersMuser, G., Science 289:1307-1308 (2000). 
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Existing theories of the origin of life on Earth suggest that life will arise as a consequence of chemical 
and physical principles anywhere prebiotic carbon compounds accumulate in suitable environments 
(e.g., water, temperature, etc.) in sufficient amounts for sufficient time. Although the precise process 
for life's origins on the Earth is not known, it is perceived to have been a progression in complexity 
beginning from an original prebiotic mixture, at some stage involving RNA catalysis, and probably at 
later stages catalysis by peptides and proteins, ultimately culminating with the first simple organisms 
that had a metabolism, the ability to replicate and the capability of preserving useful information 
during the replication process. The most likely scenario that we can conceive for the development of 
life on Mars is by a similar process, which if stochastic, may have deviated from our own terrestrial 
process, resulting in different fundamental amino acids or nucleotides used, types of lipids, chirality, 
etc. The primary indicator of past or present life of this type would be the finding of unusual 
macromolecular assemblages (e.g., peptides or oligonucleotides with nonstandard amino acids, 
nonstandard bases, non-standard linkages). If deviation occurred only later in the process, then we 
might find Earth-like complex structures, such as recognizable ribosomal RNAs. 
Sample and Time Requirements: It is estimated that approximately 3 grams of sample will be 
required to conduct the proposed preliminary Life Detection tests on returned martian sample 
materials.50 As methods mature and new approaches become available, these sample requirements 
may change. Estimations of the time needed for Life Detection are difficult to provide. Survey 
methods can be completed within weeks-to-months, in some cases. However, any positive or 
suspicious findings may impose additional time requirements, depending on the strength of the 
findings and the follow-up methods required for further assessment. Enrichment culture experiments, 
for example, will likely extend for many months. 
Need for New Technolouv, Mefhods, and Database Develo~ment: 
Miniaturization of many chemicallphysical analyses 
Sample registry, for re-interrogating precisely defined sites 
- Micro-calorimetry 
Database development 
* Software for "multiple sequential analysis" search logic 
* Effect of Mars versus inert atmosphere on proposed methods 
* Cleaninglcleanroom technology 
- Validation of controls 
3-dimensional nano-scale physical mapping of specimens 
Characterization of complex compounds based on Si, Al, Fe 
More complete inventory of life on Earth, using molecular methods 
Biohazard Testing 
The Biohazard testing regime was designed to determine if samples from Mars pose any threat to 
terrestrial organisms or ecosystems, whether or not the samples are found to contain life-forms or 
non-replicative hazards. In designing the Working Draft Protocol, it was recognized that potential 
50. Estimates for sample amounts are based on what is necessary to do the tests outlined in the Draft Protocol, however, actual 
amounts may depend on definitions of "representative samples" made at the time samples are returned. 
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hazards could take one or more of a multitude of forms (e.g., toxic, mutagenic, life-cycle altering, 
hazardous through genetic recombination, disruptive to ecosystems, capable of biasing phenotypes 
or even behavior). Thus, the spectrum of tests selected for assessing the nature of the hazard(s) is 
deliberately diverse. 
The output of the Biohazard testing process will be used in combination with Life Detection and 
PhysicallChemical tests to determine what level of containment, if any, will be required for the 
samples. In practical terms, the final protocol should allow a determination of whether the samples 
contain any biohazards and whether or not to distribute sub-samples - with a high degree of 
confidence and a clear definition of the conditions of release. Determination about sample release 
from containment and will be made with careful consideration of applicable regulatory requirements 
and will provide reasonable assurance that the distribution of samples will not put humans or other 
terrestrial organisms at risk. 
The proposed tests and procedures for the Biohazard testing regime reflect current state of 
knowledge and practices. It is anticipated that the Working Draft Protocol will evolve both in content 
and implementation as a result of new or improved methodologies or expanded state of knowledge 
prior to sample return, and in response to real-time information about sample materials learned during 
implementation of the various processes at the Mars receiving facility. 
Biohazard Defined: In general terms, hazards of concern to biological systems are those substances 
(materials or entities of biological origin or not, replicating or able to be amplified51 by a biological 
system or not), capable of producing an adverse effect or significant alteration52 on a biological 
system at the level of individual organisms or ecosystems. In considering returned martian samples, a 
distinction has been made between replicating and non-replicating hazards. For the purpose of this 
Working Draft Protocol, a biohazard is defined as a hazard that can replicate or be amplified by a 
biological system. In practical terms, replication is a key distinction between a biohazard (i-e., 
replicating and potentially contagious) and a simple toxin or hazard (i.e., a non-replicating hazard that 
can be diluted down below a toxic concentration). Only replicating entities or entities that are able to 
be amplified by a biological system could pose a potential widespread threat. While toxic and other 
hazardous materials are of concern, they represent a potential hazard only to staff and scientists who 
may be exposed to them. 
If the distinction between a biohazard and a hazard can be made, the level of containment and 
procedure for distribution of the samples can be appropriately defined. The existence of either 
biohazards which are self-replicating or able to be amplified by another biological system or toxic 
hazards would require further study and characterization of the nature of the hazard (e-g., strong 
chemical oxidizer, radioactive, replicating life-form, etc.) so that appropriate subsequent containment 
andlor handling procedures can be determined and stipulated to avoid potential biological impacts 
during future research. However, the existence of either a biohazard or a hazard in the samples in no 
way precludes subsequent scientific analyses. 
51. In this context, biohazards are not limited to 'living' entities and may include biohazards such as viruses that are not living 
or self-replicating per se. 
52. In the context of potentially biohazardous exixaterrestrial entities, "adverse effects" includes to any significant alteration on 
a biological system and is not limited to adverse effects that are immediately or acutely toxic. 
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Assumutions About Containment: Containment at the SRF will be designed to cover a range of 
conditions while maintaining martian materials under appropriately strict biocontainment. It is 
important to understand the various containment types at the sample return facility and the 
anticipated containment needs during Biohazard testing. Life Detection tests and Physical/Chemical 
tests will seek to characterize the sample materials and determine if evidence for "life" can be found 
while testing under conditions that are both Mars-like (e-g., pristine environment) and Earth-like. In 
contrast, Biohazard tests are only designed to determine the effect of martian samples on terrestrial 
life-forms under Earth-like conditions (an important distinction). Thus containment requirements for 
execution of the Biohazard testing will not require the stringent clean room conditions associated with 
preliminary physicallchemical tests, certain Life Detection studies, and 'banking' or curation. The 
appropriate initial containment level for the Biohazard testing regime is thus anticipated to be PPL-y, 
which translates to the maximum BSL4 biocontainment, but with less strict cleanliness restrictions. 
All Biohazard testing will be conducted under strict containment at the primary receiving facility or 
other similarly secure maximum containment facility. Since neither all the necessary scientific experts 
nor the high-end scientific instrumentation they require are located at a single facility, there may be a 
need to allow samples to be distributed for studylcuration at facilities other than the initial receiving 
laboratory. Some tests may be done at locations other than the primary receiving and maximum 
containment facility as long as maximum containment and security of the sample are maintained 
(i-e., the sample must be kept completely isolated within multiple containers that are appropriately 
nested, sealed, and intact). The rationale for being able to test un-sterilized sample materials outside 
of the primary containment facility is dependent on the availability of adequate procedures for 
containing and transporting the samples, for sterilizing or cleaning the outside of the sample 
container, and for returning the sample to the containment facility after non-invasive or non- 
destructive analyses (e-g., synchrotron analyses). Mobile containers certified at the appropriate PPI- 
level (as distinct from traditional BSL transportation requirements) should be used for transport of 
samples between facilities. 
The unknown nature of any possible biohazard in returned martian samples demands, at least 
initially, the most stringent containment presently afforded to the most hazardous biological entities 
known on Earth. If sufficient data are gathered to rule out concerns about human virulence and 
infection, a decision could later be made to allow subsequent work at a lower containment level 
during tests investigating possible environmental effects. The Biohazard testing process is designed 
to allow for gradual decontainment or adjustment to less stringent containment levels if justified upon 
review of accumulated data about the sample materials during implementation of the final protocol. 
If the initial Life Detection and Biohazard tests are all negative, it would be appropriate to conduct 
subsequent tests under less strict containment conditions once sample materials have been shown to 
be non-biohazardous. In particular, additional geophysical testing can be done at a reduced level of 
containment as well as selected biological tests associated with the biohazard analysis. A lower level 
of containment would potentially enhance sample access within the scientific community while still 
providing adequate biosafety conditions under existing biosafety guidelines and regulations. 
Elements for a Biohazard Testins Reaime: Considering that Biohazard testing should yield results 
within a "reasonable time" (e.g., all testing completed within 6 or perhaps 9 months) most tests should 
be started synchronously and be conducted in parallel. However, the influence of preliminary sample 
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examination and work on Life Detection may lead researchers to proceed with some tests before 
others. Gradual "de-containment" strategies require identifying biohazards to people before identifying 
biohazards to the environment. 
The general strategy that emerged was to prioritize the types of assays in terms of the impact of 
potential pathogenicity on distribution to other laboratories. If a possible human pathogen were 
detected, the strictest of handling protocols would remain in place. If a pathogen that was specific to a 
particular host were detected (not likely), less stringent handling methods may be possible (for 
example, many virulent animal and plant pathogens are handled safely and routinely at lower 
containment levels than human pathogens). If a non-replicative toxic agent (e.g., toxin) were 
discovered, containment issues would be less restrictive and definable using dose-response 
characteristics and the nature of the toxicity. 
Prior to conducting biohazard tests, decisions will be needed on what model systems should be 
selected to make up the specific assays. The working criteria for choosing the models are given 
below: 
* The models should be relevant to a probable hazard scenario, deliberately avoiding models 
that would only be sensitive to an improbable danger (i-e., very unlikely event, very artificial 
route, extreme doses, rare species confined to remote niches, etc.) as such models would be 
of little relevance to initial Biohazard testing with Mars samples. The emphasis will thus be 
placed on modeling of biological systems likely to be in contact with samples (i.e., workers, 
their microbial flora, their pets, insects, life-forms common to the surrounding of sites of future 
experimentation with the samples), via probable routes of exposure (i.e., aerosol, etc.), at 
probable (low) doses. 
Subsequent models should be relevant to systems of ecological andlor economic interest. 
- All models should ideally be sensitive, meaningful and easy to interpret. Equivocal answers 
can only prolong time to potential sample release and can use up samples unnecessarily. 
- All models should ideally be robust. Samples are likely to contain complex minerals, oxidative 
agents and other elements that should not interfere with its function. 
* All models should ideally be well documented. Observations and analyses should identify 
known behavior of the biological system in the model. Preferably, its genome should be fully 
sequenced, and extrapolation to other species/situations should have been evaluated. 
* All models should ideally provide answers in a reasonably short time. 
* All models should be ideally compatible with handling within the SRF, under containment. 
Seauence of Tests: Table WDP-5 is an outline of a possible pathway of experiments for Biohazard 
testing with estimates of sample usage for each set of experiments. A flow chart for this pathway of 
tests is shown in Figure WDP-4. The text below provides a narrative explanation of that figure. 
Since fines can be considered 'homogeneous' and can be sub-sampled as a single category in a 
statistically relevant way, Biohazard testing should begin with fines. Whether and when other 
materials should undergo the full array of Biohazard testing will be based on the results of initial PIC 
screening and processing. 
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Inifial Testinq: The initial biohazards tests, which have a specific focus on determining adverse 
effects on humans, will be done in PPL-y (Containment: BSL-4, Environment: Normal terrestrial). 
Toxic effects on cultured cells and microorganisms should be anticipated due to the chemical 
(mineral) composition of the Mars samples. Appropriate controls (terrestrial or meteoritic) must be run 
and interpreted. It is assumed that toxic effects, if any, should diminish rapidly in sub-culturing 
('passaging') experiments, since a replicating agent or one able to be amplified would not be involved 
in a toxic response per se. 
It was recommended that specific cell and tissue systems be used for Biohazard testing. It is 
envisioned that a large amount of the cell culture work will be done robotically using existing or new 
technologies. 
The following specific initial tests are posited [Race et a/., 2001al to be included in the Working Draft 
Protocol, should it be carried out today: 
Human cell lines and primary cell cultures, with particular emphasis on epithelial cells (e.g., 
skin, lung, gut). All cells will be observed for abnormal growth (e.g., cytopathic effect, 
morphological changes, genetic response to stress, integration into host genome, co-growth 
[mycoplasma-like], and mutation rates). Cells can be checked for transformation (growth on 
soft agar). Both supernatant and homogenized cell pellets should be passaged, typically twice 
each week for 3 months. Other replicate cultures must be observed for 1-2 weeks to look for 
delayed effects. 
- Mouse cells should also be tested, with "culture-adapted material being injected into mice. 
Three mouse systems should be employed: wild-type, SCID, and SCID-Hu. 
Microbial systems to be tested should include: Chlamydomonas (stress response), 
S. aureus, yeast, and E. coli. In addition, microorganisms that grow in high salinity should also 
be considered. 
Subseauent Testina and Possible De-containmenf: If the initial Biohazard tests (above) and Life 
Detection tests are all negative, it would be appropriate to conduct subsequent tests under less strict 
containment conditions (e.g., PPL-6). In particular, additional geophysical testing can be done at a 
reduced level of containment as well as some additional Biohazard tests using the following models: 
- Secondary mammalian cell culture systems. 
Plant cell systems (Arabidopsis) and whole-plant growth experiments. 
* Additional microbes (e.g., nanobacteria, cyanobacteria, thermophiles, anaerobes, gram- 
positive bacteria) and microbial systems (e.g., various temperature ranges, pH ranges, 
salinity). 
* Other species: Drosophila melanogaster (e.g., wingless mutants), worms (C. elegans), and 
amphibian and bird eggs. Horizontal and vertical transmission studies should be done. (All 
animal species should be observed for behavior change, toxic and teratogenic effects, and 
pathological changes.) 
Additional experiments can be done using a variety of techniques to test for biologically active 
compounds, micro-arrays (for proteins), etc. 
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Figure WDP-4: Proposed Flow Chart for Biohazard testing 
after verification of containment materials integrity. 
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Verificafion of Containment Materials Intearity: A set of preliminary tests is required, relating to 
materials used in containment equipment. As a starting point to Biohazard testing, it is important to 
verify that sample materials or potential organisms growing from them do not attack rubber, 
~ i l a s h i c ~ ,  and other bio-containment materials. 
For example, one might take ten 10-milligram samples for each seallcontainment material 
(e.g., latex, silasticm, ~ l e x i ~ l a s ~ ,  cyanoacrylate, epoxy, etc.). 'Coupons' (i.e., small, regular 
samples) of each material would be incubated at a few different humidity levels, bounding those 
adually to be used for sample curation, and including liquid water. Test vessels for these experiments 
(i.e., primary containment) should be extremely non-reactive, such as refractory metals 
(e-g., titanium). For this example, if ten materials are tested, a total of one gram (or less) of martian 
sample would be expended. 
At regular intervals (over weeks to months), the sample coupons would be monitored for degradation 
using optical methods, mechanical tests, and chemical analyses. 'Failure' criteria would be defined in 
terms of parameters that would compromise containment, such as outright consumption, 
pitkinglerosion, pinhole formation, substantial changes in bulk chemical or mechanical properties, etc. 
The results would be used to provide a high level of confidence that the samples could be kept in 
storage vessels made of the tested materials without risk of inadvertent release. 
Preliminan/ Biohazard Tests: The set of preliminary Biohazard tests include: 
* Direcf culture: Part of the Life Detection testing process; any cultured organism which can not 
be clearly identified as terrestrial will be subjected to a biohazard study. 
* Cellular and 'small' models: Unicellular organisms, or very small animals can be used with 
limited amount of sample, -10-1000 micrograms per test. These tests would be based on 
simply exposing the organisms to the sample and using some form of signal readout, such as 
gene expression. Should the organisms or cells be chosen or developed today (which is not 
recommended), they would probably include: 
> Wild type, mutant and recombinant yeast bearing special sensitivity to hazardous material 
(e-g., radiation mutants, GFP and BFP (green and blue fluorescent proteins, respectively) 
recombinants to test for recombinogenicity, etc.); 
Human cell lines as sensitive to pathogens as standard cell lines which are used for 
Biohazard testing (e.g., A human equivalent to vero E6 cells), as sensitive as BHK-cells to 
mutagens, etc.); 
> Bacteria found associated with people (e-g., E. coli, Staphyloccocus, Bacferoides, etc:); 
Bacteria found in niches likely to be similar to martian underground ecosystem 
(i.e., probably cold and possibly oxidizing, low-oxygen and with high radiation levels); 
> Relevant algallplanktonic unicellular organisms; 
> Mammalian (e.g., mouse) egg before re-implantation; 
> Fish eggs (e.g., Zebrafish, Medaka, etc.) For testing effects on development; Neurospora 
crassa; 
> Cells and seeds from Arabidopsis and rice; 
> Complete C. gegans; and, 
> Complete Drosophila melanogaster (likely a flightless variant). 
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- Mutagenesis Assays: One possible approach is mutagenesis assays that look at genetic 
changes over several (rapid) reproductive cycles. Typically, this is done with bacteria (e.g., 
with the Ames test for ~arcinogenicity5~ using E. ~010. The general consensus was that these 
tests would be problematic in that mutagenesis results tend to be oversensitive and controls 
would be difficult to realize. A related assay type is terratogenicity, but these require breeding 
animals, and thus can be more lengthy (for some species) than other assay types. 
- Whole organisms: This approach includes ingestionlinhaiationlinjection of samples by living 
organisms with subsequent monitoring of physiologic functions, behavior, gene expression, 
inflammatory cascade (e.g., cytokine levels), etc. Hosts can include animals, plants, and 
modified organisms (such as SClD mice, xenograft systems, etc.). Another key aspect of this 
approach is the ability to evaluate the infectivity of the potential organisms to other organisms 
via passage. 
The benefits of this approach include: direct measurement of physiologic effects; abiliv to 
handle multi-organ interactions in toxicity; inherent inclusion of complex host characteristics 
(tough to do with cell based and other assays); and, the possibility of detecting infectivity (if 
hosts are appropriate for replication). 
However, some significant drawbacks exist, including: difficulty in seeing long-term effects; 
impossible to cover all possible organisms (many terrestrial pathogens are very host-specific); 
may require large samples; may be confounded by inorganic materials; and, results may 
depend on mode of introduction of sample to organisms (terrestrial pathogens have specific 
routes of infection). A major drawback of this approach is that it requires more sample: 
-100-5000 micrograms per test. The organisms chosen or developed as of this writing, 
include: 
> Arabidopsis and rice at different stages of development, exposed by direct contact andlor 
aerosol, 
> Zebrafish and Medaka, exposed to the sample by routes to be determined, 
> Bird eggs (notably embryonated chicken eggs) injected with powdered sample, 
> A variety of types of mice (i.e., germ free/humanizedlwild type/mutant/recombinant/ 
newborn/immunosuppressed/pregnantlreimplanted), exposed to aerosol or per os or 
injected intraperitoneally (i.p.) or intracranially (LC.) with powdered sample. 
* Molecular and biological tesfs: 
> DNA Damage: Assessment of DNA damage should include the measurement of mutation 
frequency, recombination frequency, and the occurrence of DNA strand breaks. 
Standardized methods are available to carry out each of these measurements, for example, 
genetic reversion assays for DNA mutation, transposon rearrangement assays for 
recombination, and terminal transferase assays for strand breaks. Such approaches, 
focusing on general measures of DNA damage, are likely to be more fruitful than highly 
specific measurements of DNA damage, such as comparative sequencing or the 
measurement of a particular type of DNA damage. 
53. Ames, B., F. Lee, and W. Durston. 1973. An improved bacterial test system for the detection and classification of mutagens 
and carcinogens. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 70:782-786. 
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=. Altered Gene Expression: Techniques are available for measuring the relative expression 
level of almost any gene under various conditions. For purposes of biohazard assessment, 
however, it would be preferable to narrow the focus to genes that are expressed at a 
significantly altered level in response to infection or toxic exposure. 
> Altered Levels of Proteins and Metabolites: Rapid progress is being made in developing 
chip-based and other methods that allow one to measure the level of particular proteins or 
metabolites in a biological sample. Within the next five years, driven by the demand of 
genomics research and drug development, these techniques are likely to become broadly 
available. It is difficult to make specific recommendations at this time until standardized 
procedures are established. It is expected, however, that the comparative measurement of 
proteins and metabolites associated with the biological response to infection or toxic 
exposure will become part of the biohazard assessment procedure. 
Ecosystems: While difficult to define (due to huge numbers of permutations and 
combinations), multi-organism population testing is important because potential biohazard 
effects may only manifest within the complex interactions present in ecosystems. Testing for 
ecosystem disruption seems difficult as few models have been validated. Apart from 'global' 
parameters (e.g., global metabolism, biochemical profile of solid/liquid/gas phases, etc.) few 
specific parameters for monitoring have been defined at this point. These tests would be 
potentially sensitive to both subtle and complex changes, but difficult to define and monitor, 
and may take long time periods to show effects. This points to a relatively large amount of 
research and development that will be required to develop comprehensive and effective tests. 
Sarn~le Size: Two different approaches were used to estimate the amount of sample required for 
analysis. The first was based on some sort of pre-sorting of the sample that assumed that 
'relevant' biologically interesting sub-samples would be used. With this approach, the crudely 
estimated sample consumption for Biohazard testing was ten grams; the amount of sample to be 
used is dictated by: 
> the relevance of the dose being modeled, 
> the amount the biological model system can physically be dosed with, 
> the sample preparation procedure, 
> the number of tests to be conducted, and 
> the total time Biohazard testing should take. 
The second approach did not assume a particular sorting of 'relevant' samples, but instead used 
simple statistical methods. Using Earth soil as a crude reference, a conservative calculation 
suggested that 15-25 grams of sample should suffice. These two estimates were quite close, despite 
very different approaches used to arrive at them. 
Ruling out biohazards in one sample will not allow for extrapolation to other samples - it will remain a 
case-by-case task, at least for a considerable period. This applies even when sub-sampling returned 
materials. The logical follow-on question is whether or not samples should be 'homogenized' prior to 
Biohazard testing. Input from geologists indicated that homogenization does not make sense because 
of loss of information - for example, sedimentary rocks (which may be in the minority) are more likely 
to harbor signs of life than igneous rocks. In addition, since surface conditions may be toxic to 
organisms, homogenization with deeper sample components may not be sensible. 
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In general, small sample sizes will be required to conserve the returned specimens, so biological 
assays that require small quantities are highly desirable. Examples include cell-based assays 
(requiring as little as 100 microliters of total fluid volume, making milligram samples potentialfy 
adequate) or the use of small organisms, such as Arabidopsis and C. elegans. 
It was noted that the amount of material needed for destructive testing (consumed) in biohazard 
assessments must be determined in consultation with biostatisticians. Regardless of what type of 
starting assumptions are made, the statistics of sampling will apply, and confidence in 'hazard 
exclusion' statements can only be made in the form of "no hazard exists at a concentration greater 
than Wgram." 
Time Needed: The time to conduct Biohazard testing was estimated to be twice the time to conduct 
the slowest test. It was estimated that 3 months would be too short although most of the results would 
be acquired within these 90 days. In fact, 4 to 6 months would be preferable. As an example, and in 
terms concrete to North American researchers, it is estimated that all Biohazard testing necessary to 
downgrade the samples from BSL-4 to BSL-3, will take approximately 6 months, and another 6 
months will be required to downgrade the sample to a lower level of containment or release, as 
appropriate. 
Comments on Confrols: Control samples are clearly needed for all of the above experiments. 
Methods for generating control samples (e.g., dealing with oxidants, iron, etc. - these contaminants 
could greatly confound bioassays and not be modified by some sterilization methods such as high- 
level irradiation) must be developed. 
Irradiated samples, while somewhat modified, are apparently suitable for much of the geologic 
investigations of interest. Interestingly, "clean" in terms of geology can mean knowing that certain 
elements such as gold are present in concentrations in the parts-per-trillion. The important point here 
is that typical biological containment systems are not designed with such cleanliness 
(molecular/atomic) in mind. A practical impact of this is that containmentlhandling equipment and 
materials should be characterized in terms of trace concentrations of elements that may be irrelevant 
biologically but damaging to geological and other scientific analyses. 
One additional point is that there is a need for pre-launch controls to rule-out terrestrial contamination. 
Swab samples, etc., from the assembly and launch phases and test facility should be taken two years 
before sample arrival. This will be a vital piece of the process to establish positive and negative 
controls. Negative controls can also be generated at the time of analysis by treating samples with 
DNAses, proteases, etc., to subtract out any terrestrial or Mars biomarkers, so that effects of Mars 
soil on subsequent assays can be evaluated. 
Research and Develo~ment Needed: Further efforts need to be undertaken to perfect many steps in 
the final protocol, including: 
A sub-sampling procedure needs to be developed and validated so as to provide statistical 
relevance and innate conservatism. This is essential to ensure that the Biohazard testing is 
capable of determining the safety of the samples. Without an effective representative sub- 
sampling strategy, testing of the entire sample may be necessary, and untested samples may 
need to be kept in containment indefinitely. 
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* Specific models for use in Biohazard tests have to be chosen or developed. Each one of them 
should be validated with terrestrial mimics of martian soil (possibly with meteoritic minerals 
from Mars) used as-is, or spiked with known agents to provide a positive control in Biohazard 
testing. 
* Relevant, robust and reproducible methods of sample preparation and sample delivery must 
be developed to ensure the final protocol can be effectively accomplished. 
* The selection of optimal cell and culture systems for use in biohazard and toxicology assays 
will be critical to avoid potential contamination that could interfere with data interpretation. 
Prior to implementation of the final protocol, research is needed to select optimum cell and/or 
molecular assays for Biohazard testing. 
* All assay refinements should take into account biohazard containment issues in their design 
and implementation. Moreover, NASA will likely need to coordinate these refinements and any 
attendant research developments with the toxicology and infectious disease programs at the 
NIH, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, 
and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (anticipating forthcoming funding 
increases to integrate extensive research into infectious diseases and bio-terrorism issues). 
NASA must also stay abreast of developments in toxico-genomics at the NIH, a new field 
anticipated to replace conventional toxicology and its antiquated methods over the next 5 
years. 
Facility Requirements 
The size and scope of the facility required to complete the elements of this Working Draft Protocol will 
depend on whether all protocol functions and activities (e.g., sample receiving and processing, 
physiochemical characterization, Life Detection studies, and Biohazard testing) will be conducted at a 
single SRF or some elements will be distributed to secondary labs beyond the SRF. Based on 
experience following receipt of lunar samples, regardless of whether some components are 
distributed to multiple sites, the primary SRF should be designed to be expandable and to allow great 
flexibility in switching functions as needed. In particular, the SRF should be able to support primary 
investigator-driven research, if needed. This single primary facility (or at most duplicated facility) 
should be designed to allow continuous and long-term operation in addition to its primary goal of 
receiving the Mars samples and completing this Protocol. There also should be a backup facility at 
PPL-a to contain a subset of the initial samples for banking purposes. 
The various protocol elements and appropriate levels of containment are depicted in Figure WDP-5 
on the next page shows a sample processing schematic with containment requirements by test 
category. From a planetary protection consideration, these functions can be performed at any facility 
that meets the containment requirements. Similarly, no specific test or instrument is precluded from 
use during the completion of the final protocol if that test or measurement can be done or placed in 
containment. Regardless of how the final protocol functions are distributed, all ancillary facilities must 
meet the same containment guidelines and standard operating procedures (for items such as 
personnel monitoring, security assessment, chain of custody tracking for samples, etc.). 
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PhysicalJChemical 
* Simulated martian environment 
Figure WDP-5. Sequential containment requirements by test category 
(see page 74 for the definitions of PPL-a, PPL-P, PPLy, and PPL-6). 
There are advantages to having a single facility that receives the samples and performs all functions 
up to PPLy before allowing transfer of some materials to PPL-6 facilities to complete the testing 
protocol. These advantages include a streamlined management and advisory structure, decreased 
sample volume for testing, fewer potentially exposed personnel to monitor, consolidation of 
appropriate experts at a single site, and diminished transportation and logistic concerns. Most 
importantly this approach assures that the samples are in the fewest number of facilities if they are 
found to contain life or a biohazard. The disadvantages of a single large facility are increased cost, 
possible decreased breadth of instrumentation, potential delays in recruitment or complications for 
visiting international partners, and lack of independent collaboration of test results. 
In final analysis, the facilities required to implement this Working Draft Protocol, or its successors, 
represent the minimum set that should be provided for Mars Sample Handling. A variety of facility 
strategies can be pursued, depending on the availability of personnel and resources among the 
partners pursuing a Mars sample return mission. Further studies of this issue are required, as several 
of those strategies can provide for protocol completion as well as the optimal availability of the 
samples for scientific studies at the earliest possible time consistent with Earth safety. 
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Additional issues that must be addressed include: 
- Completely define the PPL containment guidelines 
Continue to explore containment issues, options, and requirements (especially in collaboration 
with NIW, USAMRIID, and CDC), regarding refinements that will be necessary over the coming 
years to design or retrofit the appropriate and applicable biohazard containment facility. 
Develop schematics for a self-contained structure that could be placed in a BSL-4 laboratory 
and as a composite meet PPL-a containment requirements. This structure should be able to 
use remote robotics to handle the specimens. 
Develop a comprehensive list of equipment required for all proposed tests in the final protocol 
- Anticipate the need to do some life detection under simulated martian environmental 
conditions while maintaining PPL-c(/P containment. 
* Put agreements in place with the any PPL-S laboratories prior to receipt of Mars samples. 
Environmental and Health Monitoring and Safety 
Methods for monitoring the health and safety of the personnel of the SRF and the environment in and 
around the SRF, as well as at secondary sites if used, must be developed and implemented as part of 
the final protocol. This requires considering monitoring over time, beginning prior to the arrival of Mars 
samples, during work on the Mars samples at the SRF and at secondary sites, and assessing how 
long to continue monitoring. 
* The real risks associated with the Mars samples are unknown. 
The greatest potential risk is biological and includes "life as we don't know it." 
* The potential exposure in the SRF will be of a small group of trained professionals until more 
information about the nature of the specimens is available. 
A high level of security for the SRF and the samples will be maintained as part of the PPL 
designation. 
Recommended Princi~les for Develo~ment of Monitorina Proaram for SRF: Whenever possible, the 
monitoring plan should use existing regulations and standards. Since international teams will be 
working on the Mars samples, the regulatory standards from all participating countries should be 
reviewed and considered when developing the final monitoring plan. During the consideration of 
existing regulatory standards, the strictest standards, as appropriate for the anticipated hazards, 
should apply. Exemptions from existing regulations may be necessary, for example, differences in the 
protection of medical information between the participating countries. The leading principle for 
personnel monitoring and safety should be the optimal protection from the anticipated hazards for the 
individuals working with the Mars samples. Because of the unique nature of the potential hazards, 
additional controls than routinely used for hazard monitoring may be required. The monitoring plan 
should be designed to maintain a balance between the estimated risks to individuals, the environment 
or the general population and the personal impositions of the monitoring program. The monitoring 
plan should allow for cross-correlation of the data from the Life Detection and Biohazard testing of 
samples with the data from the monitoring of the SRF personnel and environment and allow for 
modification of either set of tests. 
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Potenfial Hazards: Five categories of potential hazards were considered: physical hazards, potential 
chemical hazards from non-biological toxins, biological hazards; failure or breach of containment; and 
psychological hazards. The physical hazards include hazards associated with equipment within the 
SRF labs and radiation from the Mars samples (which is expected to be negligible). The potential 
chemical hazards are predominantly from non-biological toxins. The biological hazards (including 
psychological) will clearly be the most difficult to monitor. The psychological hazards are those that 
may arise for personnel working under PPL conditions. Finally, monitoring of containment is a 
significant part of the monitoring program. Recommendations for monitoring for all hazards are as 
follows: 
Physical Hazard Monitoring (Radiation and Equipment): Radiation is a standard hazard with well- 
established protocols for protection, handling and monitoring. To confirm the expectation that the 
Mars samples will not present a radioactivity hazard, a radioactivity measurement should be one 
of the initial measurements in the physical/chemical assessments. The measurement should be 
at a level appropriate to assess for a biohazard risk, and not to assess the absolute level of 
radioactivity present. Therefore, standard radiation safety protocols should be in place prior to 'the 
arrival of the Mars samples. If the radioactivity level does not represent a biohazard, then the 
monitoring for radioactivity can be discontinued, unless required for equipment used in the SRF. If 
a biohazardous level of radioactivity were detected in the Mars samples, then the radioactiviv 
monitoring program would be continued. Other risks from equipment or facilities can be 
addressed by standard procedures of training and maintenance. 
2. Chemical Hazard Monitoring: A chemical hazard from the Mars samples is most likely from non- 
biological, non-replicating toxins, if present. The presence of toxins will be assessed early in 
physical/chemical testing. If an unusual substance or chemical is identified, specific monitoring 
methods for that substance can be designed and the substance could then also be used as a 
marker for breach of containment monitoring. 
3. Monitoring of Containment: Standard methods for monitoring of containment currently in use in 
BSL facilities can be adapted for use in PPL facilities and can be used to define a breach of 
containment or potential personnel exposure. If a breach occurs within the SRF, the breach can 
be corrected by standard procedures and personnel exposures can be assessed. If a breach 
occurs to the environment outside the SRF, a procedure should be developed to assess for 
possible environmental and/or human consequences. Procedures for handling a breach to 
outside of the SRF due to different causes (e.g., leak, disaster, security breach, etc.) should be 
considered in the development of the plans for handling a breach. 
4. Monitoring of the Environment: 
* Before Mars Sample Arrival: A baseline assessment of the environment around the SRF 
should be made prior to the arrival of the Mars samples. The assessment should sunley the 
pre-existing environmental conditions, and include an assessment of the water, air, Rosa, and 
fauna. This type of survey will likely be accomplished as part of the Environmental Impact 
Statement required prior to building SRF. During the baseline survey, sentinel species 
(microbes, insects, plants, animals) can be identified to use for monitoring for environmental 
changes. Consideration should be given to including some of the same organisms in 
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Biohazard testing. In case of noted changes in the environment around the SRF after arrival 
of the Mars samples, the Biohazard testing results could assist in determining if the changes 
were related to the Mars samples. 
During Mars Sample Handling at the SRF: Once the Mars samples are in the SRF, 
environmental monitoring could focus on the identified sentinel species and any novel 
components of the Mars samples, if identified. It may be useful also to track and record the 
weather conditions in area of SRF, for correlation in case of reports of a breach to the outside 
or any unusual events. If changes in the environment are noted on routine monitoring, assess 
if a breach has occurred. If a breach did occur, the breach procedures should be followed to 
reestablish containment and clean up any contamination. If changes in the environment are 
noted and a breach did not occur, assist with investigating the cause for the environmental 
change to establish that it either is or is not related to the SRF and Mars samples. 
Afier complefion of Life Detection/Biohazard Testing: The level of continued environmental 
monitoring required should be reassessed based on the conclusions of the Mars sample 
testing protocols. Consideration should be given to maintaining the security and containment 
within SRF for assuring the proper curation of the Mars samples. 
5. Monitoring of the SRF Personnel: 
Before Mars Sample Arrival: A process of certification for people who will work in the SRF 
should be developed that includes education about procedures and risks for employment, 
security clearance, and medical examinations and tests. Clear inclusion and exclusion criteria 
based on the results of the certification procedures should be developed prior to the hiring of 
personnel. 
Baseline medical evaluations of personnel should use the existing medical evaluation 
standards appropriate at the time the evaluations are performed. Since the SRF will be 
functional for a period of time prior to the arrival of the Mars samples, monitoring before the 
arrival of the Mars samples could include several evaluations (a period of two years was 
proposed). Recommended baseline evaluations include a medical history, physical 
examination, tests on the person (e-g., chest X-ray), and tests on samples from the person 
(e-g., blood and urine). All testing should be as non-invasive as possible and maintain a 
balance between estimated risks from the Mars samples and the risks associated with the 
tests. Specimens should also be archived for future comparison, if needed, and may include 
serum, lymphocytes, semen and/or hair. In addition neuro-psychological evaluations using 
standard testing techniques with well-established interpretation methods should be 
administered. Symptom data should be obtained using standardized instruments such as the 
Millennium Cohort survey (USA) or the GAZEL Cohort survey ( F r a n ~ e ) . ~ ~  
54. The exact survey instrument has not been identified, but it would be possible to use currently existing surveys similar to 
the Millennium Cohort Study (USA) or the GAZEL Cohort survey (France), sponsored by the US Dept. of Defense and 
INSERM, respectively. Current information about these two surveys, respectively, may be found online at: 
&ttp:/ /www.millenniumcohort.org> and <http://www.gazel.inserm.fr>. 
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* During Mars Sample Handling at the SRF: A schedule for regular evaluations of personnel 
should be established, using the same evaluation methods as used for the baseline data 
collection. Procedures for standard medical management of personnel illnesses should be 
available either on site or with adequate transportation to a medical facility, as needed. 
Intervention should be correlated with an identified, or risk of, exposure to the Mars samples. 
If an exposure occurs and the exposed individual has or develops symptoms, the person 
should be transferred to a medical facility with BSL-4 containment capabilities, until proper 
assessment of the individual is accomplished. If an exposure occurs and the individual does 
not have or develop symptoms, procedures for quarantine of the individual should be 
developed with specific guidelines as to the length of quarantine required if the person 
remains asymptomatic. If an individual becomes symptomatic and there is no evidence of an 
exposure, the individual should be treated as appropriate for the symptoms and monitoring 
should continue as prescribed by the Working Draft Protocol. 
* After Completion of Life Detection/Biohazard Testing: The question of how long to continue 
monitoring has to be addressed. Certainly the duration of monitoring will be influenced 
heavily by the outcomes of the Life Detection and Biohazard testing. Several factors may 
need to be considered in this decision, such as the protection of the workers versus the 
protection of the general population. Clearly articulated decisions will be needed on whether 
to have lifetime surveillance for the personnel or a mandatory period followed by optional 
reporting, if the risk was determined to be low. Certainly monitoring may become optional if 
the samples are deemed safe by the Life Detection and Biohazard testing. Whether or not 
surveillance is needed for relatives or people living close to the workers should be 
considered. A distinction should be made between monitoring for risk management and 
continued collection of data for a research study. The interpretation of personnel evaluations 
may require the use of a control group or population-based estimations of frequencies of 
different events. If so, sources for this information should be defined. 
Moniforina at Secondarv Sites: The level of monitoring to be used at secondary sites receiving and 
working on portions of the Mars samples should be based on the results of the Life Detection and 
Biohazard testing. If the Mars samples are still potentially hazardous or their biohazard status is 
unknown, several points should be considered in the development of a protocol for monitoring at 
secondary sites. First, secondary sites should be identified prior to the arrival of the Mars samples, to 
allow for pre-certification of personnel and their baseline data gathering. Second, all distributions 
should be tracked and procedures for monitoring of containment at the secondary sites should be 
developed. Third, consider monitoring personnel at secondary sites using the same protocols as used 
at the SRF. The number of personnel at secondary sites is expected to be a small number of 
individuals. 
If the Mars samples are deemed safe either through "sterilization" or by biohazard test results, then 
methods should be used for tracking all sample distributions and all individuals in contact with the 
samples. In this case, only event reporting is needed. 
Database Issues: A central database facility with data analysis capabilities and procedures should be 
used for environmental data (e-g., baseline, monitoring), personnel data (e.g., baseline, in-process, 
follow-up), secondary site data and sample tracking data. Procedures for regular data analysis and 
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reporting should be developed. Access to and confidentiality of the data should be defined and 
assured. Data analysis should distinguish between surveillance and research, with consideration 
given to the need for ethical review and approval for research protocols. 
The Fsllowina Points Need Further Consideration: 
* Criteria for inclusion/exclusion of personnel to work at the SRF or at secondary sites. 
The time frame of personnel monitoring: lifetime versus limited period (according to 
hazards). 
If long term monitoring is implemented, what parameters need to be monitor on a long term 
basis. 
Need for informed consent for the testing and possible long term monitoring. 
* Should monitoring be restricted to relevant public health measures as opposed to extending 
the Working Draft Protocol to allow for epidemiological research. 
* Level of medical facilities needed at the SRF. 
* Level of baseline testing and monitoring for secondary site workers as compared to workers 
at the SRF. 
* Protection of individuals from life or health insurance discrimination. 
* Procedures for database management and data analysis with consideration of confidentiality 
and security issues. 
Summaw: Monitoring methods for personnel and the environment should be developed considering 
international regulatory, cultural, and ethical issues. The radiation and chemical risks are considered 
of low probability and can be assessed early in the chemical testing procedures to reduce the 
monitoring burden. Procedures must be developed for database management and data analysis with 
assurances for confidentiality and security of the data. Procedures for monitoring personnel should 
include procedures for education and certification. 
Personnel Management Considerations in Protocol Implementation 
Staffing the Sample Receiving Facility(-ies) can be accomplished in a number of alternative ways. For 
example, scientists can be recruited to fill permanent positions at the SRF or could be selected 
through a competitive grants program for work at the SRF. Considering the variety of personnel 
categories that will be required to accomplish varied tasks during design, building and operation of 
the facilities, as well as during implementation of the Final Protocol, it will be advisable to utilize a 
variety of different selection and hiring processes. Personnel should be hired progressively during the 
development of the project and the facility(-ies). At least initially, the functions and responsibilities of 
the director's position may be carried out by appropriate committees until about five years before the 
return of samples from Mars. In the event that more than one facility is used, the required methods 
and procedures outlined in the Protocol should be applied beyond the SRF to any facility or.site 
handling maptian samples during the implementation of the Protocol. Because researchers and the 
public worldwide will have interest in returned martian materials, the international character of the 
program should be respected throughout the whole process. 
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Figure WDP-6 presents a high level schedule and overview of the process from now until the samples 
return to Earth. The functions, staffing requirements, and organization that will be needed to design, 
build, and operate a Mars Sample Receiving Facility are further elaborated in Figures WDP-7, -8, and 
-9; these figures describe proposed staffing and organization at 10, 5, and 3 years before the arrival 
of actual samples at the SRF. These proposed management, staffing, and organizational frameworks 
amounts to working hypotheses that have been based on the following assumptions: 
The protocol must be fully and successfully tested before the actual handling of martian 
samples. The exact makeup and sequence of Experiment Verification Tests (EVT) are TBD. 
* It's estimated that a complete series of EVTs will last approximately 6 months and one 
complete series must be successfully demonstrated before actual handling of the returned 
samples. The first EVT series must begin no later than 18 months before the returned samples 
arrive at the SRF in order to allow enough time to adjust and repeat the series if necessary (at 
least 9-1 0 months before experiments begin on actual returned samples). 
These EVTs are consistent with the recommendation of the SSB (1 997) and earlier 
Workshops in this Series that the SRF be operational two years before the arrival of the actual 
Mars samples. These EVT are part of the normal operational testing. 
Based on experiences at other BSL-4 laboratories in the United States and France, no less 
than one-year is required to properly staff and train the technical and scientific personnel. 
* Commissioning of the SRF, which must be performed in parallel with the staffing and training, 
will last a least 18 months. 
Figure WDP-6. Example overall timetable of activities required to design, build, and 
operate the SRF. Double-headed arrows indicate times described in subsequent figures. 
(EVTs = Experiment Verification Tests). 
Workshop 4 Final Report Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series 
J U N E  2 0 0 1  W O R K I N G  D R A F T  P R O T O C O I L  
* In order to accommodate the staffing, training and commissioning requirements of the SRF, 
construction of the facility must be finished 3 years before the actual operations. From past 
experiences in both France and the US, construction of the facility itself will require 3 years. 
* It is estimated that about 3 years will be needed to develop design specifications and plans for 
the SRF and obtain necessary authorizations for the facility. To accommodate all the activities 
necessary to design, build, and operate an SRF, the entire process must begin fully ten years 
in advance of sample return. 
To illustrate one approach to staffing and organization to meet facility and protocol requirements, 
specific details related to the recommended staffing and organizational plans are provided below. 
Accordingly, these are not intended to be-fixed requirements in this Working Draft Protocol, but are 
intended to provide a surrogate structure on which to base future staffing plans. 
10 Years in Advance 
As soon as the decision is made to build and/or update a Mars sample receiving facility, 
approximately 10 years before the actual operations, four positions should be staffed in order to allow 
the preparation of specifications for future activities and to allow a substantive review of the design of 
the facility. Figure WDP-7 shows the key positions 10 years prior to sample return: the Project 
ManageriDirector, a Director for Administration, a Project ScientistlDirector for Science, and an 
Environment, Health and Safety Officer. The Director, who is responsible for the overall sample 
handling project implementation, will have the assistance of an Oversight Committee that will monitor 
Figure WDP-7. Top-level staffing requirements and structure of the SRF at 10 years prior to arrival of 
d sample(s) (permanent positions are in plain boxes; committees are in colored boxes). 
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progress and assure the compliance of the project with the Protocol and with whatever science 
requirements are also to be implemented in the Facility. In this example, it is anticipated that the initial 
Director will have a scientific facility engineering background, and that a transition to a Director with a 
science background would be made after Facility construction is assured. The Director will be 
assisted by the Environment, Health and Safety Officer to ensure that the actual design requirements 
related to these critical topics are properly implemented. A Director for Administration will focus on 
budget and staffing issues, and the development of the staffing plan to cover the life of tlie project. 
Additional engineering support (e.g., the Facility Engineer) would be added as necessary. The Project 
ScientistIDirector for Science will coordinate the work of scientific committees and working groups 
that will develop science specifications and support the design process for their respective disciplines 
or areas. Also at this point in the project, a Communications Officer should be available, at least on a 
part-time basis, to ensure attention to risk communications and outreach - keeping the community 
informed and identifying and answering questions regarding the SRF. 
5 Years in Advance 
At roughly midway through the construction of the facility, the Scientific Discipline Heads should be 
hired for each required scientific discipline (see Figure WDP-8). These managers will ensure that 
construction is properly completed to accommodate the specific needs of their disciplines. 
Figure WDP-8. Top-level staffing requirements and structure of the SRF at 5 years prior to arrival of 
the returned sarnple(s) (permanent positions are in plain boxes; committees are in grey boxes). 
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With the help of exnerts working as part of the scientific working group and discipline advisory panels, 
they will complete tne general and specific operating procedures to handle the martian samples and 
the training program for staff to be hired. At this point, a Facility Administrativetstaff Manager will also 
be hired to assist in the hiring of the technical staff and prepare for future administrative and 
personnel needs of the facility. 
3 Years in Advance 
In order to have a fully operational facility two years before samples are returned, the final staffing 
and training of various operational positions must begin three years prior to actual operations (see 
Figure WDP-9). At this time, required supporting groups such as an Institutional Bio-Safety 
CommiBee (IBSC) and an Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) will be formed, as 
well as necessary support staff to support facility operations, administrative functions, 
communictitions, and safety program implementation. 
Figure 'WDP-9. Staffing requirements and structure of the SRF at 3 years prior to arrival of the 
r e m e c l  sample(s) (permanent positions are in plain boxes; committees are in grey boxes). 
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Also at this time, it is anticipated that the ad hoc Science Working Group (which would deal with both 
science issues and issues of planetary protection protocol compliance) would be supplanted by an 
lnvestigators Working Group that would be selected through an open solicitation that would provide 
for scientific investigations to be accomplished within the facility. The relationship of these selected 
science investigations to the accomplishment of Protocol Objectives may be close or distant, 
depending on the strategy to be undertaken by the Project to implement the protocol. From the 
beginning of the process, three different kinds of committees should be installed to help the Directors 
and Scientific Discipline Heads in overseeing their changing responsibilities. 
Scientific design panels will be specialized in the four disciplines (Life Detection, Biohazard, Geo- 
curation, and Geochemistry). The members, who will be prominent scientists, will be designated 
by the agencies. These committees will prepare the design, review the project and oversee the 
project to ensure the facility can operate consistent with the operational aspects of the planned 
Protocol. As soon as the Scientific Discipline Heads are hired, these committees will shift to 
become Discipline advisory panels helping them. 
The Science Working Group will be charged with helping to guide the overall project during the 
construction phase, to provide recommendations and expertise in assuring its compliance with 
sample scientific requirements and the Protocol. The members of the SWG are chosen from an ad 
hoc set of "Mars Scientists" representing the required disciplines and expertise. Later, they are 
replaced by the Investigators Working Group, who will be the selected Principal lnvestigators from 
an open competition seeking proposals for sample analysis activities within the Facility. 
Finally an oversight committee of 12 to 15 members will be selected by the Program leadership, 
perhaps from NASA's PPAC and the French PPC. These committees will be in charge of reviewing 
the overall process and the proposed measures to comply with the requirements of the Final Protocol. 
The committee will report to the Program Management and the Planetary Protection Officer, above 
the level of the Project ManagerIFacility Director - though it is expected that they will interact directly 
with that Manager on a regular basis. 
Membership on the various committees will be staggered to insure an appropriate turnover without 
loosing the memory of the project. Agencies involved with the SRF should set up an international 
search committee for recruitment of the Directors, various functional managers, the Facility Engineer 
and the Scientific Discipline Heads. 
Three major issues will require further consideration in the overall staffing of the SRF: 
1. Currently, no one has experience in simultaneous operations or activities in combined BSL4 
and clean room conditions as will be needed for PPL-a through PPL-6. The advice of experts 
from the high-potency pharmaceutical or the micro-process industries would be helpful. 
2. Details on the optimal staffing mix at the SRF must be considered further. It is not clear what 
mix of government employees, semi-permanent staff employees, outside contractors, and 
guest scientists will be needed to staff the facility and implement the Final Protocol. In 
planning for facility staffing and operations, international access and participation should be 
considered throughout the process. 
= In order to comply with planetary protection constraints and protocol requirements, a sustained 
and adequate budget will be needed throughout the design, building and implementation 
phases of this project. 
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ConGngency Planning for Different Protocol Outcomes 
Developing contingency plans for different protocol outcomes will require anticipating how the 
scientific community might interpret test results and react under a variety of possible scenarios 
following the return of martian samples. In addition to considering how to interpret possible scientific 
results, it will be important to plan how to respond in the face of possible breaches in containment. 
Recommended response to various likely scenarios are discussed below: 
Oruanic Carbon: It is likely that carbon will be found in sample materials. The sensitivity of current 
and future methods will be very high, so that at least some level of contaminants should be detected, 
and perhaps carbon compounds from Mars, as well. The existing base of knowledge on meteorites 
and other material collected from space will be useful in providing baseline information to help guide 
these investigations. Since the Viking results focused on volatile organics, further attention to the 
question is appropriate. In situ measurements of non-volatile organics on missions prior to the sample 
return mission would be useful to gauge predictions of anticipated sample organic content. 
Exfanf Life or Biomarkers Positive: If extant life or evidence of biomarkers are detected in the 
samples, all work on the samples will continue to be done in strict containment facilities until more 
definitive data can be gathered [see release criteria, above]. Maximum effort should be made to 
determine if the positive results are originating from Earth life or Mars life. Information management 
will become an issue both for scientific communication and in shaping the debate among scientists. 
It will be important to plan for how initial information, with its attendant uncertainties, should be 
disseminated to the public. 
Non-Earth Life Confirmed: In keeping with the SSB recommendations [SSB 19971, and the stated 
release criteria, sample materials will be released from containment only if they are shown to contain 
no extraterrestrial life-forms, or they are sterilized prior to release. If non-terrestrial life is confirmed, a 
previously constituted scientific oversight committee will need to review the steps taken in support of 
the Draft Protocol, the Draft Protocol itself, and ongoing provisions for containment. If a portion of a 
sample is confirmed as positive for non-terrestrial life, subsequent testing and analyses on all sample 
materials will continue in containment. This means that all physical, chemical, and geological 
characterization, as well as Life Detection and Biohazard tests requiring non-sterilized material should 
continue to be done in strict containment, either in the SRF or in any other test facilities that may be 
used. Experimentation on methods to sterilize samples containing the newly discovered life should 
begin in conjunction with investigations of appropriate culture conditions. Once appropriate 
sterilization techniques can be validated, detailed plans for distribution of samples can be developed 
or revised in order to meet the established or revised scientific objectives. Management issues will 
include administrative and technical procedures for scientific study and curation, as well as informing 
the public. 
Although it is premature to develop specific recommendations at this time, it is possible to identify 
issues that will need further discussion in advance of sample return. The concerns fall into three 
broad categories: Science and Testing; Facility and Technological; and Policy and Administrative: 
Science and Testina: Confirmation of a preliminary discovery of martian life should require a careful 
reconsideration of results from many parts of the Draft Protocol, ranging from a review of preparation, 
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scanning and testing methods, to verification of biocontainment materials and sterilization techniques, 
to a reassessment conditions for banking, storage, transportation and curation. In addition, it will be 
important to understand the culture and environmental conditions required to maintain and perhaps to 
grow the new life-form to obtain more material for study in the lab - and what precautions are needed 
in the process. In addition, it will be important to review the final protocol to recommend modifications 
in physical, geological, and chemical tests of samples, adding or deleting tests as needed 
Facilitv and Technoloaical Concerns: Questions about the adequacy of the SRF to maintain the new 
life form must also be addressed, including the possible need to add equipment, change operations, 
review emergency plans or upgrade the facilities because of what has been found. Concerns about 
security should also be reconsidered, especially in view of the potential disruptive activities of any 
'radical' group that may be opposed to sample return. The advisability of allowing distribution of 
untested sample material outside the SRF may need to be reconsidered, as well. 
Policv and Administrative Concerns: If martian life is detected, both short-and long-term policy issues 
will arise. The short-term listing of concerns relates to procedures regarding access to and distribution 
of sample materials, as well as to the publication and review of research findings. In anticipation of 
the discovery of extraterrestrial life, it will be advisable to develop an organized communication plan. 
This should be done well in advance of the event, in order to avoid a frenzied, reactive mode of 
communications with government officials, the scientific community, the mass media, and the public. 
Any plan that is developed should avoid a NASA-centric focus by including linkages with other 
government agencies, international partners, and external organizations, as appropriate. It will also 
be advisable to anticipate the kinds of questions the public might ask, and to disclose information 
early and often to address their concerns, whether scientific or non-scientific. 
In the long term, the discovery of extraterrestrial life, whether in situ or within returned sample 
materials, will also have implications beyond science and the SRF per se. Such a discovery would 
likely trigger a review of sample return missions, and plans for both robotic and human missions. 
Legal questions could arise about ownership of the data, or of the entity itself, potentially 
compounded by differences in laws between the United States and in the home countries of any 
international partners. In any event, ethical, legal and social issues should be considered seriously. 
Expertise in these areas should be reflected in the membership on appropriate oversight 
committee(s). 
Contradicton//lnconsistent Results: Given the number of techniques, spanning several scientific 
disciplines, it is very likely that contradictory or inconsistent results will be found. Differences in the 
sensitivity of methods will exist and confidence in the reliability and level of experimental controls will 
differ among procedures. It is important to stress the need for replication of experiments and 
duplication of results among multiple sites to add confidence to the results assessed. In addition, it 
will be important to follow a strict scientific procedure for interpreting data and making decisions about 
sample materials. There is a need to involve multidisciplinary experts and groups in the overall 
decision making process as well in devising procedures for drawing conclusions, certifying results, 
and deciding whether samples are safe enough to be released to lower containment levels. 
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A~~l icat ion f Release Criferia: According to the COMPLEX report [SSB 20021: 
"If the samples are shown to be altogether barren of organic matter, to contain no defecfable 
organic carbon compounds and no ofher evidence of past or present biological activity, release of 
un-sterilized aliquofs of fhe samples for study beyond the confines of the Quaranfine Facility is 
justified. " 
The stated goal of this Protocol Workshop Series was to design a protocol to test the sample(s) for 
biohazards and the presence of martian life that could be applied to ensure that a sample is safe to 
be released without sterilization. The release criteria listed above are consistent with this 
recommendation, but with the additional requirement to complete biohazard testing in addition to the 
tests for organic carbon (and other, similar life-detection testing). 
Arguments have been advanced that suggest that a sterilization step be added to the protocol for the 
release of any materials, for "good measure," even if the samples are devoid of organic compounds 
and do not demonstrate any biohazard. Based on the arguments advanced, pro and con, this 
additional step is not contained in this Working Draft Protocol. Central to an understanding of the 
arguments is the question of risk - Can any protocol be guaranteed to be absolutely risk-free? If not, 
what is an acceptable level of risk (for example, one that approximates the risk from the natural influx 
of martian materials into the Earth's biosphere)? And is there any treatment method that can 
eliminate all risks from the returned samples while preserving them for the detailed scientific study 
envisioned by scientific community? Clearly, the issue of sterilization will require serious additional 
attention and research well in advance of sample return. Likewise, the safety of releasing materials 
that have passed both life-detection and biohazard testing should be carefully challenged through a 
rigorous quality assurance program applied to the completion of the final protocol. 
Breach of Containmenf: Anticipating a containment breach and planning for such an event is an 
essential element of facility management. The responses to a breach will depend on where it occurs 
and what happens. Conceivably, it could occur in an area with a high population density or in a 
remote location. The breach could be a result of an accident or a crime - as a result of activity either 
outside or within containment. The consensus of the Sub-group was that we know basically how to 
handle breaches based on long term experience and emergency plans for handling pathogenic 
biological material under BSL-3 and BSL-4 containment. Additional information for responding to 
breaches and containment problems has been gained through decades of experience in handling 
lunar and extraterrestrial materials. 
Clearly, an emergency plan will be needed well in advance to develop recommended responses to 
various breach scenarios. The first steps would involve investigation of the degree of compromise, 
considering both biosafety and sample integrity. Full documentation of any breach event will be 
required as well as identifying the degree of sample compromise, what organizations or personnel 
should be involved in all phases of a response, and how notifications and communications should be 
handled. The plan should focus on all aspects of mitigation, cleanup, and recovery from perspectives 
of both biosafety and sample integrity (e.g., decontamination of the area; sample recovery, 
re-packaging and labeling as compromised, or destruction if required, etc.) 
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Maintaining and Updating the Protocol 
The COMPLEX report [SSB 20021 also recommended: 
"A continuing committee of senior biological and geochemical scienfists fhat includes 
appropriate international representafion should be formed, and charged with reviewing every 
step of the planning, consfruction, and employment of the Mars Quarantine (and initial 
sample handling) Facility. The committee should be formed during the earliest stages of 
planning of a Mars sample return mission. Members of the committee should also participate 
in the design of the spacecraf? and those portions of the mission profile where biological 
contamination is a threat." 
The protocol implementation and update process will require establishment of a number of exped 
oversight and review committees; re-evaluations of proposed plans at key points in time before 
sample return; and open communication with scientists, international partners and the public about 
risks, benefits and plans. The scope of the task is summarized in Figure WDP-10. A narrative 
explanation of recommendations and activities in the process is provided in the text that follows. 
Review Process 
Figure WDP-10. Protocol Implementation and Update Process. 
Final Scientific and Policv Reviews: The final review of the protocol document should be subjected to 
the highest degree of scientific scrutiny and evaluation. The evaluation should be conducted jointly by 
scientific organizations from both the United States and France to avoid prolonged negotiations and 
resolutions that may arise when such reviews are conducted separately. This review should probably 
occur at the level of the National Research Council in the United States, and its equivalent scientific 
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organization in France. The French members of this Sub-group agreed to investigate which of the 
French institutions is most appropriate (among the French institutions discussed were CNRS or 
representatives of various Etablissements Publics a Caractere Scientifique et Technique (EPST), 
including but not exclusively CNRS or Academie des Sciences. Final decisions about which 
institutions should be involved in scientific reviews is TBD. 
Claritv of Meanina and Terminoloav: Clarity of meaning is essential to the implementation of any 
process especially when the process involves international agreements. Therefore, absolute 
consistency should be used in the language for any documents and charters associated with the final 
protocol. When the actual definition of a word or phrase is in dispute, reference should be made to 
those definitions or meanings that are standard and accepted when interpreted at the international 
level. Clarity in terminology will be especially important when describing levels of containment so as 
to avoid confusion caused by mixing United States and French definitions of BSL, PPL, and P4 
containment. 
Efhical and Public Reviews: Evaluations of the proposal should be conducted both internal and 
external to NASA and CNES and the space research communities in the nations participating in the 
mission. An ethical review should be conducted at least at the level of the Agencies participating and 
these reviews made public early in the process (in France, the National Consultative Bioethics 
CommiHee, CCNE, is the appropriate independent organization). The final protocol should be 
announced broadly to the scientific community with a request for comments and input from scientific 
societies and other interested organizations. Broad acceptance at both public and scientific levels is 
essential to the overall success of this research effort. 
Future Modifications to fhe Protocol: When a final protocol has been adopted and approved by a 
consensus of appropriate scientific organizations, few changes should be made to its content. 
Changes should be made as scientific information, methodology andlor technology improve between 
the time of the approval and the actual physical implementation of the final protocol within the SRF 
laboratories. Changes in the final protocol methodology or technology may be considered if a 
proposed change would meet the following criteria: 
* increases the sensitivity or selectivity of the test, 
reduces the length of time necessary for a test without a reduction in sensitivity or selectivity, 
* reduces the complexity of the sample handling process, 
* increases the overall safety of the process, 
* reduces the chances of contamination to the sample or the environment, 
reduces the cost of the process, or 
represents a new technology or method that has the broad general acceptance of the scientific 
community. 
Advisorv Committees and Ex~er t  Panels: Changes to scientific methodology and instrumentation are 
inevitable due to the long development time envisioned for this mission. This necessitates long term, 
consistent input and advice from the external scientific communities of all the partners engaged in the 
process. To facilitate this process, it is recommended that a standing Planetary Protection Advisory 
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Committee (PPAC) be appointed in the United States to provide input to the Planetary Protection 
Officer and that a similar standing committee (Planetary Protection Committee, PPC) be appointed in 
France as tentatively planned. 
Standing joint (French and US.) working committees or specialized expert panels should be 
appointed with appropriate expertise to provide support and advice to the United States PPAC and 
French PPC in each of three specific areas: technical processes, scientific procedures, and 
safetylbiosafety issues. To provide the highest level of support to the process, these groups should 
be individual panels comprised of members with expertise in a particular area of concern. individual 
experts should be limited to a single panel. The overall membership of the committees and expert 
panels should meet the specific needs of the Agencies and should represent the scientific goals of 
the Agencies and the external science communities. Their work should aim at providing the 
respective agencies with information essential to the success and safety of the Mars sample return 
missions. These panels and committees may function jointly or independently depending on the 
specific need. 
The PPAC and French PPC will receive the annual reports of the three panels, which will also provide 
annual written reviews to the NASA Planetary Protection Officer and, in France, to the appropriate 
Minister to whom the committee reports. These reviews should include relevant operational issues 
and concerns and provide risk assessments of the technical processes, scientific procedures, and 
safetylbiosafety plans and processes. These reviews should be made available to scientific and 
professional organizations with interests in the mission activities. 
'Communications: Unusual or unprecedented scientific activities are often subject to extreme scrutiny 
at both the scientific and political levels. Therefore a communication plan must be developed as early 
as possible to minimize the dissemination of misinformation and to provide the highest level of public 
assurance about the issues addressed by the mission. Communications should clearly inform about 
the extensive efforts to protect the environment, health and safety through facility designs, 
procedures, and personnel training. This information on risk management and planetary protection 
should be balanced with education/outreach about the anticipated benefits of Mars exploration and 
sample return from the scientific perspective. The communication plan needs to address the concerns 
of both the scientific community and those external stakeholders who will raise valid concerns on 
behalf of the world's population. In order to minimize long-term criticism and concerns, it will be 
important to inform the public openly and honestly about all aspects of the mission in a way that 
provides accurate, timely details about scientific benefits, expectations, risks, and uncertainties. In 
particular, both the public and scientific community should be informed of results during Life Detection 
and Biohazard Testing at appropriate times in the process based on procedures and criteria 
(e.g., level of certainty, consensus or majority, etc.), for determining how observations and data will 
be designated as results suitable for formal announcement. Details about who will be in charge of this 
communication plan and the release of information are TBD. 
Flow Charts and Timelines: In order to assure the rational utilization of both the facilities and sample 
materials, development of appropriate flow charts and time lines will be needed to coordinate the 
complex series of interrelated procedures. Safety issues must be prominent at all significant decision 
points in the process (e.g., release from containment, downgrading to lower level of containment) 
This means that everybody has knowledge of the critical points for these decisions and understands 
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they are not negotiated on the fly. Such flow diagrams are intended to coordinate complex testing and 
inclusion of all required elements especially those concerning biosafety and biohazards leading to the 
sharing of sample material with the external scientific communities. Such flow charts, in addition to 
time lines, procedures and process, should also include key decision points for changing the status of 
the sample to a less restrictive PPL and to proceeding in a particular direction along branches of the 
decision tree. Each such chart should contain an incorporated risk tree and assessment process. 
Workshoos/Reviews: The need to change schedules and procedures may be anticipated during the 
time between now and sample return. To provide assurance that rules exist between the involved 
international partners and the scientific communities, two workshop/reviews should be scheduled 
prior to sample return to Earth in order to reaffirm details about process, methodology, safety and 
release criteria. The first review should be conducted at the conclusion of the facilities design phase 
to determine if the physical structure meets the scientific and safety standards as defined within the 
specifications. In addition, the first workshop should review the existing procedures that will be 
conducted within the facility to confirm the specific flow chart outlining the approved sequence of tests 
and analyses. A second similar workshop/review should occur after the samples have been collected 
on Mars but in advance of their actual return to Earth for evaluation. Details about who should 
coordinate these workshop/reviews and modify schedules or procedures are TBD. 
Preparations and Processes for Decision Makina about Release of Samples: It will be important to 
make advanced preparations for data interpretation and decision making in an organized way. These 
preparations will be especially critical in the event that a distinctly martian life-form is found within the 
returned samples. While it is impossible to develop details of the final protocol at this time, it will be 
crucial to have considered how decisions will be made, by whom, and based on what principles if an 
extraterrestrial life-form is discovered. A specific committee should be established at least a year 
ahead of sample return to develop contingency protocols and processes that will be in place if and 
when a martian life is found and verified. 
It is likely that protocol test results will not lead to unanimous decisions in all instances. it will thus be 
important to have a review and approval infrastructure for handling decisions about whether or not to 
release sample materials from containment, or reduce containment to a lower level, upon completion 
of protocol tests. Addressing the overall decision making process in a formal manner will be critical for 
drawing conclusions, certifying results, and deciding whether samples are releasable or not. Any 
decision to release samples should involve selected multidisciplinary experts and groups, as well as 
an Interagency Committee on Back Contamination (ICBC) similar to the one used during the Apollo 
program. The U.S. PPAC and French PPC should be involved in reporting to relevant bodies in their 
respective countries. Details on the structure(s) associated with decision making are TBD. 
The organizational structures, management plans, charters and reporting lines for many of the 
proposed committees and groups will need to be developed in the coming years. Many questions 
cannot be resolved until additional details on facility design, operational logistics, mission a~chitecture 
or anticipated schedules are made available. 
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WORKSHOP SERIES ASSUMPTIONS 
The Mars Sample Handling Protocol (MSHP) Workshop Series was designed to touch on a variety of 
questions in pursuit of the stated objective, such as: "What typeslcategories of tests 
(e.g., biohazard, Life Detection) should be performed upon the samples? What criteria must be 
satisfied to demonstrate that the samples do not present a biohazard? What constitutes a 
representative sample to be tested? What is the minimum allocation of sample material required for 
analyses exclusive to the Protocol, and what physical/chemical analyses are required to complement 
biochemical or biological screening of sample material? Which analyses must be done within 
containment and which can be accomplished using sterilized material outside of containment? What 
facility capabilities are required to complete the Protocol? What is the minimum amount of time 
required to complete a hazard-determination Protocol? By what process should the Protocol be 
modified to accommodate new technologies that may be brought to practice in the coming years 
(i-e., from the time that a sample receiving facility would be operational through the subsequent return 
of the first martian samples?) 
To keep the Workshops focused, a set of basic assumptions were provided to guide and constrain 
deliberations; these assumptions were: 
1. Regardless of which mission architecture is eventually selected, samples will be returned from 
martian sites which were selected based on findings and data from the Mars Surveyor program 
missions. 
2. Samples will be returned sometime in the next decade. 
3. Samples will not be sterilized prior to return to Earth. 
4. When the Sample Return Canister (SRC) is returned to Earth, it will be opened only in a Sample 
Receiving Facility (SRF) where samples will undergo rigorous testing under containment prior to 
any controlled distribution ('release') for scientific study. 
5. The amount of sample to be returned in a SRC is anticipated to be 500-1000 grams. 
6. The sample will likely be a mixture of types including rock cores, pebbles, soil, and atmospheric 
gases. 
7. The amount of sample used to determine if biohazards are present must be the minimum amount 
necessary. 
8. Samples must be handled and processed in such a way as to prevent terrestrial (chemical or 
biological) contamination. 
9. Strict containment of un-sterilized samples will be maintained until testing for biohazards and Life 
Detection is accomplished. Sub-samples of selected materials may be allowed outside 
containment only if they are sterilized first. 
10. The SRF will have the capability to accomplish effective sterilization of sub-samples as needed. 
11. The SRF will be operational two years before samples are returned to Earth. 
12. The primary objective of the SRF and protocols is to determine whether or not the returned 
samples constitute a threat to the Earth's biosphere and populations (not science study per se) 
and to contain them until this determination is made. 
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WORKSHOP 4 AGENDA 
Day 1: Tuesday 5 June 2001 
Introductions, opening remarks 
Lecture 1 - Summary of Workshops 1,2,2a, and 3 (M. Race) 
Lecture 2 - Results: U.S. NRC Mars 2001 Sample Handling Study (J. Rummel) 
Break 
Lecture 3 - Presentation of Strawman Comprehensive Protocol (Team) 
Objectives of Workshop 4, Sub-group charters, etc. (J. Rummel) 
Lunch 
Sub-group deliberations 
Sub-group 1 - Review, assess, and adjust protocol for sample container 
processing, sample preparation, and physical/chemical analyses 
* Sub-group 2 - Review, assess, and adjust protocol for Life Detection 
Sub-group 3 - Review, assess, and adjust protocol for Biohazard Testing 
Sub-group 4 - Environmental & healthlmonitoring and safety issues 
Adjourn 
Reception 
Day 2: Wednesday 6 June 2001 
Day 1 Sub-groups report out in plenary session (30 min each) (Sub-group Chairs) 
Plenary discussion 1 - Problems and issues associated with integrated protocol 
Day 2 Sub-group charters (J. Rumrnel) 
Lunch 
Sub-group deliberations 
* Sub-group 5 - Requirements of protocol for facilities, equipment 
Sub-group 6 - Contingency planning for different protocol outcomes 
- Sub-group 7 - Personnel management considerations in protocol implementation 
* Sub-group 8 - Protocol implementation process and update concepts 
Adjourn 
Day 3: Thursday 7 June 2001 
Day 2 Sub-groups report out in plenary session (30 min each) (Sub-group Chairs) 
Plenary discussion 2 - Research required needed to implement current protocol 
Plenary discussion 3 - Review processlOpen issuesllmplementation status 
Lunch 
Plenary discussion 4 - Research areas for protocol improvement in interim 
Open items, discussion, assignments review 
Adjourn 
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judith.h.allton@jsc.nasa.gov 
Dr. Jeff Bada 
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University of California 
at San Diego 
La Jolla CA 92093-0212 
USA 
tel# 858-534-4258 
fax# 858-534-2674 
jbada@ucsd.edu 
Dr. John R. Battista 
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Louisiana State University 
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IAS 
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APPENDIX E 
OVERVIEW LECTURES 
Summary of MSHP Workshops 1,2,2a, and 3 
Margaret S. Race, SETI Institute 
MSHP Workshop #4: Lecture 1 
June 5,2001 - Arlington, VA 
Summary of  MSHP Workshops 1-3 and 
Sterilization Workshop 
Margaret 5. Race 
SEE Institute 
Overview of Workshop Series 
- WS 1: Bethesda, MD March 2000 
- Framing; Nature of Samples; Prelim. P-C, LD & BH tests 
WS 2: Bethesda, MD October 2000 
- I D  & Prioritization of Candidate Tests; BH emphasis 
* WS 2a: Arlington, VA November 2000 
- Sterilization 
WS 3: San Diego, CA March 2001 
- Unifying Properties of Life; Specific Methods 
WS 4: Arlington, VA June 2001 
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WS 1: Bethesda, MD March 2000 
Framing; Nature  of Samples; Prelim. P-C, LD & BH tests 
SGI: Prelim. Sample Characteriz. Requirements (Maximize SCI. Info) 
- SG 2 & 4: Sub-Samples; Prelim. P-C Analyses Flow Chart 
- 5-step process: removal; characterization; splitting; tests; release 
- emphasize non-destructive; minimal amount for tests 
SG 3: Sequence and Types of Tests (End to End); ResultsICriteria 
- Biohazard Assessment and Clearance; Link with LD and PC tests 
- Carbon Assumption; emphasize Replicating Entities as well as Toxicity 
- Sequence of Questions & Strategy (structures; chemical;replication;adverse 
* SG 5: Prelim. Life Detection Tests 
- Gas, Fines, Pebbles, Cores (Non Destructive Scans vs Particle Sorting) 
- Combustion analyses & Mass Spec.- Complex molecules 
- Positive sorts- Microscopy, PCR, LAL, culture etc. 
SG 6: Prelim. Biohazard Tests- Both in vitro and in vivo 
- Combination of Cell and Tissue cultures; Established model systems 
- Varied responses (phenotypic; host gene expression; ecolog. microcosms 
I D  & Pr ior i t izat ion of Candidate Tests; BH emphasis 
* Life Detection Sub Group 
- Non-Destructive (IR & Fluorescence Micro-spectroscopy; Light 
Microscopy; Head Gas analysis.; LDIMS & Laser Raman; 3D Tomography 
- Destructive (GCIMS; Extraction; Flow Cytometry; Cultures (terrestrial and 
'martian' conditions);GCIMS; LCIMS; Enzyme Amplification techniques 
* Biohazard Sub Groups (2) 
- Pathway to Decontainment; Multiple Models & Readouts; Passaging 
- Classes & Exs of Models: Verify containment materials; direct culture; 
cellular, small organisms,whole organisms, ecol. microcosms; monitor 
personnel etc. (plants, insects, microbes, mouse,human,ecosyst.) 
Physical-Chemical Tests Sub Group 
- Initial: Appearance, mass, major element comp; sample separation 
- Detailed: major/minor/trace element comp.; mineral comp; 
inorganiclorganic carbon abundances 
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WS 2: (continued) 
ID & Prioritization of Candidate Tests; BH emphasis 
* Molecular Biological Tests Sub Group 
- No major role in martian LD per se- only false positives, 
background contamination levels & deleterious effects on terrestrial 
organisms. (DNA damage, gene express, altered gene expression 
- Actual tests TBD; Focus on Mars simulants as positive controls 
* Organism- & Cellular Based Tests Sub Group 
- Outlined PPL designations (BSL plus cleanliness conditions) 
- Outlined important lab design concerns 
- Initial Testing (Human health emphasis): Human cell lines; mouse 
cells & microbial systems 
- Subsequent Tests- reduced containment level if earlier tests 
negative- (environmental emphasis) additional BH and geophysical 
WS 2a: Arlington, VA November 2000 
Sterilization 
* Terrestrial Extremophiles as Models of how martian life might 
resist sterilization? Yes 
Worst Case Scenario for Sterilizing Martian Samples? 
- Infectious agent; remain in BSL-4 containment 
* Best Methods & Procedures to Preserve Sample Integrity 
- No Ideal Method-Combination of heat and radiation methods 
* If No Carbon or Polymers, Is sterilization required prior to 
distribution outside containment? 
- If no life or hazard detected, then OK to distribute wlo sterilization 
* Can martian samples be safely distributed before LD, BH and 
other tests are completed? 
- Yes- decreasing levels of sterilization as data accumulated & interpreted. 
* Can Martian Meteorites serves as models to test sterilization. 
procedures and effectiveness? Yes- but after test development 
on terrestrial analogs 
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WS 2a: Sterilization (continued) 
* What are effective sterilization methods for martian samples? 
- 3A: Strictest level: Radiationldry heat using virus based model (20X 
European Pharmacopoeia @ 120 degrees C) 
- 3B: Combination of Gamma ray or high-energy electron exposure plus 
simultaneous dry heat(Exposures & Temps. TBD- likely >IOMrad and >95 
Supplements to 3B: 
- Life based on Silicon Polymers 
- Sterilization by Ionizing Radiation 
W 3: San biego, CA March 2001 
Unifying Properties ; Specific Methods 
* Unifying Properties of Life 
- Life = catalytic, genetic, replicates/evolves (measurable) 
- Avoid earth-centric approaches (yet method must recognize Earth life) 
- Focus on complexity, energy flow, oddities 
- Emphasize structural signs as first order task 
- Must recognize by multiple methodslsigns, iterative approach 
- Inactive or past life treated as potentially active 
- Generalize carbon-centered methodology to other chem. species 
Morphological Organization & Chemical Properties 
- Assumptions about life based on Earth life 
- Possible Biosignatures of ET life: Microscopic morphology, 
structural chemistry; metabolism and bioenergetics; isotope 
signatures (distinctive fractionation);biologically induced geochem. 
- Recommended research areas: detection methods; enumerate 
cells and biomass; growth rates; metabolic activity, enzymatic 
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WS 3: San Diego, CAMarch 2001 
Unifying Properties ; Specific Methods 
Geochemical & Geophysical Properties (for subsample selection) 
- Delineated Specific Properties and Criteria for all sample 
types:Gas; Head Space Gas; Bulk Fines; Rocks Fragments; Rock 
Cores; Soil Cores 
Chemical Methods (to detect low biomass or dormant martian life) 
- Detailed Flow charts & Protocol 
- (basic mineralogy; sub-micron morphology; inventory of biological 
elements; organic characterization) 
- Considered non-Carbon based life also 
* Cell Biology Methods 
- Search for Complexity using strategic approach & multiple algorithms 
- Also Considered Non-Carbon Based Life 
- Specific Cell Biology Methods, Controls & Equipment Discussed 
WS 3: San Diego, CA March 2001 
Unifying Properties ; Specific Methods 
a What if ET Life is Detected? (Plenary Discussion) 
- Science and Testing Issues (related to Protocol) 
- Facility and Technological Concerns (adequacy) 
- Policy and Administrative Concerns (risk communication; 
distribution; legal etc) 
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Report on the U.S. NRC Mars 2001 Sample Handling Study 
John D. Rummel, NASA Headquarters 
Report On: 
The Quarantine and Certi$cation of Martian 
US National Research Council 
Space Studies Board 
Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration 
John A. Wood 
Chair 
May 2001 
h Institute of Infectious 
Kenneth Jezek, Ohio State University 
Karen J. Meech, University of Hawaii 
Michael Mendillo, Boston University 
John Mustard, Brown University 
Keith S. Noll, Space Telescope Science lnstitute 
David A. Paige, University of California, Los Angeles 
J. William Schopf, University of California, Los Angeles 
Everett Shock. Washington University 
Ann L Sprague, University of Arizona 
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that must be satisfied before samples can be 
techniques for isolating and handling planetary 
g their content of biota (if any), and carrying out 
basic geochemical characterization studies in the certification facility? 
P How much capability for scientific analysis beyond that required for 
biosafety certification should be incorporated into the facility, and what 
principles should govem the utilization of this scientific capability? 
TO what extent can valuable lessons be learned from the Apollo 
quarantine experience and from recent developments in the 
biotechnology and biomedical communities? 
subsample will provide an invaluable baseline. Samples in which 
organic carbon is below gC/g are unlikely to contain 
. '....Essentially all our attention will be paid to organisms, largely 
ignoring viruses, viroids, prions, or other possible biohazards." 
First, the samples might contain biological materials that are similar to 
those found on Earth. In this case, all four categories of infectious agents 
are of concern, but then the means of sterilizing the samples are well 
understood. 
The second possibility is a lie-fonn that is significantly different from 
terrestrial life. In this case, viruses and viroids could not replicate in 
terrestrial organisms, because of their reliance on a gene expression 
system different from that on the Earth. 
..It is apt to be easier to detect organisms ortheir traces than to detect 
these other agents. 
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e capabilities within the 
microscopy and most other 
out on sterilized samples 
Of course, this assumes the sterilization procedure would not destroy 
morphological evidence of life. 
There is a need to establish the effects of sterilization methods on 
microscopic morphological evidence of life. 
n In all of these cases, viability, or even cellular structure, is not required. 
3, Molecules whose presence can be taken as evidence of life are proteins. 
DNA RNA, straight-chain fatty acids, and a variety of other lipids. 
. A critical part of life detection in martian samples will be the ability to 
assess whether the source is extraterrestrial or terrestrial. 
Detection of Life; Biohazards 
Life Detection Experiments 
and microbial, seems certain to be a time-consuming, needle-in-a- 
haystack hunt 
$8 The f im task should be to identify the haystack: to detect and profile the 
distribution of carbonaceous (lorganic")matter in a representative subset 
of the total sample. 
. The search for organic carbon should be accomplished early during 
sample processing, by su~ey ing  a sterilized representative subset of 
the sample outside of the Quarantine Facility. 
Such a survey will require use of extensive laboratory facilities that are 
stringently clean both of biological and organic terrestrial contaminants. 
- To constitute Strong evidence, evidence of earlier like must meet the tests 
of Indigenousness and Biogenicity. 
. While the techniques described [here] can demonstrate or suggest the 
presence of life in martian samples, none of them can conclusively 
prove the ab~enc8 of life. 
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Protocol 
prior to introduction of the Man samples; 
w Place samples in the facility; 
Inventory and cany out preliminary analyses of the samples; 
Search for evidence of biological activity; 
Assess whether the samples contain biohazardous material; 
Sterilize aliquots of the samples in preparation for their removal from the 
3, Remove samples from the facility; and 
a Store samples within the facility. 
Recommendation: 
. If unmistakable evidence of life as we know it is found in the Mars 
samples, they should be dedicated to biological studies. Studies of 
the biosignatures in them should be minimal until an optimal study 
plan has been developed, and an appropriate research facility set up 
and staffed. In the interim, no aliquots of the samples should be 
released from the confines of the Quarantine Facility unless warranted 
by ongoing biological studies, and the samples are sterilized. 
w In this report the word life, when used in the context of martian life, 
should always be understood to mean 'Life as we know it," to allow for 
evidence of past or present biological activity, release of unsterilized 
aliquots of the samples for study beyond the confines of the 
Quarantine Facility is jutiiied. 
. If the samples contain evidence of life, or if evidence of life is 
equivocal (e.g., organic matter is present), aliquots that have been 
sterilized by heat andlor gamma radiation to levels more than 
adequate to kill any known terrestrial organism can be certified for 
release from the Quarantine Facility. 
. If the samples contain evidence of life, or if evidence of life is 
equivocal, removal of unsterilized aliquots from the Quarantine Facility 
for transfer to approved containment facilities elsewhere should not be 
excluded, on the condition that containers and transfer procedures 
conform to protocols established by a panel of experts (e.g., from the 
Center for Disease Control) in containment 
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Recommendation: 
. In the likely event that initial examination of the Mars samples can 
neither prove nor definitively rule out evidence of life in them, plans 
should be in place to promptly sterilize aliquots of the samples and 
remove them from the Quarantine Facility for biological and 
geochemical studies in specialized laboratories elsewhere. This 
action should not be deferred pending some hypothetical future 
resolution of the question of whether the samples contain life or 
artifacts of life. 
Schematic Representation 
efficacy of supercritical fluids and commonly used organic solvents in 
killing organisms. It is highly desirable to be able to remove solvent 
extracts from quarantine without the damage to dissolved biomarker 
compounds that would be caused by heat or ionizing radiation. 
Sterilization probably is systematically achieved by the supercritical 
fluids used in making extracts, but this needs to be verified before 
extracts can be removed from the Quarantine Facility. 
. A program of research should be initiated to determine the effects on 
organic compounds in rocky matrices, and also on microscopic 
morphological evidence of life, of varying degrees of sterilization by heat 
and by gamma irradiation. This research should be stated well in 
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Recommendation: 
. All samples in the initial collection returned from Mars should be 
placed in a Quarantine Facility in the United States, at least until the 
preliminary examination of the samples has been completed. 
Management and operation of the Quarantine Facility should be 
shared between the U.S. and major international partners who 
participated in the collection of martian samples. 
repackaging, and storage. (In addition, certain lifedetection studies 
which cannot be made on sterilized samples will have to be carried out 
in the Quarantine Facility.) To try and bring other scientific studies with 
bulky, complex instrumentation into the containment facility, along with 
the personnel that conduct the studies, would unacceptably increase the 
complexity, cost, and potential for failure of the facility. 
Recommendation: 
. The Quarantine Facility should be designed to the smallest and 
simplest possible scale consistent with its role as a biological 
containment and clean room facility. No scientific investigations 
should be carried out in the Quarantine Facility that can be executed 
on sterilized samples outside of the facility. 
. A major obstacle to design of a Quarantine Facility is the problem of 
combining biological containment with clean room conditions. It is 
essential that work on the solution of this problem be started 
immediately, to include mockups of containmenticlean room 
combinations whose efficacy can be tested, so the design of a 
Quarantine Facility can proceed. 
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1. Institutional support. A collaborative agreement with the host institution would mean the 
M m  Facility could draw on the latter for personnel, training, eqwrience, security, and 
speciediied utilities. 
2. Economy. Sharing the resources named under 1. should effect a large economy in 
operation of the Mars Quarantine Facility. 
3. Environmental Impact. Clearing an Environmental Impact Statement for a BSL-4 facility 
can take years. Ideally, the Mars Facility would operate under the Environmental 
impact Statement of its host institution. 
Recommendation: 
. The Mars Quarantine Facility should be affiliated with an ongoing 
Recommendation: 
. It is imperative that planning and construction of the Mars 
Quarantine Facility be begun at least 7 years in advance of the 
anticipated return of Mars samples. This responsibility cannot be 
deferred without compromising the quarantine and study of the Mars 
at the design forthe Mars Quarantine Facility b 
as possible, consistent with the facility's mission of protecting Eart 
environment and the samples. Although it may be feasible to store the samples 
at low temperatures, an effort to try to maintain a Mars environment 
(temperature. pressure) during sample handling would complicate the design and 
operation of the facility to a very large degree, probably unnecessarily, and it 
should not be attempted for the first Mars sample retum. 
Recommendatlon: 
. A continuing committee of senior biological and geochemical scientists that 
includes appropriate international representation should be foned, and charged 
with reviewing every step of the planning, construction. and employment of the 
Mars Quarantine (and initial sample handling) Facility. The committee should be 
formed during the earliest stages of planning of a Mars sample retum mission. 
Members of the committee should also participate in the design of the spacecraft 
and those portions of the mission profile where biological contamination is a 
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of Mars: Issues and Recommendations, 
NASA on measures to protect Mars from 
rganisms, as well as overall policy 
en Nealson, Chair) 
. Mars Sample Return: Issues and Recommendations, which 
reported advice to NASA on Mars sample return missions 
(Ken Nealson, Chair). 
martian surface, unless life-detection is a goal. 
. New technologies to detect life are important and should be adopted 
to measure spacecraft bioload. 
. "The Task Group strongly recommends that a sequence of unpiloted 
missions to Mars be undertaken well in advance of a piloted 
. 'Missions carrying humans to Mars will contaminate the planet.. .The 
issues of forward and back contamination have societal, legal, and 
international implications. These implications are serious, and they 
desenre discussion and attention." 
sample and spacecraft should either be sterilized in space or not 
returned to Earth 
. Integrity of sample containment should be maintained through 
reentry and transfer to a receiving facility 
. Controlled distribution of unsterilized materials should only occur 
if analyses determine the sample not to contain a biological 
. Planetary protection measures adopted for the first sample 
return should not be relaxed for subsequent missions without 
thorough scientific review and concurrence by an appropriate 
independent body 
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. A panel of experts, including representatives of relevant governmental and 
scientific bodies. should be established as soon as possible once serious 
planning for a Mars sample-return mission has begun, to coordinate 
regulatory responsibilities and to advise NASA on the implementation of 
planetary protection measures for sample-return missions. 
. An administrative structure should be established within NASA to verify and 
certify adherence to planetary protection requirements at each critical stage 
of a sample-retum mission, including launch, reentry, and sample 
d samples with or 
id the possibility that terrestrial 
matter in general could 
inadvertently be incorporated into sample material returned from Mars. 
Contamination with terrestrial material would compromise the integrity 
of the sample by adding confusing background to potential discoveries 
related to extinct or extant life on Ma rs.... Because the detection of life 
or evidence of prebiotic chemistry is a key objective of Mars 
exploration, considerable effort to avoid such contamination is justified." 
. In-flight steri l i t ion 
. Sample handling and preservation 
. Ensuring sample containment 
. Avoiding return of uncontained martian material 
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Ovellbiew of Draft Protocol and Workshop 4 Objectives & Sub-Groups 
John D. Rummel, NASA Headquarters 
orkshop to Finalize a 
Mars Sample Handling 
John D. R m e l  
NASA Headquarters 
Goal -- Life: Determine if life ever arose on Mars 
Determine if life exists today 
Determine if life existed on Mars in the past 
Assess the extent of prebiotic organic chemical evolution on Mars 
Goal -- Climate 
Characterize Mars's present climate and climate processes 
Characterize Mars's ancient climate 
Determine the geological processes that have resulted in formation of the 
Marian crust and surface 
Characterize the structure, dynamics and history of Mars interior 
Goal -- Prepare for Human Exploration 
Acquire Martian environmental data set (such as radiation) 
Conduct in-situ engineeringlscience demonstration 
Emplace infrastructure for future missions 
.Mars Smrtplp HaxdIinx Protocol I~Vorkshop Srries Worklzoa 4 Fz~rnI Rwo.: 
MnrLs: A Sysferns Science -4pproacli @% 
Lt'orkshoo 4 Final Report Mars Sample Elandizn~ Protocol Worbhop Serw 
Rime Missioc: A?ri! '98 - Frb. '01 
Extcuded $fission Just Begun!! 
,%r,,;ov !,,slr",,!,~,,,t 
i a c r  Alcimclc: (MOLA. 
Mars Samplr Handizng Protocol Workshop Srrzts 
-- -- - -- 
Workshop 4 Ftnn! Repori 
--- - - - 
ScientiGc Reconnaissance as a Pathfinder to Where to Investigate 
MER: Validate MGSIC~W~Y data. 
J, oxplam Iprvmining slba 
Em~nple Vision .for 2012-2020 
Respond to discoveries in previous decade. 
Expand surface access to: 
Nawork science 
Near subwfcdce H,O (lo 200rn) 
+ Deep Subsurf.dcc (>20Orn) 
Wigh latitudes. 
Multiple Mars Sample Return missions 
Long-term virtual presence for public engagement 
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"The conduct of scientific investigations of possible 
extraterrestrial life forms, precursors, and remnants must not 
be jeopardized. In addition, the Earth must be protected from 
the potential hazard posed by extraterresmal matter carried by 
a spacecraft returning from another planet or other 
extraterrestrial sources. Therefore, for certain space- 
missionltarget-planet combinations, controls on organic and 
biological contamination carried by spacecraft shall be 
imposed in accordance with directives implementing this 
Biological Contamination of Mars: Issues and 
Recommendations, which reported advice to NASA on 
measures to protect Mars from contamination by Earth 
organisms, as well as overall policy guidance 
(Kenneth Nealson, Chair) 
Mars Sample Return: Issues and Recommendations, which 
reported advice to NASA on Mars sample return missions 
(Kenneth Nealson, Chair). 
Contamirzation of Mars (1992, 
* Full "Viking-Level" sterilization is not required for missions to 
the martian surface, unless life-detection is a goal. 
New technologies to detect life are important and should be 
adopted to measure spacecraft bioload. 
"The Task Group strongly recommends that a sequence of 
unpiloted missions to Mars be undertaken well in advance of a 
piloted mission. " 
"Missions canying humans to Mars will contaminate the 
lanet.. .The issues of forward and back contamination have 
ons are serious, and they deserve discussion and . 
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Mars Sample Return (1997) 
Samples returned from Mars should be contained and treated as 
though potentially hazardous until proven otherwise 
If sample containment cannot be verified en route to Earth, the 
sample and spacecraft should either be sterilized in space or not 
returned to Earth 
* Integrity of sample containment should be maintained through 
reentry and transfer to a receiving facility 
- Controlled distribution of unsterilized materials should only 
occur if analyses determine the sample not to contain a 
Planetary protection measures adopted for the first sample 
return should not be relaxed for subsequent missions without 
thorough scientific review and concurrence by an appropriate 
Protocol Development Workshops 
Plan: A series of workshops have been organized by NASA, with 
CNES participation, to assess the requirements for sample hazard 
testing and subsequent release, specify the tests necessary to 
show that a biological hazard is not present in the sample, and 
safeguard the samples against the various threats to its purity 
caused by the Earth's environment. 
For returned martian samples develop a requirements and 
recommended list of comprehensive tests, and their sequential 
order, that will be performed to fulfill the NRC recommendation 
that "rigorous analyses determine that the materials do not 
contain a biological hazard," taking into account the further 
recommendation that "returned samples should be considered 
Organizing committee, Co-chaired by NASA Planetary 
Protection Officer (with CNES participation) 
Senior-Level Oversight and Review Group (25 people) who 
advise the organizing committee on the planning, organization, 
participants, and conduct of the workshops (US and France) 
- Chosen for their abilities to address key scientific, biohazard evaluation 
and quarantine protocol issues associated with handling, characterizing, 
testing, and judging whether returned sample materials are in any way 
biohazardous and when and whether they may be certified for 
controlled distribution outside containment and quarantine 
- Will provide peer review of the requirements & draft protocol, prior to 
its release for external review by appropriate groups outside of NASA 
Participants (by invitation) 
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Planning for Sample Hazard Analysis I I ~  Progress, a I Questions for Protocol Development Workshops I 
Consider: 
What criteria must be satisfied to demonstrate that the samples do not present a 
biohazard? 
- What will constitute a representative sample to be tested? 
What is the minimum allocation of sample material required for analyses 
exclusive to the protocol, and what physical/chemical analyses are required to 
complement biochemical or biological screening of sample material? 
Which analyses must be done within containment, and which can be 
accomplished using sterilized material outside of containment? 
What facility capabilities are required to complete the protocol? What is the 
minimum amount of time required to complete the protocol? How are these 
estimates likely to be affected by technologies brought to practice by 2012? 
Questions/lssues: Final Wovkshop 
Integrate the detailed methodologies for biohazard determination and life 
detection into a recommended protocol and timeline. 
Assess how the recommended analyses will satisfy the criteria for release of 
samples from containment. 
How will advances in methodsftechnologies in the coming years be 
incorporated into the recommended protocol? How will the protocol be 
amended in the future up to the receipt of samples? How will this process be 
overseenlreviewed by Planetary Protection? 
What considerations of facilities, equipment, and personnel are important for 
implementing the recommended protocol? 
Develop outline of findings and recommendations for final repon. 
Planning for Sample Hazard Analysis ( ~ n  ~ro~eress)  @ 
Workshops, Finishing June 2001 
Protocol layout; Biohazard Determination: Sample Sterilization; Life 
Detection; Protocol Finalized 
Includes health and environmental monitoring and updating procedures 
Post-Workshop Tasks 
Preparation of overall repon and draft protocol details 
Review by Blue-Ribbon Scientific Advisory Panel and revisions 
Submit final document 
Endorsement by NAC 1 PPAC: Parallel review by foreign partners. etc. 
Dissemination of repoxt to relevant audience(s) or Agencies for comment 
Approval by other Agencies, and availability for use in Mars Receiving 
Facility, etc. 
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Oversight and Review Committee 
Joshua Lederberg, PbD. &hair Vacant 
Rockefeller University 
H"nrich D. Holland. P1I.D. Roben M. Wrlkrr. Ph.D. 
Jams R Arnold. Ph.D. H m x d  Unlverstty Washington Univcrssty in St. Louis 
Univsnity ofC3Jifornr3. S m  Diego Stuart A. KuuKnun. M.D. JubDid ic r  Vimccnl. Ph.D. 
Purndl W. Choppin. M.D. Bior Group LP Director. L'lnstitut AIfrcd Frrsard 
Haward H u g h  Medied Instztu~~ Roben W. MeKimey. Ph.D. Apallo h P 1 m t 1 q  Prr,,ion 
Dominiquc Dormont. M.D. National Instttuts of H d h  Consdronc 
CEA - Servee dr Nsurov~rologic Florukl  G. Mullick. M.D. John R. Bagby. Ph.D. 
Anthony S. Fauci. M.D. A m d  Farss Inscimlc of P a d o g y  cx~CDCDePutY Director 
Naoond Institules of H d l h  Robu t  Naqua. P1I.D. Hismrrcal Cmsulrwr: 
N i i  V. Fnloroff, Ph.D. bsumt ~r \wn f  Stcvcn J. Dick. Ph.D. 
Ihr PmnnsylvmiaSwlcUnivmty ~ i t k n s .  Omcnn, M.D., p h . ~ .  US. Navd Observatory 
Pahicir N. Fultr. Ph.D. University of Midugm NASA Adminirlrolor'r tinison: 
University of Alab- L-lib Orzrl. Ph.D Kulhic L. OLuor. Ph.D. 
John E. Hobbic. Ph.D. Ths Salk lnslttvle for Biological Slu&cr NASA "wdquurmn 
Mmne Biologjul I^ zbar3(oly Mury June Osborn. Ph.D. Erccuivc Sccrclary: 
Lynn Goldmsn. M.D. Unxvmity of Connecticut Hwlh  Center JOhD.Runud. Ph.D. 
Johns Hophns Sfhml of Public Lucy S. Tompkim. P1I.D. Office of S p x r  Science 
Skinford Unrversity Msdical Cmler NASA Hwdqumrrr 
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MARS SAMPLE HANDLING PROTOCOL WORKSHOP 4 
SUB-GROUP CHARTERS & MEMBERS 
Sub-Group 1 Charter: 
Review, assess, and adjust protocol for sample container processing, sample preparation, and 
physical/chemical analyses: Does the protocol adequately provide for planetary protection 
containment*, handling, and analysis requirements to protect the Earth, as well as for the 
requirements to ensure the scientific value of the sample? Can data about the sample be provided 
in a timely fashion to support the life-detection and biohazard determination steps of the protocol, 
as well as to support sample preservation and curation considerations? Which analyses need to be 
done in containment either within the primary containment facility or outside of containment using 
sealed containers? Which analyses can be done outside of containment on samples subjected to a 
sterilizing process, involving heat, radiation, etc., or a combination of these agents, to ensure they 
are safe for analyses outside of containment? 
Treiman, Alan H. (US Co-Chairperson) Edelson, Martin C. 
Counil, Jean-Louis (French Co-Chairperson) Garvin, James 
Holland, Heinrich D. 
Allton, Judith H. Johnson, Dale W. 
Bibring, Jean-Pierre Manhes, Gerard 
Collins, Mary E. Mills, Aaron L. 
DeVincenzi, Donald 
Sub-Group 2 Charter: 
Review, assess, and adjust protocol for Life Detection: Are data available from the first-tier 
physical/chemical analyses to support further analyses for Life Detection? Can the protocol be 
expected to yield evidence of living organisms within a martian sample? Can Earth organisms that 
might contaminate the sample be detected and identified as such? Can the protocol enable the 
detection of life-forms which are not based on Earth-biochemistry, but which have an active 
metabolism? Which analyses need to be done in containment either within the primary containment 
facility or outside of containment using sealed containers? Which analyses can be done outside of 
containment on samples subjected to to a sterilizing process, involving heat, radiation, etc., or a 
combination of these agents, to ensure they are safe for analyses outside of containment? 
Relman, David A. (US Co-Chairperson) Lambert, Joseph 6. 
Mustin, Christian (French Co-Chairperson) Maurel, Marie-Christine 
Bada, Jeffrey L. Sogin, Mitchell L. 
Clemett, Simon J. Stabekis, Pericles D. 
Voet, Donald 
Friedmann, E. lmre Wainwright, Norman . 
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MARS SAMPLE HANDLING PROTOCOL WORKSHOP 4 
SUB-GROUP CHARTERS & MEMBERS (cont.) 
Sub-Group 3 Charter: 
Review, assess, and adjust protocol for Biohazard Testing: Are data available from the first-tier 
physicallchemical analyses to support the analyses for infectivitylbiohazard (especially the 
presence of toxic materials)? Can the protocol be expected to yield sufficient evidence to rule-out 
any reasonable doubt over the absence of biohazard in the samples? Will the protocol allow for a 
broad-spectrum of challenges with the sample material that can reasonably be expected to show 
a response if the sample displays infectivity or a similar biohazard? Can the protocol results 
provide indications of the potential for chronic effects that should be assessed separately? Can 
Earth organisms that might contaminate the sample be detected and identified as such if a 
biohazard is detected? Which analyses need to be done in the primary containment facility, and 
which canlshould be done outside of the primary containment facility using samples selected and 
shipped to another containment laboratory or kept in sealed containers? 
Richmond, Jonathan (US Co-Chairperson) Grange, Jacques 
Sourdive, David J.D. (French Co-Chairperson) Khan, Ali S. 
Battista, John Malling, Heinrick 
Bielitzki, Joseph McSweegan, Edward 
Chamberlain, Virginia Pardee, Arthur B. 
Fishbein, William N. Schad, Jack 
Foster, Virginia Stanbridge, Eric J. 
Fultz, Patricia Viso, Michel 
Gabriel, Dean W. 
Sub-Group 4 Charter: 
Environmental and healthlmonitoring and safety issues: What sort of monitoring capabilities both 
within and outside of the containment area should be required to ensure the health and safety of 
the human workers in the primary receiving laboratory and any secondary facilities? What sort of 
capabilities should be required to ensure the adequacy of containment* and the safety of the 
environment outside the primary receiving laboratory? If no biohazard is found in the samples, 
and they contain non-biohazardous toxics or radioactive material, what measures to ensure 
safety should be required or recommended for those working with samples that are analyzed 
outside of containment - both in the case of samples subjected to a sterilizing process to ensure 
they are safe for analyses outside of containment, and in the case of samples that have been 
released for scientific study during or after sample recovery? 
Leonard, Debra G.B. (US Co-Chairperson) Giroir, Brett P. 
Cambon-Thomsen, Anne (French Co-Chairperson) Race, Margaret 
Crissman, Harry A. Rummel, John 
Daly, Michael J. Ryan, Margaret 
Debus, Andre Scannon, Patrick J. 
Emmett, Edward Vasil, lndra K. 
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MARS SAMPLE HANDLING PROTOCOL WORKSHOP 4 
SUB-GROUP CHARTERS & MEMBERS (cont.) 
Sub-Group 5 Charter: 
Requirements of protocol for facilities, equipment: What? Where? When? What if [a life-form or 
biohazard is detected]? What are the advantagesldisadvantages of distributing the protocol 
activities among more than one containment facility? What factors should be considered in sizing 
the primary containment facility? What requirements should be met by secondary (PPL-a, BSL-4) 
facilities? Are there any other considerations that should be taken into account in providing a 
facility capability to enact the protocol? 
Khan, Ali S. (US Co-Chairperson) Friedmann, E. lmre 
Bibring, Jean-Pierre (French Co-Chairperson) Garvin, James 
Grange, Jacques 
Battista, John Johnson, Dale W. 
Clemett, Simon J. Malling, Heinrick 
Collins, Mary E. Manhes, Gerard 
Counil, Jean-Louis McSweegan, Edward 
Stabekis, Pericles D. 
Sub-Group 6 Charter: 
Contingency planning for different protocol outcomes: Given the various possible outcomes of 
the different protocol elements, what should be done affinlaround the containment facility(ies) if: 
1) Absolutely no evidence of organic material is found in the sample? 2) The results from the 
protocol (esp. Life DetectionIBiohazard Testing) are contradictory/ inconsistent? 3) A self- 
replicating entity or biomaterial(s), indicative of extant life is discovered within the sample 
materials? 4) That self-replicating entity cannot be shown to represent Earth-contamination. 
Wainwright, Norman (US Co-Chairperson) Holland, Heinrich D. 
Maurel, Marie-Christine (French Co-Chairperson) Lambert, Joseph B. 
Bada, Jeffrey L. Mills, Aaron L. 
Chamberlain, Virginia Mustin, Christian 
Daly, Michael J. Relman, David A. 
Fishbein, William N. Schad, Jack 
Foster, Virginia Stanbridge, Eric J. 
Gabriel, Dean W. Sourdive, David J.D. 
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SUB-GROUP CHARTERS & MEMBERS (cont.) 
Sub-Group 7 Charter: 
Personnel management considerations in protocol implementation: What are the requirements for 
personnel to complete the protocol, as written? When do personnel need to be hired and trained? 
What considerations can be given to the qualifications of required personnel, and the selection 
process by which personnel are chosen to: 1) Conduct the various elements of the protocol? 
2) Provide for the appropriate biosafety considerations and containment at the primary and any 
secondary facilities? and, 3) Conduct any required analyses that are of scientific interest or are 
also necessary to support preservation and curation of the martian samples (e.g., time, 
processing-dependent studies)? What external adviceloversight capabilities should be available to 
support the execution of the sample-handling protocol (e.g., to ensure that the protocol is 
executed according to plan, and that if modifications are necessary they are approved and 
Vasil, lndra K. (US Co-Chairperson) Emmett, Edward 
Viso, Michel (French Co-Chairperson) Giroir, Brett P. 
Allton, Judith H. Leonard, Debra G.B. 
Crissman, Harry A. Richmond, Jonathan 
Debus, Andre Ryan, Margaret 
Edelson, Martin C. Voet, Donald 
Sub-Group 8 Charter: 
Protocol implementation process and update concepts: How should the final review and 
modification of this protocol be conducted? What steps should be taken in gaining approval of the 
final Draft Protocol by national and international bodies important to its 
acceptancelimplementation? How should the Draft Protocol be maintained and after its initial 
approval and promulgation? What steps should be available to the protocol implementers to 
provide for proposed changes in the details andlor framework of the final Draft Protocol once it 
has received initial approval? What process should be followed to reaffirm acceptancelapproval of 
the final protocol to be used for the actual samples? What regulatory steps (if any) should be 
taken to certify the samples are safe for release from containment after the protocol is completed? 
Bielitzki, Joseph (US Co-Chairperson) Race, Margaret 
Cambon-Thomsen, Anne (French Co-Chairperson) Rummel, John 
DeVincenzi, Donald Scannon, Patrick J. 
Fultz, Patricia Sogin, Mitchell L. 
Korwek, Edward Treiman, Alan H. 
Pardee, Arthur B. 
"Floaters" (Attendees who will be observing the Sub-Group deliberations): 
Acevedo, Sara E. Lindstrom, David 
Briggs, Geoffrey Papanastassiou, Dimitri A. 
Dawson, Sandy Phillips, Mark 
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APPENDIX G 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 
ALH 
ATP 
BFP 
BSL 
CAPTEM 
CCNE 
CDC 
'cleanliness' 
CNES 
CNRS 
COMPLEX 
'coupons' 
Alan Hills (Antarctica) 
Adenosine Triphosphate 
Blue Fluorescent Protein 
Biosafety Level 
Curation and Analysis Planning Team for Extraterrestrial Materials 
"Comite Consultatif National dlEthique pour les Sciences de la Vie et de la 
SantS, CCNE (French) 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.) 
Freedom from biological or chemical contamination 
Centre National dlEtudes Spatiale (French) 
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (French) 
Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration 
Small, regular samples of solid laboratory materials such as plastic 
037 The average radiation dose required to inactivate a live or infectious particle 
DNA 
Eh 
EPST 
EVT 
GCIMS 
GFP 
i.p. 
I R 
Knockout mouse 
L AL 
LCIMS 
LDIBH 
LDlMS 
Mrads 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid 
Oxidation Potential 
Etablissements Publics a Caractere Scientifique (French) 
Experiment Verification Test 
Gas ChromatographlMass Spectrometer 
Green Fluorescent Protein 
High Efficiency Particulate Air (filter) 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee 
Institutional Bio-Safety Committee 
Interagency Committee on Back Contamination 
lntracranially 
lntraperitoneally 
Infrared . 
A mouse that is genetically engineered (both alleles of a critically targeted 
gene are replaced by an inactive allele using homologous recombination) to 
produce a particular designer alteration whereby a specifically targeted gene 
becomes inactivated (or "knocked-out") 
Limulus Amebocyte Lysate 
Liquid ChromatographlMass Spectrometer 
Life DetectionIBiohazard (Testing) 
Laser Desorption Mass Spectroscopy 
Megarads 
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MS 
MSHARP 
MSHP 
MSR 
NAS 
NASA 
NASA-CP 
Nd:YAG 
Nude mouse 
NlH 
NRC 
PAH 
'passaging' 
PIC 
PCR 
PH 
PP 
PPC 
PPAC 
PPL 
PWDP 
'readout' 
'rime splitter' 
RhlA 
'rocklets' 
SClD 
SCID-HU 
'simulant' 
SRC 
SRF 
SSB 
TBC 
TBD 
TEM 
Mass Spectroscopy 
Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel (U.S.) 
Mars Sample Handling Protocol 
Mars Sample Return 
National Academy of Science (U.S.) 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (U.S.) 
NASA Conference Proceedings 
Neodymium-doped:Yttrium Aluminum Garnet (LASER) 
A mouse which lacks a thymus and, therefore, cannot generate 
mature T lymphocytes to mount most types of immune responses 
National Institutes of Health (U.S.) 
National Research Council (U.S.) 
Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon 
A sub-culturing technique 
Physical and Chemical (Testing) 
Polymerase Chain Reaction 
Measure of hydrogen ion concentration (acidity) 
Planetary Protection 
Planetary Protection Committee 
Planetary Protection Advisory Committee 
Planetary Protection Level 
Penultimate Working Draft Protocol 
A measure of potential biohazard effect 
A mechanical separation device used for geological samples 
Ribonucleic Acid 
Millimeter-sized rock fragments 
Severely Compromised lmrnunodeficient (non-human cells, usually mouse) 
Severely Compromised lmrnunodeficient (Human cells) 
Analogue 
Sample Return Canister 
Sample Receiving Facility 
Space Studies Board 
To Be Confirmed 
To Be Determined 
Transmission Electron Microscopy 
TOG Total Organic Carbon 
USAMRllD U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases 
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 
UV Ultraviolet 
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WHO World Health Organization 
'witness plates' Controls for forward contamination; used to monitor for bioload on spacecraft 
XRD X-ray Diffraction 
XRF X-ray Fluorescence (Spectrometer) 
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